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Abstract
Part 1 of the thesis questions the traditional relation model of intentionality.
After fixing reference on the target phenomenon, intentionality, and
explaining my interest in it, I ask what sorts of things intentionality might be
a relation to.

I consider ordinary objects, properties, propositions and

hybrid views, and conclude all make the intentional relation appear rather
mysterious. From there, I move on to examine the relation view’s most
prominent

proponents,

the

tracking

theorists—pointing

out

some

challenges such views face, and concluding that it might be worthwhile
looking into alternatives to the relation view.

Part 2 asks whether the newly emerging phenomenal intentionality
movement can provide a viable alternative to the relation model of
intentionality.

After focusing on a specific kind of phenomenal

intentionality theory—something I call modificationism—I examine three
such accounts. From there I go on to discuss some common
complaints/challenges these kinds of views face, and consider how they
might be addressed within the modificationist framework.

In Part 3, I address what I call the problem of cognitive contact: how do
our contentful mental states manage to make cognitive contact with the
ordinary objects (e.g. tables and chairs) that they appear to. The problem
is particularly acute for any version of phenomenal intentionality that
denies the relation view, and has been given very little attention in the
literature. I consider how a modificationist might address this problem, and
conclude that though some avenues appear promising, there is
nevertheless a great deal of work to be done if modificationism, and
phenomenal intentionality theory, is to overcome this problem.
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Part 1
Introduction
The focus of Part 1 is the phenomenon of intentionality—the aboutness, or
directedness, that some things, systems, or objects display. In particular, I am
interested in the species of aboutness displayed by minds/mental states.
Traditionally, this phenomenon is thought to be, or involve, a relation
between mental states and the items that such states are, or appear to be,
about, or directed at. In Part 1, I attempt to raise some concerns about this
traditional view. My plan is as follows: In chapter 1, I attempt to distinguish
the kind of intentionality I am interested in from other possible forms of
aboutness. I then describe two different conceptions of intentional content,
and give a description of content that I think is consistent with both.
If we assume that intentionality is indeed some sort of relation between
minds/mental states and distinctly existing things, then two questions arise:
1) What kinds of things does intentionality relate us to? 2) What kind of
relation is intentionality?
Chapter 2 addresses the first question—namely, what kinds of things does
intentionality relate us to. I consider what I take to be some of the most
popular contenders: everyday objects, such as tables, chairs and states of
affairs; and abstract objects, such as propositions and properties. I raise
concerns for both options.
In chapter 3, I set aside the issue of what kinds of things contents are,
assuming a kind of content agnosticism, focusing instead on the most
influential attempts at spelling out the nature of the intentional relation.
These are the tracking based accounts found in the writings of authors such
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as Fodor (1988, 1992), Dretske (1997), and Millikan (2002).

With the

exception of Millikan’s consumer-based theory, tracking theories are almost
unanimously causal. I therefore sort these causal theories according to how
they attempt to supplement the causal relation so as to allow for
misrepresentation.

I consider appeals to normal conditions, natural

selection, learning and asymmetric dependence—all of which face some
concerns.
Part 1 ends with a summary of the results of this foray into what I hereafter
will call intentional relationalism.

My conclusion will be that though

intentional relationalism has been the most widely accepted stance on
intentionality, the concerns raised make a search for an alternative view
understandable.

2

1. Intentionality: Fixing Reference
When you read the words on this page, when you wonder whether spring
will ever come, when you crave extremely hot chicken wings, you are
enjoying mental states that appear to be about, or directed at, things. This
aboutness/directedness is intentionality. This part of the thesis is about the
nature of that phenomenon.

In particular, this chapter asks whether

intentionality is, or consists in, a relation.
Intentionality is sometimes referred to as mental representation. Neither
‘intentionality’ nor ‘representation’ is without its difficulties, nor do the
words themselves appear synonymous: While it sounds acceptable to say
that smoke represents fire, it sounds odd to say that smoke is about fire. In
my view, the distinction between intentionality and representationality is
terminological rather than substantive. All the same, in what follows I will
primarily talk about intentionality when trying to describe the aboutness
that certain mental states exhibit.

1.1 Original/Derived Intentionality
On the other hand, there is an important distinction between two forms of
intentionality,

namely

intrinsic/original

intentionality,

and

derived

intentionality. While this distinction is not uncontroversial,1 I nonetheless
follow a large number of theorists in accepting a real distinction here, and
allowing that there are indeed cases of both derived and original

See (Dennett, 1987, pp. 288-297), who argues that all intentionality is
derived.
1
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intentionality. See, for instance, (Fodor, 1988, pp. 99), (Dretske, 1997, pp. 78), (Searle, 1983).
An extremely helpful way of articulating this distinction can be found in
(Bourget, 2010): Things have derived intentionality when they “have their
contents or representational properties, at least in part in virtue of
intentional states distinct from themselves, or relations to such states
(Bourget, 2010, pp.33).”

Natural language, street signs, and paintings all

count as having derived intentionality in this sense: they are about what they
are about in virtue of intentional states distinct from themselves—namely
our thoughts. 2 On the other hand, some mental states have their
intentionality originally. We do not, for instance, decide (as we do in the case
One problem that emerges for this way of cutting the original/derived distinction is that it
implies that intentional mental states that have their contents in virtue of being related to
other mental states turn out to be derived. If we take holism—the thesis that something is
about what it is about, or means what it means, only relative to the entire (representational)
system of which it is a part—seriously, then it looks like the majority of intentionality is
dervied. Perhaps this is not such a concern: holism is certainly not a unanimous view. Fodor
is a particularly vociferous opponent (see Fodor & Lepore, 1992). However, at the outset, I
do not wish to preclude any theory for merely definitional reasons. On the other hand, I
think Bourget’s way of articulating the distinction accurately distinguishes between different
species of intentionality. For holists, I propose the following: Something has derived
intentionality when it has its aboutness, at least in part, in virtue of the aboutness of things
disitinct from itself. Something has original intentionality if its intentionality is not derived.
How exactly does this amended formulation of the original/derived distinction avoid the
holism problem? Holism can be understood as a thesis about how representational things
get to be about what they are about, rather than a thesis about how things get their
aboutness. One can thus be a holist about what exactly thoughts are about—namely they are
about what they are about in virtue of their relation to the entire representaitonal system—
without denying that said thoughts have their aboutness originally. To be as transperent as
possible: I am not hereby endorsing a view on which the aboutness of some mental state, and
what that state is about, come cleanly apart. For instance, perhaps words get their aboutness
in virtue of our deciding what they are about. What I am saying is that if you accept some
form of holism, you could take the line that there is a real disitnction between a) a mental
state’s aboutness, and b) what it is about, hold that original/derived disitnction concerns
only a) and that holism concerns only b), and thereby save the disitnction from holism or
vice versa. Holists, and anyone else who thinks intentional mental things have their contents
in part because of relations they bear to other intentional things, can follow me this far.
2
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of words) that our thoughts have intentionality: they come, as it were,
prefurnished.
All that being said, I am willing to concede this formulation of the
original/derived distinction, if needs be, and fall back on just citing paradigm
cases. Paradigm things that have derived intentionality are words, street
signs and pictures. Paradigm things that have original intentionality are
mental states. My concern in what follows is original intentionality.

1.2 Introspection and Intentionality
One thing to note about original intentionality is that it is, at least, sometimes
observable. We are often able to notice that our thoughts, perceptions,
memories, desires, and so on, have the aboutness in question. This is good
news, since it allows observation and experience to count among the tools we
can use in our account of this phenomenon (see Mendelovici, 2010, pp. 2-7).
I am not alone in thinking this (see, for instance, Mendelovici, 2010; Kriegel,
2011).3
Of course, the kind of observation appealed to here is a form of introspection,
and introspective accuracy is a controversial topic.4 To forestall worries
here, I note the following: When I silently pick a number between one and
twenty, there are certain features of my thought that are transparent to me.
First, it is clear that my thought, at the very least, purports to have aboutness.
Second, I need only look to my own thoughts to observe which number I
picked. That is, there is a perfectly clear sense in which what number I
picked is transparent to me. It is this kind of introspection, that my proposal
Kriegel offers an extensive argument that our concept of intentionality is experiential
(2011, pp. 3-47).
4 See (Schitzgebel, 2012), (Smithies & Stoljar, 2012).
3
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will appeal to. What is not transparent to me is why, exactly, I chose the
number 19. As I understand it, we are pretty bad at this latter form of
introspection: It might, for instance, turn out that a repressed longing to be
19 again caused me to choose an odd number; and this despite the fact that, if
asked, I might confabulate some story about a mathematical penchant for
primes.

1.3 Intentionality and Content
On the surface, the concept of intentional content might seem clear enough.
Intentional states display the phenomenon of aboutness, and what they are
about is their content. Upon closer inspection, however, things get a bit
muddy. If I ask you what the content of your thought is, it seems like I am
asking you what your thought is about. Or, if I ask you what you are thinking
about, it seems like I am asking you for the content of your thoughts. But how
exactly are we to understand this? On one reading, intentional states are
about their contents. But this seems like an odd way of speaking: My thought
that the grass is green seems to be about the grass, not about this thing called
a content. I find the following kind of answer unhelpful: “in describing what
one’s thought is about, namely the grass, one gives the content of one’s
thought.” Perhaps less confusing, but still slightly cryptic, one might say that
intentional states have contents. It is in virtue of your thought’s being about
the grass that it has the content it does.
What is it then, to have content? One answer here is that content arises in
virtue of a relation—one that holds between mental states and something
else. In virtue of A’s bearing a particular spatial relation to B, A is said to be x
distance from B. But, at least on the present line of thinking, there is not

6

some thing that both A and B are related to—namely this thing called a
distance.5
There is something very intuitive about parts of this view, which goes back as
far as Thomas Reid (Reid, 1983, pp. 129-150).6 More recently, Davidson has
argued against what he calls the “meanings as entities” (contents as things)
view (Davidson, 1967/2001, p. 20).7 Something about the idea that contents
are not things, rings true with me.8 However, the question of whether
contents arise in virtue of being related to things is an additional claim that I
will not endorse so early on. For now, I will just note that there is this view of
content, and that in what follows, I will try to be sensitive to it.
On the other hand, there are several examples that indicate many theorists
have a view of contents on which they are (distinctly existing9) things. Here
is David Pitt:

The contents of mental representations are typically taken to be abstract
objects (properties, relations, propositions, sets, etc.) (Pitt, 2013).
Likewise, Fodor too seems to think contents are things in the relevant sense.
In his canonical formulation of the representational theory of mind, Fodor
writes:

For any organism O, and for any proposition P, there is a relation R and a
mental representation MP such that: MP means (expresses the
Thank you to Rob Stainton for this useful analogy.
Thank you again to Rob Stainton for pointing me in Reid’s direction. It should, however, be
noted that Reid’s attack on Locke is most plausibly taken to be an attack not just on the view
that contents are things, but on the representational theory of mind in general.
7 Davidson is interested in linguistic meaning, not (underived) intentional contents.
8 I discuss this in much further detail in Part 2.
9 This is Mendelovici’s terminology (see her MS, ch. 8)
5
6
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proposition that) P; and O believes that P iff O bears R to MP (Fodor,
1992, p. 16).
Diagrammatically, Fodor’s view can be represented thus:

Mental
Representation

Organism

Proposition

It seems pretty clear what the content is supposed to be here, and that the
mental representation bears the expresses relation to it. In this case, it looks
like the content of the mental representation is the proposition. And as
Fodor is a realist about abstract entities such as propositions,10 it would
seem that he takes intentionality (mental representation) to be a relation to
independently existing things that play the role of contents.
This is important for what follows, since I will be questioning whether or not
intentionality is a relation. The way I propose to go about questioning this
relational view of intentionality is by first examining what kinds of things
intentionality relates us to. And I follow several theorists (Mendelovici,
2010; Pitt, 2009; Kriegel, 2011a,b) in understanding this examination as an
examination of what kinds of things can play the role of contents. If the above
examples are any indication, I think this way of describing things is not too

10

See (Fodor, 1992, pp. 132 n. 6).
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far off base. However, if the reader dislikes this particular way of speaking,
then s/he is free to understand what follows thus: The relational view of
intentionality has it that intentionality is a relation. Relations have relata.
One of the relata in the intentional relation is our mental states. Chapter 2 is
concerned with what exactly the other relatum is.
All that said, I have still not provided even a tentative, reference fixing,
account of content. Along with (Kriegel, 2011, pp. 151-152), and (Pitt, 2009),
I start by noting that among other things, we often invoke or appeal to
content in order to distinguish one intentional state from another. One of the
differences between imagining a Labrador and a Pug is a difference in
content. We might thus approach content by saying that intentional content
is one way that an intentional state differs from another, or something that
distinguishes one intentional state from another. Though rather thin, this
initial way of approaching content is silent about the nature and mechanics of
intentionality. On this view, intentionality could turn out to be essentially a
relation between mental states and distinctly existing items (e.g. ordinary
objects, propositions, property instances) that serve as contents. On such a
view the difference between imagining a Labrador and a Pug would be that in
the former case, one’s intentional state is related to the, e.g., the property of
being a Labrador, and in the latter, the property of being a Pug. On the other
hand, taking content to be one way intentional states can differ is also
compatible with the view that contents are not distinctly existing things. For
instance, quickly and slowly are ways that runnings can differ, but quickly is
not a distinctly existing thing.

1.4 A brief Recap

9

So far, I have explained that my target phenomenon is a species of
intentionality, or aboutness—namely, original intentionality. Something has
original intentionality if its intentionality does not derive from other
intentional things distinct from itself. Words, street signs and pictures fail to
have original intentionality, and therefore fall outside the focus of this thesis.
I have also noted two possible ways of understanding the concept of
intentional content, and provided the reader with two possible ways of
understanding the project of investigating what sorts of things intentionality
relates us to. Finally, I proposed an encompassing conception of intentional
content.
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2: The Objects of Intentionality
Any view that takes intentionality to be a relation between minds and
distinctly existing things is a relation view. Different relation views disagree
about what items play the role of contents; and, depending on the particulars
of the view, there may be a second relation between contents and the things
to which they refer.11 In this chapter, I look at the various options for
specifying the objects to which we are related via intentionality.

2.1 Intentionality and the DR-relation view
Pre-theoretically, intentionality looks like a phenomenon that relates us to
items and states of affairs in the world beyond our skins—most often
everyday items.12 When I say of someone that she often thinks about her
Labrador, Buddy, it looks like I am saying that she often bears a relation to
Buddy. Pre-theoretically then, it looks like when we say X is about Y (where
X is some intentional mental state), the ‘is about’ locution names a relation
between the mental state X and some ordinary object, Y, such as a cup of
coffee or a Labrador.
Because this pre-theoretical view enjoys a strong kinship with direct realist
theories of perception—indeed it is basically direct realism writ large enough
to encompass all forms of intentionality (perceptual, cognitive, etc.)—I will
call it the DR-relation view. The DR-relation view takes intentionality to be
a relation between mental states (or subjects) and everyday items.
I am speaking, of course, about views that take contents to be something like abstract,
perhaps universal, properties.
12 ‘Items’ should be read to mean not only artefacts, but also states of affairs. Thus, Barak
Obama, a coffee cup, and the dog being on the couch all count as items.
11
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Several challenges emerge for what I am calling the DR-relation view:
1) I can think about something that does not exist. Often referred to as
the problem of intentional inexistence (Brentano, 1887/1995), this
worry has probably been around as long as philosophy.

More

recently, the worry has been raised by (Mendelovici, 2010; Kriegel,
2007, 2008, 2011; Crane, 2001).
2) I can think about something under one aspect, or description but not
another.

Lois Lane can hope to see Superman tonight, without

thereby hoping to see Clark Kent (Mendelovici, MS)
3) I can think about indistinct things. (see Mendelovici, MS; Kriegel
2008). I can desire a sloop without desiring any particular sloop
(Quine W. , 1966, pp. 185-186), I can think of a man without thinking
of a man of any particular height (Anscombe, 2002, p. 58), and I
visualize a tiger without visualizing a tiger with a particular number of
stripes (Dennett, 1969/1986, pp. 136-137).13 But I cannot feed an
Anscombian man to a Dennettian tiger while sailing on a Quinean
sloop.
In what follows, I focus on 1) and 2)—though more time will be spent on 1)
since I take it to be the most important.

2.1.1 Intentional Inexistence and the DR-relation View
Above, I said that the DR-relation view takes intentionality to be a relation to
ordinary/everyday objects. Among the ordinary objects I have in mind are
It should be noted here that Quine, Anscombe and Dennett do not raise the above
examples in the context in which I am putting them to use. I use these examples because
they are relatively famous.
13
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tables and chairs, people, and so on. So, the DR-relation view holds that for
me to think about my kitchen table is for me to stand in a relation to my table.
Of course, I doubt very much whether anyone thinks that all intentionality is
a relation to ordinary objects. This would imply, for instance, that I cannot
have thoughts about numbers, which are plausibly taken to be abstract
objects. However, the concerns that I shall discuss below apply equally to
more restricted DR-relation views—ones that take only certain forms of
intentionality to be relations to ordinary objects. For instance, one might hold
that singular thoughts—thoughts about J.K. Rowling, thoughts about your
kitchen table—have these objects as constituents. Or, someone might hold
that all those thoughts that purport to be about ordinary objects are relations
to those ordinary objects.
The problem of intentional inexistence is that I can entertain thoughts about
unicorns, Bigfoot, Pegasus, thestrals, Santa Claus, and so on. If thinking about
something involves being related to it, how can I think about something that
does not exist? In what follows I will focus almost exclusively on the example
of unicorns.

However, for a DR-relation view whose scope covers only

singular thoughts, just replace every instance of ‘unicorn’ with ‘Pegasus’.
A useful way to think about this problem is in terms of an inconsistent triad
of sentences (see Kriegel, 2007, pp. 307-308):
1) I can think about things that do not exist.
2) I cannot be related to something that does not exist.
3) Thinking about something = being related to it.
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The question is how to resolve the inconsistency of the triad. To deny 3)
would be to abandon the DR-relation view, or any other relation view for that
matter. The options for the DR-relation view are thus to deny 1) or 2).
A denial of 1) could take several forms, most of which are vetted and
ultimately rejected in (Kriegel, 2007, pp. 310-311). Considered first is the
view that when we take ourselves to be thinking of unicorns, we are actually
not thinking at all (Kriegel, 2007, p. 310). Though Kriegel finds this view
highly implausible, one might take this line because of other theoretical
commitments. For instance, someone who accepts a purely referentialist
theory of content (see Fodor, 2008), and who accepts semantic externalism
about natural kind concepts (see Putnam, 1975), might argue that ‘unicorn’ is
a natural kind concept whose content is therefore its external world
referent.14 Since no such referent exists, ‘unicorn’ is contentless.

Unicorn

thoughts, on such a view, are not bonafide thoughts at all. Whether or not
such a view is plausible, Kriegel insists that it simply pushes the problem
back:

“…the problem will resurface for the activity of seeming to oneself to be
thinking of something (in the relevant sense of “seeming,” where an
intentional mental state is actually attributed). That is, we can devise a
new inconsistent triad: one can seem-to-think of non-existents; one
cannot bear relations to non-existent; yet seeming-to-think of something
involves (constitutively) a relation to it.” (Kriegel, 2007, p. 310)
One way of denying 1) that Kriegel does not discuss is to argue that when we
seem to ourselves to be thinking about, for instance, unicorns, we are actually

However, see (Kripke, 1972, pp. 156-157) for an argument that ‘unicorn’ cannot be a
natural kind concept.
14
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entertaining a composite thought that bears several relations to distinct
things. In the unicorn case, the things we are related to are horses, and
horned animals.
This composite line has two parts: a) A negative thesis about what we take
ourselves to be thinking of: When we take ourselves to be thinking of
unicorns, we are not thinking of what we take ourselves to be thinking of.
And b), a positive thesis about what we are in fact thinking in such cases:
When we take ourselves to be thinking of unicorns, we are actually thinking
of the composite horses + horned animals. I have concerns about both a) and
b).
A) Appears to imply that there are some thoughts—thoughts that seem to us
to be about unicorns—that are never about what we take them to be about.
As Kriegel points out, any approach that makes such a claim seems to imply a
second-order error theory about intentional states (Kriegel, 2007, p. 310).
While I follow Kriegel in finding such a view highly counter–intuitive, it is an
option. To avoid the counter-intuitiveness, one would have to devise some
principle whereby we could distinguish cases of accurately taking oneself to
be thinking of x, from inaccurate cases, such as taking oneself to be thinking
of y, where y does not exist.
Perhaps this could be done, but the relevant principle would have to
distinguish such cases on grounds other than the existence or lack thereof of
the entities in question. That is, it would seem circular to say that when you
take yourself to be thinking of unicorns, you have to be mistaken (about what
you are thinking about) because unicorns do not exist. Recall that we are
here considering how someone who holds the DR-relation view might deal
with the inconsistent triad of sentences above.
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In particular, we are

considering whether someone might reasonably deny that we can think of
things that do not exist. The present proposal is that when we take ourselves
to be thinking of unicorns, we are mistaken. Unless someone keen on such a
proposal is ready to bite the bullet and accept a full-blown second-order
error theory about intentional states—a theory that says we are
often/always wrong about what we take ourselves to be thinking about (viz.
what we take ourselves to be thinking is rarely, if ever, what we are in fact
thinking)—then some principle whereby we might distinguish the bad cases
from the good ones seems required. But the relevant principle cannot be
simply that the bad cases are those where what one takes oneself to be
thinking about does not actually exist. Otherwise, the explanation is circular.
Again, divining such a principle might be possible, but I think the burden of
evidence is on those who deny that we can think about things that do not
exist.

2.1.2 A Word on Externalism
On the other hand, one of the central lessons (or consequences) of
externalism is that what we are in fact thinking of is determined, in part, by
external factors—factors that can be quite outside a subject’s epistemic
reach, yet no less determinative of what s/he is thinking. Hence, it should
come as no surprise that we can and often are mistaken about what we take
ourselves to be thinking of.

I cannot say everything I want to about

externalism at this point. However, I will note that a great deal of ink has
been spilled, by a great many important thinkers, trying to reconcile some
form of externalism with self-knowledge (see Davidson, 1996; Burge, 1996;
McKinsey, 1996; Bilgrami, 1996). Indeed, that in his seminal paper (Putnam,
1975) Putnam himself opted for a narrow/wide bifurcation of content has
seemed to some as an attempt to allow for self-knowledge (see Bilgrami,
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1996). This alone suggests that throwing out self-knowledge with the
internalist bathwater is a consequence that even the most ardent externalists
(e.g. Putnam, Burge) are wary of. And to incur such a loss just to account for
thoughts about things that do not exist seems worse.
An interesting worry for the externalist in this context can be found in
(Boghossian, 1998). In order to bring Boghossian’s point to bear on the
present concern, I adapt his insights in the following brief thought
experiment: Ed and Ted are internal duplicate unicorn thinkers, living on
earth and twin earth respectively. The difference between earth and twin
earth is that the latter contains unicorns. According to the present line, when
Ed takes himself to be thinking of unicorns, he is actually entertaining a
composite thought. Let us assume that having a composite thought is a
matter of tokening a molecular concept: ‘horses with horns’. On the other
hand, when Ted takes himself to be thinking of unicorns, he is tokening the
atomic concept ‘unicorn’. The problem is that the external factors that are
supposed to determine content—the relations or lack thereof between
Ed/Ted and unicorns—are not just having an effect on content; they are
having an effect on syntactic form. That is, Ed’s unicorn concept is molecular,
and Ted’s is atomic. And this appears to be a rather serious consequence for
any view that takes syntactic form to be a matter of internal constitution: It is
part of any twin earth thought experiment to hold internal states constant.
Therefore, syntactic form is not (wholly) internal in the same sense that
meaning and content are not.

It might be objected that I am incorrectly

assuming ‘unicorn’ to be atomic on Twin Earth, and that this argument
depends on that assumption.

On the contrary, take any earthly atomic

concept, ‘A’, and have it be tokened by Ed. Now assume a Twin earth where
whatever normally causes the tokening of ‘A’ on Earth does not exist. The
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composite line holds that because there are no A-s on Twin Earth, when Ted
tokens ‘A’ he is tokening a composite/molecular concept.
In a similar vein, Segal (2000, pp. 54) raises concerns about how an
externalist might spell out the extension conditions for the concept ‘unicorn’.
There are two options according to Segal:

“The first is that such concepts are modally empty: they do not apply to
anything any possible world. The other is that they are motley concepts,
applying, roughly speaking, to anything satisfying the core descriptions
associated with them” (Segal, A Slim Book About Narrow Content, 2000,
p. 54).
While we are considering the latter possibility—namely that unicorn
thoughts are actually composite thoughts about horses and horns—it is
worthwhile noting that the former option entails that unicorn thoughts are
on par with thoughts about round squares and Penrose triangles.

No

extension conditions = modally empty = impossible. I suppose this is a live
option, but further argument would be required. Returning to the second
option—the motley, or composite, concept view—I begin by noting that
fixing extension conditions by way of core descriptions seems like it would
be an uncomfortable prospect for an externalist. The more pressing point,
according to Segal, is that any extension fixing core description will pick out
the same things across worlds, pace externalism (see Segal, 2000).
Again, the point here is not to mount a full scaled examination of the merits
of externalism. Rather, it is to discover whether externalism can quickly and
decisively come to the aid of the DR-relation theorist who seeks to account
for our seeming ability to think about things that do not exist by denying that
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we can think about such things. The proposal is that when we think about
unicorns, we are actually thinking a composite thought about horses and
horns. The initial worry was that this involves unicorn thinkers in a kind of
second order error about what they take themselves to be thinking about.
The appeal to externalism is supposed to temper this consequence because
externalism—a widely excepted view—implies that we can and often are
mistaken (or otherwise lacking complete knowledge) about what we take
ourselves to be thinking about. The first point I made was that the rejection
of self-knowledge is not taken to be unanimously unproblematic, even by the
most ardent externalists. It is clear from the works of (Davidson, Knowing
One's Own Mind, 1996), (Burge, Individualism and Self-Knowledge, 1996),
(McKinsey, 1996), (Bilgrami, 1996), (Kriegel, 2007) and (Putnam, 1975) that
self-knowledge is not something to be discarded lightly. The second point
was that authors like Segal (2000) and Boghossian (1998) have provided
some powerful reasons to think that externalism has problems accounting
for empty concepts. Hence, an appeal to externalism in the present context
might not be appropriate. At the very least, externalism does not supply a
quick and decisive way of denying that we can think about things that do not
exist.
To come back to the issue at hand, the view we are examining is one on
which intentionality is a relation our mental states bear to ordinary objects
such as tables and chairs—a view I have called the DR-relation view. From
this, and the fact that we can think about things that do not exist, we have the
following inconsistent set of sentences:
1) I can think of things that do not exist.
2) I cannot be related to something that does not exist.
3) Thinking about something is a way of being related to it.
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I have raised some concerns about different ways of denying 1); but might
someone deny 2)? There have been several theorists, both historical and
recent, who have sought to do so (see Parsons, 1975; Meinong, 1960); but
none take the view that intentionality is a relation to ordinary objects: The
objects in question are construed as having being, but not existence
(Meinong, 1960), which makes them extraordinary.
On the other hand, it is possible to argue that I can be related to an ordinary
object that does not exist in this world, but does in another. The thinking
here would be to accept a strong modal realism along the lines of David
Lewis (1986); allow that things like unicorns, and bigfoot, number among the
ordinary objects in some possible world; and construe the intentional
relation to hold between you in this world—where unicorns do not exist—
and said things in the world in which they do exist. Whether or not this view
is ultimately plausible, I leave to the reader. However, it should be noted that
this makes the intentional relation look rather fantastical—able to stretch
between worlds. Certainly it makes the intentional relation different from
some other relations such as causation.

2.1.3 The DR-relation View and Thinking About Things Under an Aspect
or Description
Relations between ordinary objects are not sensitive to description in the
way intentionality is. I cannot kick Superman without thereby kicking Clark
Kent. Likewise, I cannot be taller than Superman without thereby being
taller than Clark Kent. I can, however, hope to see Superman without hoping
to see Clark Kent. There are several arguments in the literature that raise
this point (see Mendelovici, MS; Kriegel, 2011).
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Consider the following: Assume that I am unaware that the morning star is
the evening star, so that I can think about the latter without thinking about
the former (for instance, I can hope to see the one without hoping to see the
other). For any other (non-intentional) relation I bear to the evening star I
also bear it to the morning star. I cannot point to the evening star without
pointing at the morning star; I cannot shoot at the evening star tonight
without shooting at the morning star; I cannot be less massive than the
evening star without being less massive than the morning star, and so on. If
thinking about the evening star is a matter of bearing the thinking-about
relation to the evening star, then the thinking-about relation is unlike any
other non-intentional relation: It relates me to the ordinary object (the
evening/morning star) under one description/aspect, but not another (see
Mendelovici MS, Kriegel 2011, pp. 127 – 132).

2.1.4 Summary
There is undoubtedly more one could say about the DR-relation view and
intentional inexistence, but I think I have raised some fair concerns for the
view. At the very least, the DR-relation view must choose to: 1) Deny that
intentionality is like any other relation that holds between everyday objects.
Call this the mysterious relation view. 2) Allow that in some cases (e.g. nonexistent objects, objects under a particular description) intentionality does
not relate us to ordinary objects, but rather to abstract properties, universals,
propositions, or some other non-everyday item. Presumably, the mysterious
relation view—being a species of what Kriegel (2007, pp. 311) calls
“intentionality exceptionalism”—is something to be avoided: It sounds odd to
say that certain facts hold of every relation between ordinary objects except
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for one (see Kriegel, 2007, pp. 311).15 However, on 2) the DR-relation view is
no longer, as it were, pure: In some cases, intentionality relates us to
something other than ordinary objects. Call this second line the Impure DRrelation view. I will address the Impure DR-relation view below, but I will
first examine whether abstracta are good candidates for the things
intentionality relates us to.

2.2 Abstracta as Intentional Contents
There are, of course, alternatives to the DR-relation view. Indeed, advocates
of DR-relation views are in the minority. More common is the view that
intentionality is a relation between mental states and abstract objects such as
properties or propositions. Before examining the merits of views that take
intentionality to be a relation to such things, it should be noted that the
literature concerning properties, propositions, abstract objects, and so on, is
vast. For instance, it has been held that the particular/property (universal)
distinction might not be as clear as it is often thought (see Ramsey, 1997).
This would make any examination of the purported relation between
intentional states and the properties they are about that presupposes a clear
distinction between particulars and properties wrong-footed from the get go.
There are also views of properties on which properties are classes or sets
(Lewis, 1997, p. 190). On such view, the pre-theoretical sense that properties
are things that particulars have—or parts of particulars—is turned on its
head:

“Far from the property being part of the [particular], it is closer to the
truth to say that the [particular] is part of the property. But the precise
15

I will consider the possibility that intentionality is a unique relation below.
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truth, rather, is that the [particular] is a member of the property (Lewis,
1997, p. 190).”
Propositions are sometimes thought to be particular kinds of properties—
namely, “those that are instantiated only by entire possible worlds (Lewis,
1997, p. 175).” It is also sometimes held that properties are not all that
abstract—at least not as abstract as say Platonic universals. Trope theory,
for instance, can be seen as denying the kind of full out abstractness to
properties that Platonism ascribes them. Though theorists like (Campbell,
1997), (Williams, 1997) call tropes “abstract particulars,” it is clear that the
degree of abstractness such entities are said to have is significantly less than
universal properties. Universals of the Platonic kind exist outside of time and
space; tropes do not. What makes tropes abstract—at least on views like
Campbell’s (1997, pp. 136-137), is that they can contemporaneously occupy
the same space as other tropes: My Pyrenees’ whiteness is present in the
same place as my Pyrenees’ furriness.
Even if we could settle on one plausible view of the nature of abstract
entities—that they are universals, tropes, sets, or something else, other
problems arise. Numbers are often considered abstract, as are propositions,
the average taxpayer, the 2004 Kia Sorento, tallness, redness, and so on. But
to group all of these things into one category—abstracta—seems
problematic. For instance, in reading the owner’s manual, I discover that the
2004 Kia Sorento comes equipped with four airbags, but no proposition can
be equipped with such things. Likewise, the number four is the product of
primes, but the average taxpayer is not. More importantly, abstracta are not
members of one causal kind; some are thought to have obvious causal
influences in the realm of concreta; others do (may) not. Since causal powers
are one way to type objects, it seems that abstracta do not form a single type.
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With such disparate views on the nature of abstracta, the only hope of
providing an adequate examination of the suitability of abstracta to be that to
which we are related via intentionality, is to stay focused on precisely that.
Note also, that the suitability, or lack thereof, of abstracta to be one of the
relata of the intentional relation does not entail anything about the truth of
any given theory of properties, universals, tropes, and so on. It could, for
instance, turn out that though tropes are poor candidates for being that to
which we are related via intentionality, the trope theory of properties is
nevertheless true. Only theories that invoke the relevant abstracta in order
to account for the intentional relation would be impugned/vindicated by
what follows.
What I propose to do in this section is examine three views of abstract
entities: as Platonic properties, as Aristotelian properties and as
propositions. Before going on, I should explain why I choose not to address
the view that takes the relevant abstracta to be tropes: I will be raising
concerns about the suitability of properties that depend on instantiation (aproperties) to be one of the relata in the intentional relation. The concerns I
raise there apply equally to tropes.

2.2.1 Intentionality as a Relation to the Forms
Following (Armstrong, 1997, pp. 108) and (Kriegel, 2011b, pp. 252), we can
call properties that exist outside of space and time, ante rem, and properties
that depend on instantiation, properties in re. The former are what Plato
calls the forms, and have more recently been invoked by philosophers such
as Russell (Russell, The World of Universals, 1967/1997) to account for
similarity (or dissimilarity) between concrete particulars.
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Several metaphysical/ontological challenges arise for those who posit what I
will hereafter call Platonic properties—p-properties for short.

Quine is

notoriously anti-ante rem, so to speak (Quine W.V.O., 1953), as is (Devitt,
1997). Both argue against ontological commitment to such things. Indeed,
from a physicalist point of view, it would seem that p-properties cannot be
tolerated. From (Shoemaker, 1997), one might construct an indirect
argument against p-properties. Shoemaker notes that observing something
is one way to be causally affected by it (Shoemaker, 1997). If we assume that
some properties are observable—not such a stretch given that observed
similarities/differences is one of the chief purposes of invoking properties—
then some properties are causal. However, if properties are p-properties and
exist outside of space and time, then it is difficult to see how they could exert
a causal influence in the realm of spatiotemporal concreta. But I digress;
what is important here is whether or not p-properties can be one of the
relata in the intentional relation.
To be sure, the problem of intentional inexistence disappears with the
positing of p-properties: When I think about unicorns, I bear the thinkingabout relation to the abstract p-property of unicorness, or perhaps the
abstract properties of horseness and hornedness, or some such. Likewise,
when I think about the morning star, I bear the thinking-about relation to
some p-properties; and when I think about the evening star, I bear the
relation to others.
So far, so good. However, a number of issues arise here. First—stemming
from the argument we adduced on Shoemaker’s behalf just above—the
causal impotency of p-properties in the spatiotemporal realm would appear
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to preclude providing a causal theory of intentionality (Kriegel, 2011b).16
Second, one might reasonably ask what kind of relation intentionality is such
that it can traverse the divide between the realm of spatiotemporal concreta,
and Plato’s realm of the forms, a fantastical one to be sure.17 Of course,
Plato’s own story is that before we take corporeal form (before we are born),
we are in direct contact with this posited realm, and that our thoughts are
recollections of the p-properties we encountered there. However, I am not
sure whether this would satisfy many current theorists. For one thing, it is
patently dualistic.18 For another, it ties the intentional relation essentially to
memory.

All thoughts turn out to be species of recollection.

Russell’s

account of how exactly we become acquainted with p-properties is by
abstraction:

“When we see a white patch, we are acquainted, in the first instance,
with the particular patch; but by seeing many white patches, we easily
learn to abstract the whiteness which they all have in common, and in
learning to do this we are learning to be acquainted with [the universal]
whiteness (Russell, The World of Universals, 1967/1997, p. 51).”
Of course, Russell was not focused on the same issue I am; but nevertheless,
it is unclear whether this kind of answer is adequate to account for how
intentionality relates mental states to p-properties. For one thing, this kind of
answer seems to require contact with instances of the relevant property.
And there again, we seem to run into difficulties with properties that are
I do not hold a causal theory, but for those who do, p-properties might not be suitable
candidates for intentional contents.
17 Mendelovici (2010; MS) raises similar complaints.
Her arguments focus on the
mysteriousness of saying when two things from different ontological categories belong
together.
18 Being dualistic does not necessarily condemn a view.
It is just that contemporary
philosophical orthodoxy is not dualistic. Hence a theory that implies dualism would
undoubtedly enjoy a less than enthusiastic reception.
16
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never instantiated, and so are not the kinds of things that we may abstract
from.
Third, whether I am thinking about unicorns, dogs, tables or chairs, the
intuitive answer as to what kind of thing I am thinking about is that I am
thinking about ordinary concrete objects, not abstracta. As Kriegel notes,
phenomenologically, these things present themselves in thought as ordinary
concrete things (Kriegel, 2007, p. 310). So this view too appears to imply
fairly widespread error about what we take ourselves to be thinking about.
Fourth, Kriegel explains that on such a view, there emerges a “veil of
abstracta” over the realm of ordinary concrete objects (Kriegel, 2007). His
argument focuses on perception and proceeds in several steps. First, he
distinguishes between two models of the relation that holds between
perceptual experiences and perceptual beliefs: the inference model, and the
endorsement model. On the inference model, we infer beliefs about the
objects of perception from our perceptual experiences. On the endorsement
model, “some perceptual beliefs are justified simply by taking at face value
one’s current perceptual experience” (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 247). According to
Kriegel, for most perceptually based beliefs,19 the correct model is the
endorsement model (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 247).
While Kriegel does not offer much in the way of argument for favouring the
endorsement model, reasons are not hard to divine. First, inference requires
a level of intellectual sophistication that certainly eludes animals, small
children, and probably some adults. Hence, the inference model implies that
the way animals, small children and some adults form perceptually based
beliefs is different in kind from the way the rest of us do. Second, inference is
Kriegel recognizes certain instances where the inference model is probably better
equipped: e.g. scientific beliefs about sub-atomic particles, etc.
19
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more temporally expensive than endorsement, and so is rather a hindrance
both evolutionarily, and in our day-to-day lives: imagine how the inference
model would account for driving a car. For most of our perceptually based
beliefs, such beliefs are acquired by endorsement of our perceptual
experiences.
The second step is the veil thesis:

“There is a class of entities X1,…,Xn, such that for any perceptual
experience E and some perceptual belief B, (i) E does not bear an
epistemically and subjectively relevant intentional relation to a member
of X1,…,Xn, and (ii) B does bear an intentional relation to a member of X1,…,Xn (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 249).”
Kriegel adds that a relation is epistemically irrelevant “if the experience
would justify the same beliefs even if it did not bear it,” and subjectively
irrelevant “if the subject could not tell the experience apart from another,
otherwise similar experience” (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 249). The problem with the
veil thesis is that it denies that the objects about which we have perceptually
based beliefs—the ordinary objects that furnish our surroundings—are the
same objects that we perceive. It therefore mandates the inference model:
we infer our beliefs about the concrete objects around us from the objects we
perceive, where the former is different from the latter. This, as Kriegel notes,
is one of the central concerns for the sense data theory (Kriegel, 2011b, p.
248).
But notice that the veil of abstracta only arises when the property theory of
perceptual intentionality is paired with the view that perceptually based
beliefs are not about the relevant properties. But why would someone who
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seeks to account for intentionality in terms of relations to p-properties not
think that beliefs are such relations? That is, why would someone construe
the perception relation as obtaining between perceptions and p-properties,
but the belief relation as holding between beliefs and the ordinary concrete
objects that furnish our surroundings? Taking one’s beliefs about tables and
chairs to actually be beliefs about p-properties is a live option, and one that
would undermine Kriegel’s argument. The so-called veil emerges because
one’s perceptions are of p-properties and one’s perceptually based beliefs are
not; hence the justification for one’s perceptually based beliefs must be by
inference, not by endorsement; and that is the wrong model. But the veil
would not emerge for someone who thinks perceptually based beliefs are
about p-properties.
Of course, this may be a moot point, since I doubt anyone thinks that one’s
beliefs about the ordinary objects in her surroundings are actually about pproperties. But that alone would count as yet another concern for the pproperty theory of intentionality.

At any rate, if you assume that your

perceptually based beliefs are beliefs about the ordinary concrete objects in
your surroundings, and that perception is a relation to p-properties, then the
veil of abstracta does arise.
To summarize, the view we have been considering is that intentionality is
relation to p-properties—universals that exist outside of space and time.
Setting aside whatever metaphysical/ontological issues arise by positing
such things, there are several reasons why p-properties are not good
candidates for being that to which we are related by intentionality. First, the
causal impotency of non-spatiotemporal entities (e.g. p-properties) would
seem to preclude giving a causal account of intentionality. Second, this view
makes the intentional relation look a bit fantastical—able to cross between
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the realm of ordinary spatiotemporal concreta and the realm of the forms.
Third, the view conflicts with the phenomenality of intentional episodes
about ordinary concrete objects: such things present themselves in
experience as ordinary spatiotemporal concreta, not abstracta. Hence, this
view too threatens introspective knowledge—probably not something to be
given up just to allow for our representational contact with the realm of the
forms. Fourth, if we assume our perceptually based beliefs are beliefs about
the ordinary concrete objects in our surroundings, but that perception is a
relation to p-properties, then Kriegel’s veil of abstracta arises. On the other
hand, the alternative to erecting the veil—denying that our perceptually
based beliefs are about the concrete ordinary objects we think they are, but
are instead about the very p-properties the perceptions are about—seems
worse.

It seems fair to say that p-properties are not unproblematic

candidates for one of the relata in the intentional relation.

2.2.2 Intentionality and properties In Re
Properties In Re do not exist outside of space and time, but instead are
dependent on the concrete objects that instantiate them. In this sense, they
are akin to Aristotelian universals; and I will thus henceforth call them aproperties. The metaphysical/ontological virtues of a-properties over pproperties seem obvious. Metaphysically, because a-properties exist within
the spatiotemporal realm, their causal efficacy seems less problematic than
that of p-properties. Ontologically, we need not posit a distinct realm in
which to put a-properties; they are already somewhere: here. Among the
most well known proponents of a-properties over p-properties is Armstrong
(Armstrong, 1997, 1997b, 1999). The question is whether a-properties can
serve as one of the relata in the intentional relation. Certainly, the fact that a-
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properties exist in the very things that instantiate them appears to favour
them as plausible intentional relata.
One concern about the a-property theory of intentionality concerns the
relation of a-properties to the concrete things that instantiate them. One
might reasonably ask whether, if stripped of all its a-properties, the concrete
particular would remain? Armstrong calls such a stripped down particular a
“blob” (Armstrong, 1999, p. 199), and argues against the “blob” view—which
he claims arises for the p-property view—by having “a thing’s properties as
constituents of the thing” (Armstrong, 1999, p. 199). This raises the question
of whether the concrete objects whose constituents are a-properties are sets
of a-properties, or sums of a-properties (see Kriegel, 2011b, pp. 257). I
realize that there are some tremendously difficult metaphysical questions
concerning this issue; but again, my focus is on the view that takes aproperties to be one of the relata in the intentional relation. Admittedly, on
either the set or sum view, the intentional relation to the relevant aproperties gets us to the right object—be it a set or a sum of a-properties.
However, I agree with Kriegel that the a-property theory should opt for sums
over sets:

“Given that sets are non-spatial entities,…if…beliefs were intentionally
related to sets of i-universals [a-properties], they would be intentionally
related to non-spatial entities” (Kriegel, 2011b, p. 257).20
On the other hand, both the set and sum views appear vulnerable to
extensions of the arguments for content determinacy found in (Horgan &
Graham, 2012). I will not rehearse their arguments here, but will note that if
In note 37 (Kriegel, 2011b, pp. 265), Kriegel cites (Van Cleve, 1985). Van Cleve’s article is
both forceful and illuminating in its vetting and rejecting of both the set and sum views of
particulars.
20
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certain forms of intentionality can determine that a rabbit-thought is not
about the set of undetached rabbit parts, then perhaps it can also determine
that rabbit thoughts are not about sets or sums of rabbit a-properties.
However, my main concern about the a-property theory is that, unlike the pproperty theory, it reintroduces the problem of intentional inexistence—not
for ordinary concrete objects, but for a-properties. A-properties depend on
instantiation in a way that p-properties do not. On the a-property view, there
can be no uninstantiated properties. However, I can think about unicorns
even though the property of unicorness is not instantiated, and that appears
to tell against the view that intentionality is a relation to a-properties. I have
already discussed the plausibility of explaining away apparent unicornthoughts in terms of horses and horns, and will not rehearse my concerns
again.
Perhaps, however, you are unsatisfied about properties such as unicorness
counting as genuine properties. That is, perhaps you think that as unicorness
is not a genuine property, it is not an appropriate example of the
shortcomings of the a-property theory of intentionality. While I disagree, the
concern can be raised about other, more conventional properties. Take
colors, for instance. Colors seem to be properties par excellence. On some
views of color (see Hardin, 1988; Mendelovici 2010; Boghossian & Velleman,
1997), color properties are never instantiated and so stand as counterexamples to the view that intentionality is a relation to a-properties
(assuming that we have intentional episodes of color). However, the example
need not rest on the truth of color irrealism. Kriegel (2011b) points to an
article by Churchland, who discusses experiences of certain “chimerical
colors” that are not just uninstantiated, but are nomologically impossible
(Churchland, 2005).

The crucial point is that a-properties depend on
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instantiation; there are no unistantiated a-properties. But since I can have
thoughts, beliefs, perceptual experiences, and so on, of uninstantiated
properties (e.g. chimerical colors), a-properties seem ill-equipped to be the
relata of these purported intentional relations.
In summary, there are several worries about the suitability of a-properties to
serve as relata in the intentional relation. Positing a-properties involves the
theorist in taking a stance on the nature of the relation between the aproperties and the concrete things that have them. Neither the set, nor the
sum view of this relation is ideal: The former turns ordinary concrete objects
into abstracta by identifying them with sets. And both appear to be
phenomenologically inadequate: When I think about a rabbit, I take myself to
be thinking about an ordinary concrete object, not a set or a sum of abstract
(though instantiated) properties. Finally, and most importantly, the fact that
the a-properties depend on instantiation raises, once again, the problem of
intentional inexistence.

2.2.3 Intentionality and Propositions21
In what follows in this section on propositions, I will be assuming that there
is an intuitive sense in which propositions are distinct from properties, pace
Lewis (1997, p. 175).22 Once again, my goal here is to examine the suitability

I am here concerned with propositions as the things we (our mental states) are related to
via intentionality. Propositions have been assigned a variety of roles outside of the
philosophy of mind, but those are not my primary concern here.
22 If propositions were not distinct from properties—if propositions were, as Lewis
would have it, properties “instantiated only by entire possible worlds,” (Lewis, 1986, p.
53)—then on the view under consideration intentionality would be a relation to such
properties. But, as Lewis says, propositions, on such a view, would just be the set of
possible worlds where the proposition is true. And that means that intentionality is a
relation to sets of possible worlds, which, according to Lewis, looks to be false: It
precludes certain de se thoughts on account of failing to discriminate between
individuals at the same world (Lewis, 1986, pp. 55). So, though propositions are
21
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of propositions to be one of the relata in the intentional relation.

In

particular, my focus is on whether propositions can serve as the X of the
intentional relation thought to hold between non-derived intentional states
and X. It could turn out that the intentionality of words/sentences, for
instance, cannot be accounted for without invoking propositions. But my
focus is not on words/sentences.
That being said, the first question to ask is whether propositions are concrete
or abstract. Lewis, though sceptical about the clarity of the concrete/abstract
distinction, takes possible worlds to be as concrete as the actual world. But
as “the objects of thought in general are not sets of possible worlds,” (Lewis,
1986, pp.55) taking propositions to be concrete in this sense precludes them
from consideration in the present context.23 Might there be other ways of
construing propositions to be concrete? Dummett notes that a subset of
propositions—the true ones—are sometimes identified with facts (Dummett,
2006). If we take a fact to be concrete—as, perhaps, a state of affairs (see
Wittgenstein, 1922/1961)—then at least some propositions are concrete.24
The issues here run deep, but this brief sketch of how some propositions (the
true ones) can be conceived of as concrete leaves precisely half of all
propositions (the false ones) hanging in the balance. On the other hand, there
might be a class of propositions that are concrete in virtue of having concreta
as constituents. Singular propositions, for instance, might be thought of as
inheriting concreteness from that of their concrete constituents.

Again,

however, since not all propositions are singular, not all propositions are

properties on Lewis’ view, they are not generally the objects of thought, since the objects
of thought are not sets of possible worlds.
23 Assuming, that is, that Lewis is right.
24 Although this may conflict with the desideratum that propositions be bearers of
truth/falsity. Concrete states of affairs do not seem like the kinds of things capable of truth
and falsity.
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concrete in this sense. In any event, any view that admits of propositions,
will, it seems, have to allow that some are abstract.
Returning to the question at hand: Is intentionality a relation to
propositions?

If the answer is an unqualified ‘yes’, then it follows

straightforwardly that we cannot have sub-propositional intentional states.
This view, call it propositionalism, seems problematic (see, for instance,
Montague, 2007). For one thing, it seems to rule out anything incapable of
propositional thought from having intentionality. Small children, certain
mammals, and so on, will all be incapable of aboutness. Second, it seems to
deny that we can merely entertain a thought about X without thinking
anything in particular about X. But this kind of thing seems to happen all the
time. Sometimes, random thoughts about a person/object just pop in and out
of my mind, without my thinking anything more about that person or object.
Just now, I thought to myself ‘Spring’, smiled, and then refocused my
attention on writing.

Perhaps someone will object that what I actually

thought to myself was something like ‘spring is coming…great’, hence the
smile. However, regardless of the plausibility of this particular propositional
reconstruction, I think the burden of proof is on the propositionalist, if her
claim is that all such seemingly simple intentional states can be
reconstructed propositionally.25
What is required here is some account of propositions such that the
intentionality of some mental states could be a relation to propositions,
whereas the intentionality of other simpler intentional states need not be.
This will allow that when I think to myself that spring is finally here I am
bearing the thinking about relation to the proposition ‘that spring is here’;
and when I merely think spring, I am bearing the thinking about relation to
25

See (Montague, 2007) for extended discussion on the merits/flaws of propositionalism.
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something simpler than an entire proposition. An added bonus would be for
such an account to show how my mere spring thoughts are somehow related
to my propositional thought that spring is here. And indeed, the two most
famous accounts of propositions—the Fregean account and the Russellian
account—have sought to do that.
Before looking at each, a caveat: My purpose here is to examine whether
propositions—be they Fregean or Russellian—are unproblematic candidates
for being one of the relata in the intentional relation. My characterizations of
each of their respective views will therefore be partly a function of this
purpose. That is, if one were to make a list of all the things the Fregean or
Russellian holds about propositions, only some of those things will be
relevant to the question ‘are propositions what the intentionality of mental
states relates us to?'. Others will undoubtedly be relevant to questions in
epistemology, the philosophy of language, mathematics, logic etc.

My

characterization of their respective views will focus on those things I take to
be relevant to the former question.
Though Fregean propositions are often contrasted with Russellian
propositions, the two have more in common than the standard juxtaposition
would seem to imply.26 Both Frege and Russell took propositions to be
timeless, abstract, unchanging, mind-independent entities that served as the
objects of the propositional attitudes, and were accessible by multiple
thinkers at the same time.27 Both also took propositions to be complexes, the
nature of the simpler parts of which is partly what distinguishes their
respective views.
See (Makin, 2000, pp. 135 – 178) for an excellent chapter on the similarities and
differences between Russell and Frege.
27 I am not alone in interpreting Frege and Russell as Platonists in this way. See, for instance
(Dummett, 1991, pp. 249-262), (Dummett, 2006, pp. 8 - 12), (Soames, 2014, pp. 25 - 33)
(Makin, 2000, pp. 139 - 150)
26
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For Frege, propositions (“thoughts”, see Frege, 1997c) are complex sinn,
made up of simpler sinn. The proposition ‘that spring is warm’ is made up of
the sinn of ‘spring’, ‘warm’, and so on, and is itself the sinn of the expression
‘spring is warm’. In short, the simpler parts of a propositional sinn are
themselves sinn (Frege, 1892/1997). On the other hand, the constituents of
Russellian propositions could be concrete objects/people, relations,
properties and so on.28 Notice, however, that both views can accommodate
sub-propositional intentionality: On Frege’s view, my intentional state as of
Spring turns out to be a relation to the sinn of Spring, and that very sinn
figures in the sinn of the proposition ‘that Spring is coming’. On Russell’s view
my simple Spring-thought bears a relation to the actual season, and that
actual season is a constituent of the proposition ‘that spring is coming’.
Minimal though this account of the two classical theories of propositions
undoubtedly is, we have enough here to pose the question I am interested in:
Could Fregean or Russellian propositions be that to which we are related via
intentionality? If propositions are Fregean in the sense that their constituent
parts are other sinn that—along with the propositions of which they are
constituents—occupy what Dummett calls a “third realm” (Dummett, 1991),
then the concerns I raised in the context of discussing the p-property theory
would seem to arise here as well.
First, it is not entirely clear how items that occupy a distinct ontological
realm can have a causal influence on the realm of concreta. Frege’s answer is

In what follows, I will do my utmost to avoid directly addressing the problem of the unity
of the proposition. What it means to be a constituent of a proposition, and how a
proposition’s constituents are bound together, are difficult and important questions, but far
beyond the scope of this thesis. Where the topic is broached, I will not focus on the merits of
anyone’s account of unity. Instead, I will be examining what a particular account of unity
implies about the suitability of propositions to be one of the relata in the intentional relation.
28
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that propositions can have causal effects on the external (to the mind) world
of concreta in virtue of being grasped by competent cognizers, who then give
the proposition a causal voice:

“If…I grasp the thought [proposition] we express by the theorem of
Pythagoras, the consequence may be that I recognize it to be true, and
further that I apply it in making a decision, which brings about the
acceleration of masses (Frege, 1918/1997, p. 344)”
This seems fairly intuitive. But how exactly does the proposition affect the
cognizer in the first place? How does grasping a proposition “bring about
changes in the inner world of the one who grasps it” (Frege, 1918/1997, p.
345)? Certainly the cognitive act of grasping the proposition will bring about
inner changes in the same way that the physical act of grasping my rum will
bring about inner changes in my arm muscles. But this is presumably not
what Frege has in mind: The fact that it is rum that I grasp, rather than
vodka, orange juice, or water makes no difference to these internal changes. I
take it that what Frege is after here is an account of grasping that makes
relevant the fact that it is a grasping of Pythagoras’, rather than Fermat’s,
theorem.

To put things another way, I take it that in addition to the

properties of the grasping, Frege wants the properties of what is grasped to
be relevant to the inner changes. And this seems more problematic since
propositions and their constituents exist outside of the spatiotemporal realm.
In a similar vein, how does intentionality29 relate concrete mental states to
entities in the third realm? For Frege, “the thought [proposition]…gets
I realize that Frege, and probably Russell, would most likely reject this way of speaking, if
not the entire line of questioning. Both took propositions to be the primary bearers of
intentionality, and the act of grasping said propositions is what imbues mental states with
intentionality. The intentionality of propositions is conceptually prior to that of mental
29
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clothed in the perceptible garb of a sentence, and thereby we are enabled to
grasp it” (Frege, 1918/1997, p. 328). I find this clothing metaphor a bit
cryptic.
language?

Does this make our grasping of a proposition dependent on
However, just a few pages later, Frege says, “[a]lthough the

thought [proposition] does not belong with the contents of the thinker’s
consciousness, there must be something in the consciousness that is aimed at
the thought [proposition]” (Frege, 1918/1997, p. 340). While these two
quotes are not obviously inconsistent, I am not sure whether the grasping
relation in the former is the same as the aiming relation in the latter. On a
plausible interpretation—one on which the two relations are distinct—
Frege’s claim is that we are first able to grasp a proposition via that sentence
that expresses it. Then, once the grasping has occurred, our consciousness
gets appropriately aimed at the relevant proposition. There are probably any
number of ways this might be developed, but again, my concern here is how
(or whether) the intentionality of our mental states is a relation to
propositions. The worry is that if propositions occupy this third realm, then
the relation appears a bit mysterious. The story that propositions are clothed
in sentences and thereby serve to aim one’s consciousness, is certainly
coherent, but it does not alleviate much of the mystery.
On the other hand, though Russellian propositions also occupy a third realm,
they can have concrete things as constituents:

“…[I]n spite of all its snowfields Mont Blanc is a component of what is
actually asserted in the proposition ‘Mont Blanc is more than 4,000
states, or particular acts of grasping/acquainting (see Soames, 2014, pp. 33). But this,
according to Soames, is precisely the source of the so called problem of the unity of the
propositon. Roughly: You cannot get unity without the act of unifying—an act that we
perform (by predicating, or some such). But this is precisely the answer that an account that
takes propositonal intentionality (and therefore unity) to be conceptually prior to the
cognitive acts of grasping cannot give. We (or our cognitive acts) unify propositions
(Soames, 2014).
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meters high’.

We do not assert the thought, for this is a private

psychological matter: we assert the object of the thought, and this is, to
my mind, a certain complex (an objective proposition, one might say) in
which Mont Blanc is itself a component part” (Russell, 1904/1988, p. 57).
Again, what I am interested in here is whether propositions can be that to
which we are related via intentionality. The main concern about Fregean
propositions is that it is a bit mysterious how abstract entities composed of
other abstract entities, all of which exist in a third realm, can play this role:
how does intentionality relate concrete mental states to these kinds of
propositions. On the other hand, because Russellian propositions can take
concrete things as constituents, the relation might seem initially more
plausible: intentionality might be a relation between concrete mental states
and abstracta, but these abstracta can have concreta as constituents.
However, it is this very feature of Russellian propositions that raises some
concerns in the present context.
One question that arises for Russellian propositions is whether they can
adequately cope with intentional inexistence. How can a term for something
non-existent contribute what it is supposed to—namely, the thing itself—to
the proposition in which it occurs?

Russell’s view appears to change

significantly between 1903 and 1905:30

“Whatever may be an object of thought, or may occur in any true or false
proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term…I shall use as
synonymous with it the words unit, individual, and entity. The first two
emphasize the fact that every term is one, while the third is derived from
the fact that every term has being, i.e. is in some sense. A man, a
30

Principles of Mathematics was originally published in 1903, and On Denoting in 1905.
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moment, a number, a class, a relation, a chimera, or anything else that
can be mentioned, is sure to be a term…” (Russell, 1903/1996, p. 43).
After distinguishing two kinds of terms, things and concepts, Russell
continues:

“Points, instants, bits of matter, particular states of mind, and particular
existents generally, are things, and so are many terms which do not exist,
for example,…the pseudo-existents of a novel” (Russell, 1903/1996, p.
45).
This suggests that Russell endorsed a kind of Meinongianism (see Quine,
1966) at the time (i.e. in 1903), and that his views shifted significantly by
1905.31 If this is the correct interpretation of (early) Russell, then his answer
to the problem of intentional existence would be to deny 1) below.
1) I can think about things that do not exist.
2) I cannot be related to something that does not exist.
3) Thinking about something = being related to it.
Again, we are assuming that Russellian propositions take terms (in the sense
above) as constituents.
propositions,

and

Therefore, if intentionality is a relation to

propositions

have

terms

as

constituents,

then

intentionality is also a relation to the terms of a proposition. If I think to
myself that chimeras are green, then I bear an intentional relation to
chimeras. (Early) Russell’s (and Meinong’s) solution to this is to deny that
chimeras do not exist, and therefore deny 1). While this is a possibility we
did not consider in the section on intentional inexistence, the problems with
31

However, see Makin (2000, pp. 52 – 57) for arguments to the contrary.
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such a view have been well documented (by Russell himself, see Russell,
1905/2008). I will not rehearse these here, as they focus mainly on the
ontological/logical problems that follow from countenancing such things, and
my concern is what sorts of things intentionality relates us to. Instead, I will
simply note that on such a line, intentionality appears to be a rather
fantastical relation: in one instance it relates us to quite ordinary things
(propositional constituents) such as people, and in the other it relates us to
quite extraordinary things like chimeras. At the very least, that seems like a
rather unusual kind of relation.
In any event, the theory of descriptions that first emerges in (Russell,
1905/2008), changes tack (Makin, 2000, ch. 3 notwithstanding) on the
existence of chimeras, unicorns and the like. Perhaps from a semantics of
natural language point of view the theory of descriptions appears promising,
from a phenomenological point of view, it appears less so. When I think
about Pegasus, my thoughts appear to be about the concrete, flesh and blood
(though non-existent) Pegasus. What they do not seem to be about are
descriptions.

I certainly do not intend this to be an argument against

Russell’s theory of descriptions. My point is merely that if intentionality is a
relation to Russellian propositions, and if the occurrence of ‘Pegasus’ in such
propositions is to be analysed away by the theory of descriptions, then this
account of intentionality appears phenomenologically inadequate.
Finally, I want to discuss a feature of Russellian propositions that I find
troubling in the present context of trying to find the right relatum in the
intentionality relation. However, to bring out the concern I cannot avoid
broaching the issue of the unity of the proposition. Soames (2010, pp. 11-
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32)32 notwithstanding, the problem of the unity of the proposition is the
problem of saying how the constituents that make up a proposition manage
to adhere together, and thereby make it a proposition at all. For Frege, the
glue that binds the constituent sinn into a cohesive complex sinn
(thought/proposition) is the saturation, or lack thereof, of the constituent
sinn (Frege, 1892/1997). It is the unsaturatedness of certain sinn that draw
the saturatedness of other sinn towards them, therefore binding the
proposition. 33

For Russell, the relation indicated by the verb binds

propositions:

“Consider, for example, the proposition “A differs from B”.

The

constituents of this proposition, if we analyze it, appear to be only A,
difference, B. Yet these constituents, thus placed side by side, do not
reconstitute the proposition.

The difference which occurs in the

proposition actually relates A and B, whereas the difference after analysis
is a notion which has no connection with A and B…A proposition, in fact, is
essentially a unity, and when analysis has destroyed the unity, no
enumeration of constituents will restore the proposition…The verb, when
used as a verb embodies the unity of the proposition…” (Russell,
1903/1996, pp. 49-50).
Along with King, (King, 2007, p. 23), I take this passage to indicate that the
relation that the verb contributes to the proposition is what does all the
work.

Remember that on the Russellian view, the constituents of the

proposition ‘Mount Gugu differs from Mount Kilimanjaro’ are the actual
See n. 28 above. In fact, I take Soames’ point to be that there is a deeper source of the
problem of unity, not that the problem of unity is not the real problem.
33 Please excuse my rather crude explication of Frege here. I have always thought of the
binding of saturated and unsaturated sinn to be a process similar to the osmotic activity of
roots. When the amount of mineral salts in the roots of plants is less than that of the
surrounding soil, the roots draw in the water containing the salts.
32
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mountains and the actual relation of difference that holds between them. It is
this relation that unifies Gugu with Kilimanjaro into the proposition ‘Mount
Gugu differs from Mount Kilimanjaro’. King has his own concerns with
Russell’s account, the most pressing of which is that this appears to collapse
the distinction between propositions and the facts that make them true,
which in turn, makes problems for the possibility of false propositions (see
King, 2007, p. 23).
My concern is different. Recall that the question I am concerned with is
whether Russellian propositions can be that to which we are related via
intentionality.

This detour into Russell’s account of the unity of the

proposition has shown that what makes a proposition a proposition—i.e.
what unifies its constituents so as to form the proposition—is the relation
that the verb contributes. If propositions are the things to which we are
related via intentionality, then what makes something a proposition, what
unifies its parts into a whole, is extremely important. For Russell, what
makes ‘Mount Gugu differs from Mount Kilimanjaro’ a proposition is the
relation that holds between Mount Gugu and Mount Kilimanjaro—the
relation that the verb ‘differs’ contributes to the proposition. And that is
what gives me pause. A relation that holds between two things on the other
side of the world makes the proposition ‘Mount Gugu differs from Mount
Kilimanjaro’ a possible relatum of my intentional mental states. How can a
relation between two things on the other side of the world have this kind of
effect on what I am intentionally related to? At least on a view like Frege’s,
where it is the (unsaturated) sinn of ‘differs’ that creates the proposition that
acts as the relata of my intentional state, I need only grasp the proposition’s
constituent sinn. But on Russell’s view, the relation indicated by the verb
‘differs’ unifies the proposition by relating its other constituents, namely
Gugu and Kilimanjaro. But how can such a relation accomplish this; how
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does a relation that holds between two things on the other side of the world
make possible my thinking the proposition ‘Mount Gugu differs from Mount
Kilimanjaro’? To put things another way, if Gugu and Kilimanjaro do not
stand in the difference relation, then there is no proposition, and it therefore
cannot be that to which I am intentionally related.
To summarize, the view we have been considering is whether propositions
can be that to which we are related via intentionality. After pointing out that
what Montague calls propositionalism (Montague, Against Propositionalism,
2007), seems too exclusive for an exhaustive theory of intentionality, we
examined both the Fregean and the Russellian views of propositions. As
occupants of what Dummett calls the third realm, Fregean propositions faced
similar challenges to the p-properties view discussed in section 2.2.1.: How
can items that occupy a distinct ontological domain have a causal influence
on the realm of concreta? Frege’s answer is that they can have such influence
in virtue of the causal input of competent cognizers/graspers. But this raised
the question of how exactly the propositions affect the cognizers in the first
place, and whether the changes in the “inner world” of those who grasp the
relevant propositions would be the kind of changes Frege is after (see p. 37
above). We also raised some concerns about how intentionality could make
contact with this third realm, and suggested that the idea that propositions
get clothed in sentences does not help resolve the mysteriousness of the
view. Prima facie, Russellian propositions seem less mysterious candidates
for relata of the intentional relation on the count of (sometimes) having
concreta as constituents. We raised the problem of intentional inexistence
for the constituents of Russellian propositions, and noted that both of
Russell’s solutions—Meinongianism and the theory of descriptions—were
not without difficulties, though for different reasons. Finally, I suggested that
Russell’s account of the unity of the proposition makes propositions less than
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ideal candidates for that to which we are related via intentionality (see p. 42
above).
To be sure, I have not provided any knock down arguments against the
possibility of Fregean or Russellian propositions being that to which we are
related via intentionality. What I have tried to do is to explain that on the two
most prominent views of propositions, propositions are not unproblematic
candidates for playing this role.

2.3 Hybrid views
What I have considered so far are cases where the intentional relation relates
us to one sort of thing, or another (but not both). I have not considered
hybrid views, on which intentionality is sometimes a relation to, for instance,
ordinary concrete objects, and other times, abstracta such as properties or
propositions. The Impure DR-relation view, mentioned above (section 2.1.4),
would count as one such view. Briefly, on the most encompassing hybrid
view, my Sibyll-thoughts bear the intentional relation to my flesh-blood
Pyrenees, my square-root-of-pi thoughts bear the intentional relation to an
abstract number, my belief that spring is right around the corner to a
Russellian proposition, and my belief that unicorns have horns to a Fregean
proposition. Undoubtedly, this is the most pretheoretically plausible relation
view: Pretheoretically, it seems like I can indeed bear the thinking about
relation to all sorts of things, such as numbers, properties, propositions, and
so on. However, one wonders how to decide when intentionality is relating
us to one sort of thing and when it is relating us to another. Obviously, there
will be unproblematic cases, such as when I am thinking about my left hand,
and when I am thinking about the lowest prime number. But to handle cases
of intentional inexistence, representation under an aspect/description, and
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so on, by arbitrarily stipulating that such cases are all ones where the
intentional relation is a relation to some entity of an ontological category that
can countenance such things, seems a bit like a cheat.
More importantly, one wonders whether a single relation can play all these
roles. Causation, for instance, appears only to hold between entities of the
same ontological category.

Being taller than also appears incapable of

relating something concrete to something abstract. Perhaps there is a class
of relations that can traverse the divide between ontological categories, such
as relations to numbers. If x is an ordinary concrete object, then it seems
inoffensive to say that x bears a relation to an abstract object—namely the
number corresponding to its mass. However, the central concern here is not
the possibility of there being relations between entities of different
ontological categories—though, as the previous few sections point out, this
may indeed be problematic—but the possibility that a single relation could
hold between a mental state and a p-property in one instance, an a-property
in another, a proposition in another, and so on, seems like a lot of work for
said relation. Perhaps intentionality is a unique relation that can play all
these roles. I have not considered such a view, and I think that for someone
genuinely intent on providing a hybrid view, this is probably the best option.
On the other hand, for someone intent on one of the views we have already
considered, I think the most plausible option is a Fregean type view. At least
on such a view intentionality is a univocal relation in the sense that it is
always a relation to one ontological realm—namely the realm of sinn.
At this point, a brief summary is in order. We began by noting that if
intentionality is a relation, then two questions emerge: 1) What kinds of
things does intentionality relate us to, 2) What kind of relation is
intentionality. This chapter has focused on 1). I do not pretend to have
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proven or disproven anything.

Rather, what I take myself as having

accomplished is raising concerns that arise for many of the most popular
answers to 1). I have examined some concerns that crop up for views that
take intentionality to be a relation to ordinary objects—these stemming
mainly from problems about intentional inexistence. I have also mentioned
some worries for views that take intentionality to be a relation to
properties—be they Platonic or Aristotelian. I considered the possibility that
propositions, whether Fregean or Russellian, are one of the relata in the
intentional relation, and found some difficulties with both construals. Finally,
I considered the possibility of providing a hybrid view, but noted that such a
view demands quite a lot of a single relation.
In the end, many of the concerns I raised for the various views I considered
revolved around the slightly mysterious nature of the relation that would be
required to relate mental states to the favoured entity, or entities. I thus set
aside the issue what kinds of things intentionality relates us to, and focus
instead on the nature of the intentional relation.
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Chapter 3: The Intentional Relation
At this point, I propose to set to one side the issue of what kinds of things we
are related to via intentionality, and look instead at several attempts to
specify the intentional relation.

The goal, once again, is to raise some

concerns about the relational view. I mentioned earlier that if we assume the
relation view, then two questions emerge: 1) What sorts of things does
intentionality relate us to, and 2) how exactly are we to understand the
intentional relation? The former was the focus of the preceding chapter. The
latter is the focus of the present chapter. The idea is that if there are
concerns about the leading answers to both questions, then it might be
worthwhile to look into alternatives to the view that prompted both
questions—namely the relational view of intentionality.
To the extent that the following various accounts avail themselves of
everyday or abstract objects, the worries I raised in the last chapter apply
here. In what follows, I examine several leading views of the intentional
relation, and raise familiar, sometimes perennial, problems that crop up for
each. None of the concerns I raise are intended to be conclusive refutations.
Instead, I want simply to rehash some old complaints and raise a new one
here and there. My goal is to remind the reader of some concerns regarding
the views under consideration, in the hopes of motivating an alternative
thesis that I will examine in Part 2.
By far the most popular and widespread relation views are tracking based
accounts, e.g. (Dretske, 1981), (Dretske, 1997), (Fodor, 1992), (Millikan,
Biosemantics, 2002). Though they differ in the details, all share some basic
features. First, and most obviously, all take intentionality to be a kind of
tracking relation, where tracking is something like keeping track of or
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indicating something.34 Second, most aim at providing a naturalistic account
of intentionality. While different theorists have different views about what
naturalism amounts to, some common criteria include the requirement that
intentionality be the kind of thing that could be had by a purely physical
entity; and that no semantic/intentional terms be invoked in the analysis.35
Third, with few exceptions, e.g. (Millikan, 2002), the majority of tracking
views take causation to figure centrally in tracking.

3.1 Causal Based Tracking Theories:
The initial impetus for causal based tracking theories can be traced back to
Dennis Stampe (Stampe, 1977). Stampe considers a case of photographic
representation.

Why, asks Stampe, is a picture of one identical twin a

representation of that particular twin and not her sibling? Resemblance
cannot help us here: the twins are identical in appearance. According to
Stampe, the reason is that one twin figures in the causal history of the
picture, whereas the other does not. Causation, it appears, plays a central
role in the representation relation.
We might thus construct a crude theory36 of intentionality based on Stampe’s
observation: Mental state type, M, is about some external world item, X,
because tokens of X cause tokens of M. Let us assume that M is the mental
representation, concept, or mental picture of a dog; and X is a dog, the
property of being a dog, or etc. The reason, according to this crude theory,
that M is about dogs is that dogs (or the property of being a dog) cause it.
However, the above view suffers from a well-known defect, and looking at
A compass tracks magnetic north, radar tracks flying objects, and thermometers track the
temperature in the room.
35 This one is especially evident in (Fodor, 1988, ch. 4).
36 A “crude causal theory” in Fodor’s parlance (see Fodor, 1988).
34
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how various theorists have sought to rectify it will help further sort causalbased tracking theories.
The defect is this: There are all sorts of things that can cause me to have
thoughts about dogs.37 Blows to the head, hallucinogenic drugs, coyotes and
veterinarians numbers on caller ID can all cause me to have dog-thoughts.
Thus, according to this simple theory, my dog-thoughts are not just about
dogs, but also about blows to the head, hallucinogenic drugs, coyotes and
caller IDs. Moreover, the theory would seem to preclude the possibility of
misrepresentation: How can I possibly get things wrong if everything that
causes a particular thought in me counts among the items in the thought’s
extension (Fodor, 1988)?38 Causation seems insufficient to distinguish the
kinds of causes that count as the contents of our dog-thoughts from those
that do not. What is needed here is some principle whereby we can sort
content fixing causes (hereafter content causes) from other causes—a
theoretical supplementation that allows us to rule out bad causes, and say in
such cases that one is misrepresenting.

3.2 Normal Conditions:
One such attempt to supplement the causal relation is to specify conditions
under which X causing M would suffice for M’s being about/meaning X, and
holding that these conditions are “normal”. Here too, Stampe (1977, sect. 8)
seems to be among the first to invoke such conditions within the context of a
causal theory.39,40 If, for instance, we want to specify the normal conditions

I use ‘thought’ here fairly loosely. E.g. I count tokening the mental symbol/concept DOG as
a dog thought.
38 This is a very cursory explanation of what Fodor calls the disjunction problem, but a great
deal will be said about it in what follows.
39 Stampe calls them “fidelity conditions”.
37
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under which we represent horses accurately, we would look at the occasions
in which horses cause us to have horse-thoughts and specify the conditions
that obtain in those occasions as normal. Then, when something other than
horses causes us to have horse thoughts, we would find that one or more of
the conditions that we have dubbed normal failed to obtain, provided our list
of normal conditions was good. Hence, though a cow on a dark night can
sometimes cause a horse thought, the fact that the normal conditions failed to
obtain allows us to rule out cow from the content of our horse thought, thus
delivering a verdict of misrepresentation in such instances.
With respect to intentionality, the normal conditions can be things such as
proper lighting, an unobscured view, the absence of an evil genius
manipulating your neurons, etc. To use our previous example, your dog
thoughts are about dogs because, under normal conditions, dogs cause them.
The intentionality of your dog thoughts is explicated in terms of the causal
relation that holds between your representing a dog and the presence of dogs
under normal conditions.

3.3 Objections and Responses

3.3.1 A Worry About Too Long a List
First, there is a general worry about how to specify all the normal conditions,
and what such a list would look like. Recall that it is these normal conditions
that are supposed to do the work of weeding out bad causes from content
causes so as to allow for misrepresentation. So, with every possible badcause, the list of normal conditions would need to include, or be expanded to
Color theorists, in the realist camp, often appeal to such conditions as well (see, for
instance, Tye, 2002).
40
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include, some condition—deemed normal—that failed to obtain. The idea
here is that the list of normal conditions would not just specify good lighting,
proper distance, etc. It would also have to include that the representer is not
wearing obscuring lenses, is not under the influence of psychedelic drugs, is
not seeing a distorted reflection, is not subject to the experiments of an evil
genius, is not color-blind, is not pathologically obsessed with seeing cows so
as to be suffering from some sort of perceptual self-deception, etc.

3.3.2 The Distinction Between Normal Conditions and Content
Another concern here comes from Fodor (1992, pp. 42 - 43), who asks what
exactly keeps the proposed normal conditions from being part of the content,
rather than mere determinants thereof. That is, if my dog thoughts are about
dogs because under normal conditions dogs cause them, then what makes
the content of my dog thoughts dogs rather than dogs-under-normalconditions?

3.3.3 Do Non-Existents Have Causal Powers?
Fourth, recall that the normal conditions line is still a causal theory. There is
thus a question about what to say about things that do not exist. I can have
thoughts about thestrals, dragons, Penrose triangles and Golden Mountains.
With respect to mere non-existent things, an appeal to counterfactuals might
help here: I can represent or misrepresent thestrals because at the nearest
possible world where thestrals exist, the normal conditions for the tokening
of thestral-thoughts would be thus and so. However, it is not immediately
clear how this line would work for impossible objects/properties. Is there
some possible world wherein Penrose triangles and round squares are
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instantiated such that we could glean the normal conditions for the tokening
of the relevant thoughts (see Kriegel, 2011, p. 138)?

3.3.5 An Unnatural Worry
A fifth, more technical objection comes from Fodor (1992, p. 44), who argues
that there is a strong teleological factor underpinning normal condition
accounts. Writes Fodor:

Thermometers are OK; given normalcy conditions…the nomic covariance
between the length of the column and the temperature of the ambient air
determines what the device represents. Violate the normalcy conditions
and, intuition reports, you get wild readings; i.e., misrepresentations of
the temperature.

But, of course, thermometers are for measuring

something, and precisely what they’re for measuring…is what the present
analysis treats as a causal (rather than a normalcy) condition. Compare,
by way of contrast, the diameter of the coin in my pocket. Fix my body
temperature and it covaries with the temperature of the ambient air; fix
the temperature of the ambient air, and it covaries with temperature of
my body. I see no grounds for saying that one of these things is what
really represents and the other is a normalcy condition (1992, p. 44).
According to Fodor, what accounts for the difference in the two cases, is that
in the case of the thermometer, we have a sense of what it is for. And since
“being “for” something is surely a matter of being intended for something
(Fodor, 1992, p. 43)”, the normal conditions line seems to be smuggling in the
intentional, pace naturalism.

However, if you find yourself within the

naturalist-causal-tracking camp, then the thing to do here would be to specify
some naturalistically kosher form of teleology.

54

3.3.6 Intentional Perfection
All that being said, the most pressing concern for the normal conditions line
is that it deems it impossible to misrepresent when conditions are normal.
That is, if all the normal conditions obtain, then we cannot misrepresent.
With respect to this point, I direct the reader to Mendelovici (2010, pp. 28 –
38, MS). I will not rehearse her entire argument here, but I will note that
there are several plausible examples (e.g. color and pain representation)
where we consistently, and reliably, misrepresent things. And while some of
these cases might be ones where normal conditions fail to obtain, it does not
seem likely they all are. Otherwise, in virtue of what should we say that the
conditions that always fail to obtain in these problematic cases are normal?
That is, if the normal conditions that are required for accurate color/pain
representations never obtain, then in what sense are they normal? See also
(Mendelovici, 2013), who argues that the mere possibility of cases of reliable
misrepresentation is problematic for tracking theories such as the normal
conditions view.

3.4 Teleology: Evolution and Education
A second41 way to supplement the causal relation is by appeal to teleology.
Again, what I have to say here pertains to causal-teleological theories (e.g.
Dretske, , 1981, 1997). Millikan’s (Millikan, Biosemantics, 2002) non-causal
teleological view will be addressed later. While causal teleological theories
are varied, at the core of most is some common ground. Recall our initial
I say second here, but a normal conditions advocate might specify the normal
teleologically: The normal conditions are those that instantiate a design conditions type—
where design conditions are those under which a particular causal-intentional relation was
selected for by natural selection.
41
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crude causal theory: intentional states track (viz. are about) their causes.
This turned out to be problematic because causation alone is insufficient to
distinguish between content causes, and other causes. Whereas the normal
conditions advocate contended that my dog-thoughts are about dogs (rather
than convincing dog statues) because, under normal conditions, they are
caused by dogs, the teleological theorist contends that my dog-thoughts are
about dogs because it is their job to track, indicate, or provide information
about dogs. To be as straightforward as possible, the question is: Given that
intentionality is a causal relation, how do we sort out good causes from bad
ones? The teleological theorist says that the good causes are those that occur
when the thing doing the representing is functioning properly. The causal
relation is supplemented by an appeal to proper functioning. The challenge
now is to say in virtue of what a particular representation has the particular
job/function it does: Why is it my dog thoughts’ job to be about, track,
indicate or carry information about dogs?

3.4.1 Natural Selection
One prominent answer here is that natural selection determines what job a
particular representation has. For example, a rabbit’s dog-thoughts have the
job of tracking dogs because it was this function that helped its ancestors
survive and reproduce. That is, nature favored those rabbits whose dog
thoughts preformed this function.

3.4.2 Which Cause?
A set of related concerns here stem from the fact that natural selection does
not appear to deliver the kind of content determinacy we might want for our
theory of intentionality.

For instance, it seems perfectly plausible that

56

rabbits whose dog thoughts were caused by not only dogs, but also wolves,
wolverines, etc., would have been equally favoured by the forces of evolution.
In which case, the function of a rabbit’s dog thoughts (as determined by
natural selection) would be to track not only dogs, but also all these other
dog-looking creatures.
Relatedly, for any causal relation between a dog and a dog thought, there is a
host of intermediaries in the causal chain. In the case of vision, light reflected
off the dog must stimulate the rabbit’s retina, and so on. In olfaction, scent
particles must travel from the dog through the air and be received and
processed by the rabbit’s olfactory system. The problem is that any selection
for dog caused dog-thoughts is equally a selection for these causal
intermediaries. So natural selection appears inadequate to determine that
the function of a dog thought is to track dogs rather than reflected light, scent
particles, etc. Moreover, natural selection would seem to favour the set of
undetached dog partsdog thought connection every bit as much as the
dogdog thought connection, so there might be an additional worry about
determinacy here.42

3.4.3 Naturally Selecting Error
A similar concern involves the possibility of naturally selecting for error.
Imagine that a small subset of the early humanoids were visually constituted
such that upon encountering berries that others would see as red and ripe,
they see the berries a sickly yellow color—quite unappetizing. As huntergatherers, berries figure importantly in the diet of early humanoids. Now
imagine that due to some rare climatic conditions, one particular species of
42For

extended arguments that only a particular kind of intentionality (or a particular point
of view on a given content) can deliver determinacy, in the above sense, see (Searle, 1987),
(Horgan & Graham, 2012).
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plant, whose red berries are highly toxic, has proliferated and outcompeted
its evolutionary rivals. In this case, it seems as though evolution would favour
the misrepresenters.

3.5 Learning
Another influential answer to the question of what makes something the
function of a representation is Dretske’s learning model (Dretske, 1981).

In teaching someone the concept red, we show the pupil variously colored
objects at reasonably close range and under normal illumination. That is,
we exhibit the colored objects under conditions in which information
about their color is transmitted…This is why we cannot teach someone
the colors if we put the objects 400 yards away…This is why we do not
carry out such training in the dark, or under abnormal illumination…In the
learning situation special care is taken to see that the incoming signals
have an intensity, a strength, sufficient unto delivering the required piece
of information to the learning subject. If the lights are too dim, they are
turned up. If the objects…are too far away, they are brought closer. If the
subject needs his glasses, they are provided (1981, pp. 194-195).
According to this model, an M thought has the function of indicating Ms
because of a learning period wherein the representer is trained to token Mthoughts in M instances. The crucial part here is that during the learning
period, a teacher ensures that the causal correlation of M thoughts to Ms in
the fledgling representer becomes increasingly robust by ensuring optimal
conditions obtain during the learning period.
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3.5.1 Normal Conditions Again?
One worry about this account is its seeming reliance on normal conditions. It
is the teacher’s job to ensure that e.g. the lighting is good and the relevant
objects are not too far way, etc. If these teacher-insured normal conditions
do any theoretical lifting, worries similar to the ones raised above (about
normal conditions) apply. One worry was that the list of normal conditions
would turn out to be rather long, and this would mean a lot of work on the
part of the teacher—ensuring all conditions are met during the learning
process. Fodor’s concerns (1992, pp. 42 - 44) about finding some principled
means of excluding the set of normal conditions from the content of a given
representation (sect. 3.3.3 above), and about finding some non-arbitrary
means of saying what counts as the normal condition versus the content
(sect. 3.3.5 above) apply here too. Moreover, the learning model would need
to say something about how we come to have concepts with no worldly
extension. For instance, how exactly do we determine the normal conditions
for the correct learning of the concept dragon?

3.5.2 A Worry About Naturalism
Relatedly, one might ask how the teacher goes about determining what
conditions are optimal for learning a particular concept. That is, why would
the teacher think that a particular lighting condition would be most
conducive to producing content causes of red thoughts? Presumably, the
teacher surveys the conditions under which s/he has red caused red
thoughts and duplicates them for the student. The problem here is that this
move appears to put things backwards. Rather than getting representations
from normal conditions, we are constructing normal conditions from
representations. What was sought here was a naturalistic theory of
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intentionality/representation—a

theory

that

explained

the

target

phenomenon without appeal to semantic/intentional terms. The hope was
that by invoking the notion of the function of a representation, and having
this function be determined by a learning period in which a teacher ensures
the conditions are conducive to learning a particular concept, we could sort
out genuine content causes from misrepresentations. The problem, however,
is that the conducive conditions appealed to in our explanation are derived
from the representations of the teacher, and so we have not done away with
semantic/intentional terms after all.

3.5.3 A Worry About Intentional Smuggling
In a similar vein, Fodor too charges this account with smuggling in
intentional items (Fodor, 1992, pp. 41-42). Fodor’s objection runs thus:
Assume the learning period is over, and the new graduate tokens a dog
thought as a result of encountering a fox. Given that the learning period has
established a law-like connection between dogs and dog thoughts, and this
instance is one that fails to instantiate the law, we have a case of
misrepresentation: the new graduate has mistaken a fox for a dog. So far, so
good. However, given that a fox caused a dog thought at time T (where T=the
moment after graduation), it seems likely that it would have caused the same
thought at time T-1 (i.e. right before graduation). But then what licenses our
classifying this event as a misrepresentation? That is, if a fox would have
caused a dog thought during the learning period, why is the content of a dog
thought dog rather than (dog or fox)?
One response here, on behalf of the causal teleological theorist, is that had
this event occurred during the learning period, the teacher would have
corrected the student. But such a response is not open to the naturalist: As
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mentioned above, Fodor’s point about invoking the intentions of the teacher
as an essential part of the explanation of how representations get their
content appears to apply.

3.5.4 Evolution as an Inappropriate Tool
While highly implausible, someone determined on the learning model might
argue that rather than relying on his/her own representations in order to
glean the conditions most conducive to learning, the teacher actually gets
these conditions by appeal to something like design conditions.43 On this
line, the teacher tries to replicate the conditions under which a particular
causal-intentional relation was selected for by natural selection.
Or, as in the case with Dretske’s later work (see Dretske, 1997, p. ch.1), we
might dispense with the notion of a teacher, allowing that there is a perfectly
clear sense in which being designed for (i.e. designed to indicate, represent)
does not imply a designer. In other words, perhaps evolution alone can do
the job of determining the function of X. Dretske seems to think so, at least
with respect to what he calls “natural representation” (1997, pp. 7-8). For
Dretske, the senses, for instance “…have information-providing functions,
biological functions, they derive from their evolutionary history (1997, p. 7).”
Evolution has imbued the senses with the function of carrying information to
the organism whose senses they are. Olfaction, for instance, has the function
of carrying chemical information about the environment in which an
organism finds itself.
The worry here is an extension of those I raised in the context of natural
selection theories. Because natural selection can confer a survival advantage
43

This is not, of course, Dretske’s view. I am merely trying to tick off the possibilities.
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on misrepresenters, it can likewise determine that the design conditions are
those under which the misrepresentation takes place. To use our previous
example, the design conditions under which our ancestors were caused to
have their cougar thoughts may be precisely those conditions under which
they were caused to have cougar thoughts by bears on dark nights. So,
design conditions may be ill equipped to establish the law-like correlation
between cougar thoughts and cougars required. Again, there are probably a
whole host of possible responses here, and I cannot hope to address them all.
However, abstracting a bit, we might say that evolution, as a system designer,
does not carve out the evolutionary history of an organism along semantic
lines such as satisfaction, accuracy, or truth; it is blind to failures such as
misrepresentation and falsity. Evolution is a process concerned solely with
continuation and adaptation.

If getting things representationally wrong

ensures the continuation of a species, then evolution rewards falsity. I am
not saying that we could not construct a theory that takes evolutionary
success as the mark of veracity, but such a theory would imply a pseudoMachiavellian

semantics—taking

evolutionary

success

as

the

only

justification for our attributions of truth, falsity, accuracy, etc. And I doubt
that any of the theories under discussion would endorse such a move. The
point, to repeat, is that evolution seems like a tool better equipped to reward
adaptability than veracity.

3.6 Asymmetric Dependence
A third and widely discussed proposal for supplementing the causal theory is
asymmetric dependence (Fodor, 1992, 1988).

Importantly, asymmetric

dependence represents a departure from the accounts we have so far
considered. While the previous theories tended to look for what goes wrong
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in cases of misrepresentation—e.g. the conditions weren’t right for good
causings, or there was a malfunctioning—asymmetric dependence focuses on
the relationship between misrepresentation and representation. The core
idea behind the theory is that getting things wrong somehow depends on it
being possible to get things right, but not the other way around. Non-content
causes thus depend on content causes in a way that content causes do not
depend on non-content causes. What does the work of weeding out noncontent causes is their asymmetric dependence on content causes. And what
makes a content cause the content of a representation is (among other
things) its being that upon which non-content causes are asymmetrically
dependent.

3.6.1 The Theory
Setting this last point aside, I want to look a little more closely at Fodor’s
account. According to Fodor my X-thoughts are about Xs if:
1) ‘Xs cause X thoughts’ is a law.
2) Some X thoughts are actually caused by Xs
3) For any Y such that Y ≠ X, if Ys sometimes cause X thoughts, then Ys
causing X thoughts is asymmetrically dependent on Xs causing X
thoughts (Fodor, 1988, p. 109).44
A brief example will perhaps be helpful here. The reason why horse thoughts
are about horses is because horses cause them. And any non-horse, (say) a
cow on a dark night, that causes horse thoughts does so in virtue of horses
causing horse thoughts. If you break the connection between horses and
For reasons of terminological consistency, I have continued to speak of X thoughts, rather
than tokens of ‘X’, concepts, or mental symbols. Also, there are two points Fodor bids us to
keep in mind. First, these conditions are meant to apply synchronically (1988 pg. 109).
Second, the theory is to be understood in terms of the nomic relations among properties
(1992 pg. 102). Nothing I will have to say rides on confusing either of these points.
44
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horse thoughts, the connection between cows on dark nights and horses
thoughts would also be broken. But break this latter connection and the
horse-horse thought connection remains; hence the asymmetry.

3.6.2 A Worry About Scope
First, and foremost, it should be noted that these are meant only as sufficient
conditions for aboutness. Unicorns and Penrose Triangles would not, for
instance, be objections here on account of failing to satisfy 1) and 2). That
said, condition 1) seems to make the theory problematically limited. Since
Fodor is adamant that the theory be understood in terms of the nomic
relations among properties (1992 pg. 102), and since laws range over
properties, not individuals, there will be a lot more than theoretical, logical
and vacuous concepts that the theory cannot account for: Thoughts that
appear to involve an individual such as singular thoughts about my father, or
proper name thoughts, will also fail to fall under the purview of asymmetric
dependence. The concern here is thus that the theory might be too narrow in
scope to be the full story of my intentional mental life.

3.6.4 A Concern About Exclusivity
There appear to be some difficulties that arise for Conditions 1) & 2).
Conditions 1) requires that X’s cause X thoughts be a law, and condition 2)
requires that at least some X-thoughts be actually caused by Xs. Given this,
the theory cannot allow for situations where an X-thought is always caused
by something other than X. As I mentioned in section 2.1.1, Mendelovici
(2010) has argued convincingly that color-thoughts are precisely the kind of
thoughts deemed impossible by condition 2): Our color representations
always represent something other than their causes. Color thoughts are most
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plausibly caused by light reflectance profiles, but these are not what I
represent when I represent color.45
Of course, someone might argue that in light of such arguments we should be
color realists; but this seems backwards. We would not, for instance, argue
that because our theory of intentionality requires the existence of unicorns
that we ought to be realists about unicorns. That said, comparing colors to
unicorns does seem slightly unfair.

In fact, however, the problem for

condition 2) is not that color realism is false, it is that condition 2) requires
that it cannot be. In effect, condition 2) rules out the possibility of our
consistently misrepresenting something (Mendelovici, 2010). Though it
would lose some of its literary effect, the point about unicorn realism could
be turned around: a theory of intentionality should not require us to deny the
existence of unicorns either (See also Mendelovici, 2013, section 6.2).
For clarity’s sake: The worry I am trying to raise here is not that asymmetric
dependence cannot countenance unicorn thoughts. It patently can. The story
about unicorns is that the property of being a unicorn would cause unicorn
thoughts in the nearest world where unicorns exist.46 “There can, of course,
be a nomic connection between properties one or more of which is de facto
uninstantiated…[U]nicorns…would be nomically sufficient for ‘unicorn’tokenings if there were any (Fodor, 1988, pp. 163-164 n.5)”. In other words,
there is a law-like connection between the property of being a unicorn and
the thought it would cause were there any unicorns. No, the concern raised
by Mendelovici, that I am here echoing, is that as stated, the theory rules out
the possibility of there being nomic connection between Ys and XFor arguments that color realism is false, I direct the reader to C.L. Hardin (Hardin, 1988).
For arguments to the contrary see (Byrne & Hilbert, 2003).
46 In the addenda to Naming and Necessity, Kripke offers interesting insights about the
possibility of unicorns. However, as endorsing his argument requires the acceptance of
essential properties, I chose not to rely on it.
45
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representations that is not dependent on any other nomic connection
between Xs and X-representations—where Y are not Xs, that is, where Xthoughts always misrepresent Ys.
Again, perhaps this is not so devastating; perhaps, as it turns out, there just
aren’t any cases of what can be called nomic misrepresentation.47 However,
blunted though the objection might be, there is still something concerning
about excluding the possibility of such cases apriori.

What exactly is

concerning about such an exclusion? It seems like the existence, or lack
thereof, of cases of this kind of misrepresentation is an empirical matter, to
be sorted out by investigation not stipulation (see Mendelovici, 2013).
Condition 3) is the asymmetric dependence clause: For any Y such that Y ≠
X, if Ys sometimes cause X-thoughts, then Ys causing X-thoughts is
asymmetrically dependent on Xs causing X-thoughts. To use one of our
previous examples: Though horses sometimes cause me to have cow
thoughts, my cow thoughts are about cows and not horses because horses
causing cow-thoughts is asymmetrically dependent on cows causing cowthoughts. Break the cow cow-thought connection, and you thereby break the
horse cow-thought connection; but break the horse cow-thought connection,
and the cow cow-thought connection remains. It is this condition that is
supposed to do the work of weeding out bad causes from content causes.

3.6.5 Pathological Misrepresentation
In (Adams & Aizawa, 1992), a host of pathological cases are submitted as
putative counter examples to Asymmetric Dependence. The following can be
Nomic misrepresentation = misrepresentation that occurs in a law-like
manner.
47
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seen as raising the same sort of concern: Assume that ‘dogs cause dog
thoughts’ is a law, and that some dog-thoughts are in fact caused by dogs, so
that conditions 1) and 2) are satisfied. Now, imagine that we find some
artificial means of producing dog thought tokens, say a particularly refined
blow to the head. The question is whether this artificial means of producing
dog-thoughts asymmetrically depends on a law like connection between dogs
and dog thoughts. We might even push the example further and say that we
have become such accomplished head hitters that we are able to produce,
with law-like consistency, dog-thoughts by this means.

The question is

whether the blow to the headdog-thought connection depends, in any way,
on the dogdog-thought connection. In other words, and at the very least, it
does not appear that the reason why the blow to the head causes dogthoughts is that dogs do.
Someone keen on asymmetric dependence might argue that extraordinary
though it seems, breaking the dog dog-thought connection would in fact
break the blow-to-the-head dog-thought connection: If dogs do not cause
dog-thoughts, then in virtue of what should we call such thoughts dogthoughts. The idea, I take it, is that it only makes sense to call a painting a
dog painting because of its connection (in this case similarity) to dogs. If this
connection is broken, say, because dogs look a lot like ants, then in virtue of
what should we call this painting of a large furry animal a dog painting?
The problem with this kind of response is that it seems circular, assuming
that concepts are individuated by their referents, which on Fodor’s view are
their contents. Asymmetric dependence is supposed to give us an account of
the aboutness of our X-thoughts—viz. why this particular thought is about Xs.
In the process of explaining the relation in virtue of which X-thoughts are
about Xs, it seems circular to assume that the thoughts in question are the
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thoughts they are in virtue of the relation you are attempting to explain. If
my dog thought is the thought it is in virtue of its connection to dogs, then it
follows trivially that it is no longer a dog thought if this connection is broken.
And if the relevant thought is no longer a dog thought, then it follows trivially
that anything else connected to it (say, a blow to the head) will also fail to be
connected to a dog thought.
Of course, Fodor does not argue this way. For Fodor, concepts and their ilk
are not wholly individuated by their contents, but partially by their form
(2008, p. 75). 48 This is how a purely referentialist semantics avoids
Paderewski cases:49 It is because John has two concepts—Paderewski1 and
Paderewski2—that he can wonder (coherently) whether Paderewski is
Paderewski.

And, this being the case, our blow-to-the-head problem

remains: Assume that dog-thoughts have the form F, and that the power of
dogs to cause dog-thoughts is reducible to their power to produce thought
tokens with the form F. A blow to the head’s power to produce thoughts with
the form F does not appear to asymmetrically depend on the power of dogs
to cause such thoughts.
Again, someone keen on asymmetric dependence will undoubtedly be able to
add to the theory to blunt some or all of the above objections. That is, I do
not think I have provided any knockdown arguments here. What I have tried
to do was show that, as a means of supplementing the causal relation in order
to allow for misrepresentation, asymmetric dependence is not without some
challenges.

3.3.6 Teleology without Causation

A similar line is taken by Fodor in his reply to Block (see Fodor 1992 pp.111-112).
Cases, that is, where the same man, Paderewski, is known by some for being an
accomplished musician, and by others as a politician.
48
49
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In her Biosemantics (Millikan, 2002), Ruth Millikan proposes a non-causal
based teleological theory.

For Millikan, intentionality is still a kind of

tracking relation that holds between intentional states and their contents.
What is different on her account is that contents are not causally determined.
An intentional state is about whatever item/state of affairs in a
representation consumer’s environment is required for said consumer to
function properly—where functioning properly is evolutionarily determined.
It is how a consumer uses the representation to function properly that
determines the content; and it is how a consumer’s ancestors used
representations of that type to survive and reproduce that determines what
it is to function properly. A consumer, on this view, is a system that exploits
the representation in the performance of its proper function.

In what

follows I will focus on organisms as consumers, rather than distinct
subsystems of said organisms. The distinction will not make much difference
to what I have to say.
The well-worn case of the frog snapping at flies will be useful here. To find
out the content of the frog’s representational state when it snaps at a fly, we
first ask how ancestral frogs would have used such a representation to
survive and reproduce. Presumably, the representation would have been
used for the acquisition of energy/nutrition. So the proper function of the
frog’s representational state is to track sources of energy/nutrition. When a
modern day frog snaps at a fly, the content of its representational state is
‘source of energy/nutrition’. Notice how well this account avoids the kinds of
bad-cause problems associated with causal theories. A causal theory has to
avail itself of the kinds of causes that can, in this case, figure in visual
representations—e.g. things like shape and color. And it is because of this
that a causal theory has a hard time ruling out BB’s from the content of the
frog’s fly representations. On the other hand, Millikan can grant that all sorts
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of things can cause a frog to token a fly-thought, because on her view, causes
are irrelevant to content. For Millikan, what matters for the determination of
content is how the representation is/was used to contribute to the survival
and reproduction of frogs.

3.7.1 Why Jack and Jill went up the hill
A set of concerns here stems from the implausible intentional explanations
this account seems to deliver in certain cases. In his famous tale of the kimu
and the snorf, Pietroski too stresses the implausible nature of the intentional
explanations the consumer-based account appears to deliver (Pietroski,
1992). The kimu are a docile species of herbivore that live near a large hill.
Their only predators are the carnivorous snorfs, who roam past the hill each
morning. At some point in the evolutionary history of the kimu, a particular
kimu, Jack, underwent a genetic mutation that caused him to token a
particularly pleasant mental state, M, in the presence of the rising sun. Each
morning when the sun came up over the hill, Jack tokened M, and ascended
the slopes in pursuit of the pleasant light of the early morning sun. As time
passed, those of Jack’s descendants who inherited the gene flourished as a
result of being at the top of the hill, pursuing the pleasant red light, when the
hungry snorfs past each morning to consume their non-M-tokening kin.
The rub is that according to Millikan’s account, the content of the kimus Mthoughts turns out to be something like ‘snorf-free zone’, or ‘safety this way’.
All the ingredients are here: We have some representation consumers (Jack’s
descendants), who have some intentional mechanism whose production of Rthoughts co-varies with the presence of some environmental feature. Some
ancestral kimus were able to survive and reproduce in virtue of using the
thought tokens of the M-type to avoid being preyed upon. This determines
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that the proper function of this intentional mechanism is to direct kimus out
of harm’s way. Thus the content of the kimus’ R-thoughts is ‘snorf free zone’.
However, according to Pietroski, though there are several plausible
candidates for the contents of the kimus’ R-thoughts—e.g. ‘sun over there’,
‘pleasant light that way’, etc.—R-thoughts are certainly not about snorfs.
Millikan’s account delivers the wrong intentional explanation; namely that
the kimus are thinking about snorfs when they token M. We are invited to
test this by imagining how the kimu would react if a herd of snorfs who had
undergone a genetic mutation so as to cause M-tokenings passed by the hill
(Pietroski, 1992, p. 276). The intuitive answer here is that the kimus would
head on over to the M source. Worse still, it is not so far fetched to think that
after several generations of climbing the hill before the immanent arrival of
the snorfs, the red loving kimus would have no idea what snorfs are, having
never encountered them. And yet Millikan’s theory still predicts that the
content of the kimus R-thoughts is ‘snorf free zone’.
The big picture here is that Millikan’s account does seem to capture an
important relation between an organism’s mental states and items in the
environment. After all, the co-variation of M-thoughts with snorf-free zones
is certainly useful in explaining the evolutionary success of the kimus. The
problem is that this relation looks like a poor candidate with which to
identify intentionality. The chief task of any relation view is to specify a
relation that explains why a mental state has the content it does.

The

problem with Millikan’s account is that the relation it homes in on does not
explain why a given mental state has the content it does, but rather, why a
given mental state was of an evolutionary advantage. And though the two
explanations can appear to converge—hence why consumer based theories
look plausible in some cases—their target phenomena are distinct.
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The kimu survived and reproduced because their R-thoughts led them out of
harm’s way. The proper function of the consumers of M-thoughts, in this
evolutionary sense, is to keep kimus from being eaten. This proper function
relation is the one Millikan’s theory identifies. However, the present case
shows that this cannot be the intentional relation, since the content of the
kimus’ M-thoughts is not ‘snorf-free zone’. Kimus could have M-thoughts,
and thereby pursue M-ly things, in a world without snorfs.

3.8 Concluding Remarks
We began with two questions that emerged as a result of assuming that
intentionality is a relation: 1) what kinds of things does intentionality relate
us to? And 2) what kind of relation is intentionality? I considered some of the
most popular answers to 1): Ordinary concrete objects, abstract properties
and propositions. Ultimately, I concluded that there are concerns about each,
and that taking intentionality to be a relation to one, several, or all of these
things can make the intentional relation appear a bit mysterious. As said, I
do not take myself as having conclusively ruled out any particular view, but
merely as having raised some concerns about the most popular views.
Setting the question of what objects might serve as contents aside, I went on
to look at a prominent family of views about the nature of the intentional
relation. Each attempted to account for intentionality in terms of a list of
relational ingredients.

These included evolution, learning, asymmetric

dependence, and biological proper functioning. The hope of the various
theorists considered was that the correct assembly of some of these
relational

ingredients

could

transform

intentionality.
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the

favoured

relation

into

The majority of the views considered were causal theories, which I
taxonomized by how each attempted to handle the problem of error.
Causation is, as it were, blind to semantic-like notions such as truth, falsity,
accuracy and error. Intentionality, on the other hand, is a phenomenon for
which such semantic notions appear to matter. So the challenge for the
causal theorist was to specify some supplemental element, X, that when
combined with causation, delivered a semantic relation. My conclusion was
that no theory was without its difficulties.
The last view I considered was Millikan’s teleological, consumer-based,
account. In general, theories that appeal to evolution in their attempts to
spell out the intentional relation may seem to have an advantage over rival
theories. To repeat, the common goal of all the theories we have considered
is to specify how the right combination of non-intentional elements could
give rise to intentionality; and the problem is that it is difficult to see how we
could get a semantic phenomenon out of a non-semantic relation such as
causation. The advantage of evolutionary theories is that the concept of
evolution comes, as it were, pre-furnished with normative notions such as
success and failure. And because normativity is also a property of those
troublesome semantic notions such as truth and falsity, perhaps evolution is
precisely the ingredient needed to get intentionality from non-intentional
elements. Perhaps we could cash out truth and falsity, or accuracy and error,
in terms of evolutionary success and/or failure.
The concern I raised is that the mapping between the concepts of
evolutionary success/failure on the one hand, and accuracy and error on the
other is not without its difficulties. The Kimus enjoyed evolutionary success
because their R-thoughts led them to snorf-free areas. But this evolutionary
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success does not translate unproblematically into truth or accuracy. If the
snorfs somehow learned to climb the hill, then the very same R-thoughts
would spell evolutionary failure for the kimus. But in both cases, the kimus’
thoughts were plausibly taken to be about red things.
To reiterate, I do not pretend to have refuted any particular theory about the
objects of intentionality, or the intentional relation. What I have done is
raised some concerns about many of the most popular answers to questions
1) and 2) above. This prompts the question: Is there an alternative to the
assumption that gave rise to 1) and 2)—namely, that intentionality is a
relation? It is to this that I now turn.
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Part 2 Intentionality and Phenomenality

4. Introduction: Phenomenality and Intentionality
I ended part 1 on an anticipatory note, suggesting that it is worthwhile
looking at alternatives to what I called the relational view of intentionality.
In this part of the thesis, I plan to do exactly that.
Employing Kriegel’s terminology of intentionality being “injected into the
world” (Kriegel, 2011, p. 17), we might take the view we are setting aside—
the relational view—as claiming that intentionality is injected into the world
by a relation to one or more types of things, a causal relation in most cases. In
this section, I will explore the alternative view that intentionality is injected
into the world in virtue of its close connection to phenomenal
consciousness.50
As I will use it, ‘consciousness’ denotes the same phenomenon as expressions
such as ‘what-it-is-like’, ‘phenomenality’, ‘how things are for me-ness’, ‘how it
is for me-ness’, ‘what it is like for me-ness’, ‘phenomenal consciousness’,
‘phenomenal character’, ‘experience’ and ‘qualitative character’. With such a
myriad of terms, it would be useful to pick one and stick with it; and, as far as
I can do that, I will. My preference is for ‘phenomenality’, but there will be
times when it will serve practical purposes to employ the slightly more
clumsy expressions ‘what-it-is-like’ and ‘how things are for me’ (and their
cognates). In any case, all such instances should be taken as denoting one and
the same phenomenon, namely phenomenality.

The vagueness of idioms such as “close connection to” is deliberate. The
view I will examine will become more definite in what follows.
50
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Why is it that I think the intentional and the phenomenal are closely
connected? First, they are both aspects of mentality. Both often happen
together, and, perhaps slightly more contentiously, both appear to converge
in several places: perception, olfaction, and so on. Representationalists
(intentionalists) such as (Tye, 2002), (Lycan W. G., 1996) and (Dretske, 1997)
have noted as much, arguing that at least some forms of phenomenality, such
as perception, are intentional. Additionally, it has been noted by several
important historical thinkers that consciousness (phenomenality) is always
consciousness of, where the ‘of’ is that of intentionality (Husserl, 1913/1998)
(Brentano, 1887/1995).51
For Husserl, phenomenological investigation involves bracketing off certain
elements (a process called epoche) of an experience in order to describe the
experience only in terms of what is available from the first person
perspective. And while the phenomenological question to be addressed will
partly determine what exactly gets bracketed off (Husserl, 1913/1998), the
positing of the existence of the things to which an experience is purportedly
directed

always

figures

in

(Husserl,

1900/2001).

That

is,

in

phenomenological investigation, we are to refrain from “naively positing the
existence of the objects,” or otherwise “going on to characterize them”
(Husserl, 1900/2001, p. 170).52 This follows from Husserl’s requirement that
the phenomenologist is to describe things exactly how they are from the first
person perspective: According to Husserl, from the first person perspective,
the existence, or lack thereof, of the purported objects of experience cannot
be determined.

53

Assuming one has bracketed off the relevant

See (Searle, 1992) for a dissenting view.
Excuse the rough-and-ready characterization of Husserllian
phenomenology.
53 Admittedly, this is a very rough characterization of Husserl’s
phenomenological approach. For a more thorough discussion of Husserl and
51
52

76

presuppositions, one arrives at an irreducible “abstract structure by virtue of
which the mind is directed” (Dreyfus & Hall, 1984, p. 2).
While my understanding of Husserl is rudimentary at best, the point here is
not to deliver an exacting exegesis of Husserl, but rather to draw on what I
take to be some of his insights. First, both Husserl and Brentano assumed
that phenomenality and intentionality were, at the very least, inseparably
intertwined.

For Husserl, directedness just is a phenomenal feature

(Gurwitsch, 1984) (Follesdal, 1984). Second, regardless of whatever else he
thought we could glean from phenomenal reduction, Husserl thought that
this phenomenal directedness was certainly accessible in this way. That is
not to say that Husserl thought phenomenal directedness was obvious and
apparent to anyone who gave it a minute’s reflection. That it required
phenomenological reduction to bring out indicates that Husserl may have
thought that the phenomenal directedness was introspectively unobtrusive,
subtle. Finally, Husserl’s view locates the source of directedness
(intentionality) in phenomenality.

For Husserl, it is consciousness that

injects intentionality into the world.54
Earlier, I listed several reasons for thinking that intentionality and
phenomenality are closely connected. Having mentioned what I take to be
some important Husserllian insights, I want to suggest a final motivation I
have for thinking that there is a close connection between intentionality and
phenomenality.

Like Husserl, I think that careful reflection on some

intentional experience can reveal a phenomenal feature of the experience

his contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science
see (Dreyfus & Hall, 1984).
54 Again, I am not hereby endorsing all of Husserl’s views. I would not, for
instance, follow Husserl in taking the noema—the entities in virtue of which
we are phenomenally directed—to be abstract entities (see Follesdal, 1984).
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that is best described as directedness, ofness or aboutness. To avoid inviting
talk of what this phenomenal feature directs us to, or is of/about, we can
describe

it

as

a

phenomenal

purporting-to-be-directed

(of/about).

Undoubtedly, this feature will be subtler in certain cases, yet no less present.
Again, this is not intended as some form of argument, or as evidence for some
further conclusion. It is merely an account of one of my principal motivations
for exploring views that accept a strong connection between intentionality
and phenomenality.
The proposal that intentionality and phenomenality are closely connected
stands in need of clarification. First, as a reminder, I am interested in whether
original 55 intentionality is closely connected to phenomenality.

More

importantly, what exactly is the nature of this close connection?
Undoubtedly there are any number of ways the connection might be
construed. It might turn out that phenomenality is identical to, reducible to,
or in some way dependent on intentionality. This kind of view is typically
associated with representationalists such as Tye (1995), Lycan (1996) and
Dretske (1997). However, most representationalists take intentionality to be
the kind of causal/covariational relation we discussed in chapter 3 (see, for
instance, Tye 2002; Dretske, 1997). The thinking is that intentionality is
reducible to some naturalistically acceptable causal/covariational tracking
relation;

phenomenality

is

reducible

to

intentionality;

therefore

phenomenality is reducible to some form of naturalistically acceptable
causal/covariational tracking relation. As one of our central purposes here is
to investigate non-relational alternatives to the relation view of

Hereafter, all uses of ‘intentionality’ (and its cognates) are to be
understood as elliptical for ‘original intentionality’.
55
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intentionality, the representationalism espoused by Tye, Lycan and Dretske,
do not fit the bill.56
On the other hand, it might turn out that intentionality stands in a
dependence relation to phenomenality—perhaps supervening on it.
Intentional content would then be determined (at least partly) by
phenomenal character. Call this the supervenience view. Or, someone might
take a very strong line on the relation between intentionality and
phenomenality—one on which intentionality and phenomenality are type
and token identical. On such a view intentional content and phenomenal
character name the same phenomenon. Call this the strong identity view.
Finally it might be that intentionality is a kind of phenomenality. On such a
proposal, intentional content would be a kind of phenomenal content. Call
this the moderate identity view.
In the next chapter, I will explore possible ways a theory of intentionality
might be developed in accordance with what I take to be the most plausible
of the three abovementioned views—the moderate identity view. I set aside
the supervenience view for the following reason: It is not obvious to me that
a relational phenomenon could not supervene on a non-relational
phenomenon. The grasping relation I bear to my coffee appears to supervene
on the neuromuscular events in my arm.

If this is the case then, the view

that intentionality supervenes on phenomenality may not be a non-relational
view after all. I also set aside the strong identity view. This is due mainly to
the fact that the strong view has certain implications that stand in need of
more time and space than I can reasonably allow for, given the time and
That is not to say that representationalism per se is inconsistent with a
non-relational view of intentionality: One might argue that phenomenality is
reducible to intentionality, and that intentionality is not a relation. I set this
proposal aside for the time being.
56
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space I devote to what I will later call the problem of cognitive contact. For
clarity’s sake, the general view about the relationship between intentionality
and phenomenality that we are going to explore is the moderate identity view:
intentionality is identical to a kind of phenomenality.

4.1 Phenomenality
On a very plausible understanding of phenomenality, the phenomenality of
some mental state is the way that state is for its subject—i.e. how that state
is, or what it is like for that subject.

We might call the particular

phenomenality of some mental state its phenomenal character.

Vague

though such a definition undoubtedly seems, I take such an understanding of
phenomenality to indicate that the phenomenal character of some mental
state is in some sense a modifying feature of that state. That is not to say that
there is the mental state M and then its phenomenal character P, and that P
then modifies M to produce PM.

Rather, I take the relevant kind of

modification to be more along the lines of how quickly, slowly, briskly, etc.
can modify running. It is not as if there can be unmodified runnings—
runnings that are neither fast, quick, slow, brisk, etc. Sure, one can run
without running quickly, but one cannot run without running in some way.
And just as there are not empty runnings that are then modified to become
quick runnings, there are not phenomenally empty mental states that are
then modified to become phenomenal mental states. The phenomenality of
some mental state is not something that can be stripped away from that state
to yield the mental state minus its phenomenal character, although we can
choose to bracket off, or focus on, some phenomenal features rather than
others. In the same way, we can focus on certain properties of the running
rather than others. Rather, the phenomenal character of some mental state is
one way for that mental state to be, just as quickly, slowly, briskly, etc. are
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ways runnings can be.

Moreover, just as slowly and quickly are ways

runnings can differ from one another, so too can phenomenalities be ways
mental states can differ from one another. If this is a plausible understanding
of phenomenality, then, given our goal of examining the moderate identity
view above, it follows that the kind of views we are interested in exploring
should construe intentionality as modifying features of some mental states.
But are there any such views?
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5 Phenomenal Intentionality Theory
Since the mid to late nineties, a growing number of theorists have become
increasingly unsatisfied by the standard picture of the mind that has it
divided between the phenomenal and the intentional. Among the first to
complain were Searle (1992) and Loar (2003)57, who, in their own ways,
contended that we really have no conception of intentionality/content as
divorced from consciousness. Siewert (1998) and Strawson (2010) too were
among the view’s early advocates, each having made foundational
contributions to what is now called Phenomenal Intentionality Theory
(hereafter PIT). More recent adherents include Kriegel (2013), Pitt (2009),
Horgan and Tienson (2002), Mendelovici (2010), Farkas (2008) and
Georgalis (2006). 58
While a varied bunch, phenomenal intentionalists are generally agreed on
several theses (see (Kriegel, 2013) for a more comprehensive list of the
central tenets of phenomenal intentionalism). One of the most central of
these is that intentionality and phenomenality do not form two separate
mental realms, but are instead inseparably intertwined (Horgan & Tienson,
2002). Many also take phenomenality to be the more basic or foundational of
the two. This latter point is what sets phenomenal intentionalism apart from
representationalism,

which

also

holds

Representationalists

usually

attempt

to

an

inseparability

reduce

thesis.

phenomenality

to

intentionality, and then account for intentionality in terms of one of the
tracking relations vetted in part 1 (see, for instance, Tye, 2002). That being
However, both Searle and Loar seemed to have denied the separatist
picture since at least the eighties; see (Searle, 1983) and (Loar, 1987).
58 However, I think Georgalis would reject the name ‘Phenomenal
Intentionality’.
57
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said, phenomenal intentionality theory does not require a commitment to the
basicness of phenomenality over intentionality. Indeed, several phenomenal
intentionalists, including Strawson (2004), Mendelovici (2010) and Pitt
(2009), hold theories on which intentionality is identical to phenomenality.
And if the two are identical, it does not make much sense to talk about the
basicness of one over the other. However, I take the ethos of phenomenal
intentionality theory to be different from that of representationalism, even
on identity views.59
In rough outline, adherents of PIT generally acknowledge a kind of
intentionality—phenomenal intentionality—that is in some way grounded in,
determined by, or identical to phenomenality (Kriegel, 2013) (Horgan &
Tienson, 2002) (Strawson, Mental Reality, 2010) (Siewert C. P., 1998). As a
corollary, the intentional content of a phenomenally intentional state is then
held to be determined by, or identical, to that state’s phenomenal content
(Horgan & Tienson, 2002).

For the most part, phenomenal intentionalists

take phenomenal intentionality to be basic (Kriegel, 2013) or conceptually
prior (Searle, 1992) to other kinds of intentionality. Stronger views, such as
Strawson’s (2010), hold that the only kind of real intentionality is
phenomenal intentionality.

5.1 Summary and Look Forward
Here is where things stand. I raised some concerns for some of the most
popular relation views of intentionality (ch. 1 – 3)—concerns that I thought
warranted exploring non-relational alternatives. From the fact that there
appears to be a close connection between phenomenality and intentionality
(ch.4), I suggested that we might begin our investigations with this in mind.
59

However, see (Mendelovici, 2010), who disagrees.
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What I proposed was that we explore a general view about the nature of the
relationship between intentionality and phenomenality—namely the
moderate identity view. In the previous section (sec. 4.1), I suggested that
phenomenality is plausibly construed as non-relational—a modifying feature
of some mental states. Given that the moderate view identifies intentionality
with a kind of phenomenality, it would seem to follow that we should be on
the lookout for theories on which intentionality is construed as a modifying
feature of mental states. On the face of it, phenomenal intentionality theory
(or certain versions of it) seems like a promising avenue down which we
might find one or more such theories. In the remainder of this chapter, I will
examine three versions of PIT that appear to fit the bill.

5.2 A First Approach
In the literature, there are different views about how to construe intentional
contents in such a way that intentionality does not turn out to be a relation.60
One such view, called type psychologism, comes to us from David Pitt (2009).
Pitt argues that intentional contents are phenomenal types, of which
particular phenomenal intentional episodes 61 are tokens. Intentional
episodes are phenomenally constituted such that a particular thought is a
token of some phenomenal type that just is that thought’s intentional
content. To illustrate the point, take the case of a prototypically sensational
episode, such as having a pain. For Pitt, one plausible way to understand
such states is not as relations to contents, but as being tokens of a particular
phenomenal type; namely, the painful type.

Hereafter, my use of ‘content’ should be taken as denoting phenomenal
intentional content.
61 Again, take ‘intentional episode’ broadly to include thoughts, perceptions,
etc.
60

84

For states such as pain, such an analysis seems pretty intuitive. The question,
however, is how well will it work for prototypically cognitive states, such as
believing that it will rain. The concerns here are twofold. First, if we take the
claim that intentional contents are phenomenal types, to imply that they have
phenomenality, then Pitt’s view implies there is something it is like to have
the thought that it will rain. Here, as Pitt claims in (2004), having the thought
that it will rain can be distinguished from taking a particular propositional
attitude towards the proposition ‘that it will rain’. The idea is simply that one
can entertain the proposition that it will rain without thereby believing,
fearing, or remembering it. However, even on this thin construal of what it is
to think that it will rain, Pitt’s view is that the content ‘that it will rain’ is a
phenomenal type. Hence, there is something it is like to token the content
‘that it will rain’.
Though philosophical orthodoxy is, I think, still sceptical of any such
phenomenality, there is a wealth of arguments (indeed, an entire volume
(Bayne & Montague, Cognitive Phenomenology, 2011)) dedicated to what is
called cognitive phenomenality.62 However, Pitt’s account does not merely
need there to be cognitive phenomenality; Pitt’s account needs said
phenomenality to, in some way, be constitutive of thought. If thinking that it
will rain is a matter of tokening a phenomenal type that just is that thought’s
content, then the content ‘that it will rain’ is a phenomenal type. It is a
phenomenal type of thing. In short, Pitt’s account actually needs there to be
enough phenomenality to the thought that it will rain to distinguish it from
all other thoughts. If there is just some generic phenomenality to cognition

62

For an early but especially convincing one, see Strawson (2010).
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such that all conscious thoughts have it, then individuating63 thoughts by
their phenomenal character would deliver a pretty short list of thoughts.
Perhaps that was too fast. The idea here is that on a very intuitive way of
individuating thoughts—the way I suggested back in part 1—thoughts are
individuated by their contents. If contents are phenomenal types, as per
Pitt’s account, then thoughts are individuated by phenomenal type. That
means either that there had better be a sufficiently distinct phenomenal type
that can constitute a particular thought’s content, or else, that there are not
very many types of thought. If the thought that it will rain is the thought it is
in virtue of its content, and this content is a phenomenal type, then either
every thought is the same (the generic phenomenality view), or else the
phenomenality of a particular thought is sufficiently distinct to distinguish it
from all other thoughts.
Presumably, Pitt does not want the former. Hence, he needs some story
about how the phenomenology of a thought is sufficient to distinguish it from
all other thoughts—sufficient, that is, to individuate it. Pitt has such a story,
and I think it a good one (Pitt, 2004, pp. 7-14). But rather than rehearsing his
arguments, I provide three simpler arguments that I find persuasive, in what
I take to be in order of increasing persuasiveness.

5.3 Three Arguments for Distinctiveness:
Assuming that there is cognitive phenomenality—something it is like to think
that it will rain—the question before us is whether or not that phenomenality
The way I am using it here, to individuate X is to distinguish it from other
Xs. Of course, there are better and worse ways to do this: I can stick post-its
on MRIs of my brain and therefore individuate my brain states with post-its.
But individuating intentional states by their content does not seem like such
an objectionable way of individuating them.
63
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is sufficient to individuate that particular thought. Struggle though you might
to put into words what exactly it was like to think that it will rain, imagine
that things are exactly that way, and ask yourself whether you could be
thinking a different thought. That is, if everything is phenomenally like what
it is like when you think it will rain, could you possibly be thinking another
thought? It is hard to deny that if how things are for you when you think that
it will rain are precisely how things are for you now, then you just are
thinking that it will rain. The point? If you accept what has so far been said,
then you cannot be thinking that it will be sunny, if things are exactly as they
are for you when you think that it will rain. Nor could you be thinking that
your dogs need supper, that your air conditioning is costing you a fortune, or
that there are only 23 species of crocodilian.
Perhaps the above did not convince you; let me try again: Think to yourself
that 16 + 32 = 48. Now, forget trying to describe how it was for you to think
that thought, do not bother trying to remember how it was. Simply ask
yourself whether your thinking that thought differed in some real, palpable,
phenomenally observable way, from a calculator’s computing it. The answer
is clearly yes. So, though you cannot describe it, there was something it was
like for you to think the thought, something you had, but the calculator
lacked. Of course, the obvious objection here is that though there might have
been some way it was to think that thought (that you had but the calculator
lacked), it was a generic what-it-was-likeness—too muted and indistinct to
do any work here. But is this right? That is, if how things are, is exactly how
they were for you when you thought the thought you did, would you not just
be thinking that thought. If what it was like for you to think that 16 + 32 = 48
is exactly what it is like for you right now, could you possibly be thinking
anything else? If the answer is no, then the what-it-is-likeness of thinking

87

that 16 + 32 = 48, though indescribable, is all that is needed to individuate
the thought from all others.
Final attempt: Imagine that you are omniscient and omnipotent with respect
to the phenomenality of some subject. Now, imagine that subject thinks 16 +
32 = 48, and you pay close attention to what it was like for him to entertain
that thought.

Now ask yourself the following: If you arranged things

phenomenally for that subject such that he was exactly the same as he was
when he thought that 16 + 32 = 48, what would he be thinking?64 Presumably
he would be thinking precisely that 16 + 32 = 48. In which case, fixing the
phenomenal character, the how things are, is sufficient for fixing the content
of 16 + 32 = 48-thoughts.
The point is this: If these arguments are right, then cognitive phenomenality
is indeed sufficient to deliver intentional individuation, and Pitt’s account is
viable up to this point.

5.4 Bonafide Thoughts and the Propositional Attitudes
Earlier, I said that there were two possible concerns with Pitt’s account. The
first was that Pitt needed the phenomenal character of thoughts to be
sufficient to individuate them. I have considered what I take to be plausible
reasons for thinking this might be possible. The second concern has to do
The reason why I like this kind of argument is that it does not rely on
actually describing, in distinct terms, the phenomenal character of the
various thoughts. Indeed, it need not even require that the phenomenal
character be, in principle, describable—other than, of course, being
describable as the phenomenal character of thinking that 2 + 2 = 4, or that it
will rain.
64
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with thoughts construed not thinly as mere occurrences of a particular
content, but as full on propositional attitude states. The problem, that is, is
that when the thought that it will rain occurs, it rarely does so as a mere
entertaining. When the thought that it will rain occurs to me, it typically does
so in the context of my believing, fearing, remembering or desiring that it will
rain. Remember that on Pitt’s account, contents are phenomenal types; so if
the content of my belief that it will rain is that it will rain, and the content of
my fear that it will rain is that it will rain, then it looks like we have two
thoughts that token the same phenomenal type. But then what resources
does Pitt’s account have to distinguish the two thoughts? I assume that we
would all like the desire that it will rain to count as a different thought than
the fear that it will. But if token thoughts are individuated by their contents,
which are phenomenal types, then what exactly distinguishes the desire that
it will rain from the fear that it will?
One option here is to recognize that the above is only a problem if you accept
that thoughts are wholly individuated by their contents. On one traditional
view, thoughts (in this rather thicker sense) are individuated by their
attitude + their content. So though the desire that it will rain and the fear
that it will have the same content, the two take a different attitude toward
said content and so are different thoughts. One move open to Pitt would be
to tell some story about how each attitude type has a corresponding
phenomenality such that this attitude + content schema could deliver the
individuation of bonafide propositional attitude thoughts. The idea here
would be that belief states have the phenomenal character of believing,
which, in conjunction with the phenomenal character of the content that it
will rain, would yield a unique phenomenally individuated propositional
attitude state (see Horgan & Tienson, 2002 for such an approach).
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Another option here is to reject the attitude/content distinction and hold that
propositional attitudes are part of the content of intentional states. On this
line the difference between believing that it will rain and fearing that it will is
a difference in content.65 Personally, I think this is the better option,
especially for a view like Pitt’s. After all, there does indeed seem to be
something it is like to believe something that is different from what it is like
to fear it. Taking such attitudes to be part of the content of intentional states
explains why believing that it will rain is a different thought than desiring
that it will. Each have different contents; each tokens a different phenomenal
type that includes the attitude type.

5.5 Two More Approaches
Two other phenomenal intentionalists have provided similar alternative
views. According to Kriegel’s adverbialism (2011), and Mendelovici’s aspect
view (MS.), intentional contents are not phenomenal types, but second order
properties of intentional properties. On Kriegel’s adverbialism, contents are
taken to be adverbial modifications of intentional states. Where this view
differs from the adverbialism prominent in the writings of theorists such as
Ducasse (1942), and Chisholm (1957), is in its scope, as well as its focus. For
the early adverbialists, the goal was to provide a plausible alternative to
sense data theory, one that eschewed mind-dependent sense data for
adverbial translations of our perceptual talk. Rather than ‘I see red’ meaning
that the speaker is in direct contact with a red sense datum, it means instead
that the speaker perceives redly, or red-wise. On Kriegel’s adverbialism,
however, it is not just perceptual experiences that are adverbially construed,
but all intentionality.

Also, the focus is not on providing adverbial

In his doctoral thesis, A Pure Representationalist Account of the Attitudes,
Steve Pearce develops such a view in far greater detail than I do here.
65
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translations, but on giving an account of being intentionally directed that is
both phenomenally based, and able to cope with various issues arising from
the relation view (see Mendelovici, MS, sec. 8.4.2).66

5.6 Adverbialism and The Aspect View
For Kriegel then, having a thought about a dog is a matter of instantiating an
intentional property, the property of being intentionally directed, that has
certain modifying properties that may be glossed as dog-wise. Again, these
properties of intentional properties are phenomenal properties:

If the

adverbialist construal of contents takes them to be ways intentional
properties are, and phenomenal characters are ways phenomenally
intentional states are, we get a rather nice phenomenal construal of contents.
On one version of Mendelovici’s aspect view (MS), contents also turn out to
be second order properties of intentional properties. Where this version of
her account differs from Kriegel’s is in its understanding of the second order
properties in question. On Mendelovici’s view, the relevant second order
properties are construed more along the lines of the second order properties
of color; namely hue, saturation, etc. (Mendelovici, MS). Of course, the
second order properties in question do much of the same modifying work as
Kriegel’s adverbial properties—i.e. they are ways intentional properties are,
or can be—but, as with the case of hue and saturation, thinking of them in
adverbial terms is not the most natural way to conceive of them. We do not,
for instance, say that red2 has a 2-ly hue.
A final important feature of both Kriegel’s and Mendelovici’s respective
accounts is that the relevant second order properties do not compose—as
66

See Part 1 for some such issues.
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distinct constituents—the intentional properties they modify. While Kriegel
does not argue for it explicitly, adverbial properties are not distinct
constituents of what they modify. Quickly, for instance, does not compose
runnings.

On the other hand, and in keeping with the color analogy,

Mendelovici explicitly says that just as we need not say that properties such
as hue and saturation are distinct components that literally compose the
color properties they modify, so too for second order intentional properties
(Mendelovici, MS, ch. 8). This is important because the whole idea of taking
contents to be second order properties is to avoid giving them “independent
existence” status—and therefore status as things we are related to via
intentionality. Taking the relevant properties to be of the first order would
be to endorse the sense data theory.
To reiterate: On the adverbial/aspect view, intentional contents are second
order phenomenal properties of intentional properties; namely they are
ways for those intentional properties to be rather than distinct constituents
of said properties. This differs from Pitt’s view that we looked at earlier. On
his view, contents are phenomenal types of which particular intentional
episodes are tokens. As we saw, the problem for Pitt’s view was that it had
the rather troublesome consequence that I cannot desire what you fear. This
resulted from the combination of several points. The first was that Pitt’s
account is a non-relational account, and therefore rejects the relational view
of propositional attitudes. The second was that in order to avoid positing
things such as empty believings, Pitt’s account would have to reject the
attitude/content distinction, and say that the attitudes are part of the
content. But since contents are phenomenal types, on Pitt’s view, this would
mean that my desire that it will rain is of a different type than your fear that
it will. And this seemed to imply that my desire and your fear share no
content.
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Does adverbialism or the aspect view fare any better here? Indeed, I think
both do. The reason why I desire what you fear is that our respective
intentional states share some second order properties; namely, rain-wise (as
per Kriegel), or of-rain-ness (as per Mendelovici). Of course, where Kriegel
and Mendelovici stand on rejecting the attitude/content distinction I do not
know. Perhaps one or either would say that the attitudes are the first order
properties that the second order properties modify. My believing it is raining
is a matter of my having a belief state that occurs rain-wise, or that has ofrain-ness.

And just as there are no runnings that are not quick, slow, etc.

runnings, so too are there no beliefs that are not rain-wise, or of-redness, etc.
This seems like a win/win: We need not reject the age old attitude/content
distinction, and we get a non-relational view on which distinct subjects can
be said to share some contentful commonality.
There is, however, a worry that emerges for the views under consideration.
The theorists we are considering take themselves to be espousing
phenomenal intentionality theories—theories that, we might say, tie
intentional content to phenomenal character in an essential way. If we
accept that intentional content is a kind of phenomenal character, there
ought not to be any phenomenal difference without a corresponding
contentful difference. But how it is for me to desire that it rain is quite
different from how it is for me to fear it. That is, there is a phenomenal
difference between the two. But the content, on a view that accepts the
attitude/content distinction is the same. In particular, the second order
properties of rain-wise, or of-rain-ness, seem to be the same in both the case
of desiring that it rain and fearing that it will.
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Of course, the solution here is obvious. The views we are considering ought
to reject the attitude/content distinction.

They ought, that is, to take

propositional attitudes to be contents like any other; namely, second order
properties of intentional properties. In this case, desiring that it will rain is
more accurately understood as being intentionally directed in a desiring,
rain-wise way. And fearing that it will rain is a matter of being intentionally
directed in a fearing, rain-wise way.

5.7 Summary
I began part 2 by suggesting that we explore views on which the intentional
and the phenomenal are closely connected. In particular, I said that I wanted
to examine what I called the moderate identity view. This led me to
phenomenal intentionality theory, and I examined three different theories
that I take to be consistent with this view. I began with Pitt’s typepsychologism, but I concluded that Pitt’s account had some consequences
that I find unpalatable. I then looked at two similar alternative accounts and
argued that the unpalatable consequences of Pitt’s view do not arise for
them, provided some conceptual fine-tuning. What is more, the latter two
views—Kriegel’s adverbialism, and Mendelovici’s aspect view—accord well
with what I called a plausible understanding of phenomenality; namely, that
phenomenality is a modifying feature of mental states. Both adverbialism
and the aspect view take intentional contents to be modifying in this way.
Hereafter, I refer to both Kriegel’s adverbialism and Mendelovici’s aspect
view as versions of modificationism. Modificationism combines the moderate
identity view (call this moderate modificationism) with the thesis that
phenomenal character is a way for a mental state to be—a modification of
that state. Hence, intentional content is a way for a mental state to be—a
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modification of that state.

In the next chapter, I will highlight some

challenges that modificationism faces.
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6. Challenges to Modificationism
In this chapter, I highlight some challenges to modificationism. The goal of
this chapter is not to provide decisive arguments either in favour of or
against modificationism, but rather to see how far it can be pushed, with the
purpose of identifying its weaknesses, in order to see how a sympathizer
might reasonably seek to overcome those weaknesses.
The first family of challenges for modificationism arises from cases where the
intentionality of an experience appears to outstrip its phenomenality. Such
worries generally emerge in discussions of cognitive phenomenology. For
instance, is there anything it is like to think that 2 + 2 = 4?
A second set of concerns surrounds the fact that modificationism is a version
of phenomenal intentionality theory, and phenomenal intentionality
is…well…phenomenal. Assuming that phenomenal intentionalists are agreed
that it is phenomenal intentionality that is, in some sense, the most basic
form of intentionality, the view seems incompatible with the very possibility
of unconscious intentionality. More specifically, phenomenal intentionality
theory, and therefore modificationism, seems unable to accommodate
unconscious, yet seemingly contentful, mental states. Worries here differ
according to the nature of the relevant unconscious states. Standing states
such as the standing belief that the Eiffel Tower is in France pose one set of
difficulties, while states of the early visual processing system pose another.
Concerns also abound about the content of subconscious states—the ones
that, according to some, figure crucially in how we behave.
A third concern that is specific to modificationism has to do with the
compositional structure of thought. In Jackson (1977, pp. 64 – 72), some
serious challenges are lodged against adverbial theories of perception. As a
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form of adverbialism, modificationism would appear vulnerable to these
same challenges.
Finally, there is the rather large concern that the views we are considering
leave us all trapped inside our own heads. Deprived of the relation that was
once thought to constitute intentionality, one might worry that our cognitive
contact with the world—the contact secured by that very relation—has gone
the way of the dodo. In effect, it looks like the present views do not have the
resources to connect us, our minds, our thoughts, etc. to the world of
ordinary objects that we inhabit.
In summary, we have four sets of concerns that need to be addressed:
1) There seem to be cases where the intentionality of some experience
outstrips its phenomenality.
2) Phenomenal intentionality theory (and therefore modificationism)
appears inconsistent with the existence of unconscious, yet contentful,
mental states states.
3) Modificationism seems inconsistent with the idea that thoughts are
structured in a particular way.
4) Modificationism appears unable to deliver cognitive contact.
In the remainder of part 2, I will try to enumerate some options a
sympathizer might have with respect to concerns 1) – 3). 4) Will occupy the
entirety of part 3, so I will not address it here.
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6.1 Cognitive Phenomenology
As mentioned, the concern here is that certain intentional states have an
intentionality that outstrips their phenomenality. In effect, this concern is
about both the existence and the distinctiveness of cognitive phenomenology.
This is a popular topic as of late, garnering an entire anthology (see Bayne &
Montague, 2011). The question is whether there is anything it is like to
undergo prototypically cognitive states such as believing that it will rain, or
wondering what the square root of pi is.
In Pitt (2004, p. 2) an initial—albeit trivial (or so Pitt claims)—argument for
the existence of cognitive phenomenology runs thus:
1) If a mental state is conscious, then it has phenomenal properties.
2) Conscious thoughts are conscious mental states; therefore,
3) Conscious thoughts have phenomenal properties.
The argument looks to be valid, and therefore to argue against it will involve
arguing against its premises. While most will admit that there is often a whatit-is-like-ness that accompanies such states, those

sceptical of a

phenomenality distinctive of cognition typically try to account for this in
terms of sensory phenomenality (see Prinz, 2011). The idea is to deny 1) by
arguing

that

just

because

a

conscious

mental

state

occurs

contemporaneously with certain phenomenal properties does not mean the
latter are properties of the former. I can, for instance, be doing long division
while listening to Mozart, but the phenomenal character of that episode is not
distinctive of long division, but of listening to Mozart. On this view, in other
words, there can be a phenomenal character with cognition, but there is no
phenomenal character of cognition.
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It follows that many of the arguments for cognitive phenomenology focus on
cases where there is a phenomenal difference that cannot be accounted for in
terms of sensory phenomenology. In Galen Strawson’s famous example, two
subjects—one of whom does not speak French—listen to a French news
broadcast (Strawson, 2010, pp. 5 -13). By hypothesis, both have identical
perceptual/sensory experiences; yet their phenomenal experiences differ.
According to Strawson, the difference is a difference in the phenomenality of
understanding, or understanding experience.

Since understanding is

precisely the kind of cognitive state at issue, there must be something it is
like to think. Other such examples include the what-it-is-like of having
something on the tip of one’s tongue, the experience of grasping what ‘dogs
dogs dog dog dogs’ (Horgan & Tienson, 2002, p. 523) means, and of suddenly
remembering what you forgot.
Such examples at least establish a plausible case for the existence of cognitive
phenomenology.

However, something more is required before we can

conclude that a cognitive state’s phenomenality can be sufficient for its
intentionality.

More precisely, what modificationism requires is some

account of how some mental state’s intentional content can be constituted or
individuated by its phenomenal character.
That being said, Strawson’s example might be construed (or suitably
tweaked) to establish as much. Kriegel, for instance, suggests a case where:

“two languages are so similar graphically and phonetically that the very
same passage can express a news report about a faraway war in one of
them, and a children’s bedtime story in the other. We can envisage two
subjects listening to a reading of the passage and each understanding it in
a different language.

Here there would be an overall experiential

99

difference that is best explained by supposing that one subject’s cognitive
experience had one intentional content while the other’s had another
intentional content” (Kriegel, 2011, p. 49).
Pitt, on the other hand, takes a different approach—taking as his starting
point the fact that we can consciously, introspectively and non-inferentially
know about our phenomenal states, and that it is only conscious experiences
that are so knowable. But this is precisely the kind of knowledge we have of
our thoughts, and “it would be impossible to introspectively distinguish
conscious thoughts with respect to their content, if there weren’t something
it is like to think them” (Pitt, 2004):

Normally—that is, barring confusion, inattention, impaired functioning,
and the like—one is able, consciously, introspectively and noninferentially (henceforth, “Immediately”) to do three distinct (but closely
related things): (a) to distinguish one’s occurrent conscious thoughts from
one’s other occurrent conscious mental states; (b) to distinguish one’s
occurent conscious thoughts each from the others; and (c) to identify
each of one’s occurrent conscious thoughts as the thought it is (i.e., as
having the content it does). But…one would not be able to do these
things unless each (type of) occurrent conscious thought had a
phenomenology that is (1) different from that of any other type of
conscious mental state (proprietary), (2) different from any other type of
conscious thought (distinct), and (3) constitutive of its (representational)
content (individuative) (Pitt, 2004, pp. 7-8).
To be sure, this kind of self-knowledge argument is open to several possible
counter-arguments (see for instance Tye & Wright, 2011), some of which are
addressed in (Pitt, 2011). For instance, one might flat out deny that we have
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any such knowledge of our mental states, be they intentional, phenomenal, or
phenomenal intentional.

However, the point here is not to provide an

extended argument in favour of cognitive phenomenology, but to lay out
several options a modificationist might reasonably pursue. Pitt’s view, if
successful, would certainly give the modificationist what she needs.
From Horgan and Graham (2012) and Horgan and Tienson (2002), we find
another possible avenue for securing the kind of cognitive phenomenology
the modificationist needs. According to them, it is the phenomenal character
of thinking that rabbits are furry that makes the content of that thought that
rabbits are furry, rather than that the set of undetached rabbit parts is.
Horgan, Graham and Tienson seem to think it obvious that there is something
it is like to think that rabbits are furry, and that that is quite different from
what it is like to think that the set of undetached rabbit parts is.

If they are

correct, then phenomenality delivers determinate content.
For my part, I too take it that what is at issue between friends and foes of
cognitive phenomenology is not the existence of certain phenomenal features
during episodes of cognition. All sides grant that I can do long division while
enjoying the phenomenal experience of listening to Mozart.
dispute is whether there is a

What is in

purely cognitive phenomenality—

phenomenality that is proper to cognition and not reducible to sensory (or
otherwise) phenomenality, and that may or may not occur simultaneously
with cognition.

Siewert

(2011, pp. 262 - 267) offers a useful way to

understand this point by dividing phenomenality into derived and nonderived. The phenomenality of doing long division while listening to Mozart
is different from doing it while listening to your favourite Punk band. Notice
too that the difference need not just be in the phenomenality of the aural
perceptual experience: it really seems like the phenomenality of the aural
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perceptual experience somehow bleeds through into the task of doing long
division, so that the cognitive exercise of doing long division is coloured by
the former. But this would still not count as cognitive phenomenality proper
because the phenomenality of the cognitive task is derived from that of the
sensory experience.
Siewert uses other examples to try and bring out a kind of non-derivative
cognitive phenomenality, and goes on to argue that this phenomenality is
constitutive of content (2011, pp. 262 - 267). However, even if Siewert is
mistaken and all phenomenality does in fact derive from the sensory, I am
not sure that that constitutes a huge problem. For argument’s sake, let me
grant that all phenomenality is in some way sensory, so that any
phenomenality that accompanies cognition is derived in Siewert’s sense.
Using Siewert’s example of reading with comprehension versus reading
without comprehension, we get a case of phenomenal contrast. There is
something it is like to read with comprehension—something different from
what it is like not to comprehend what you are reading. Let us assume, on
behalf of the foes of cognitive phenomenology, that the specific what it is
likeness of reading with comprehension derives from the sensory
phenomenology that accompanies your internal monologue in which the
words are present. The question is whether the derivative nature of the
phenomenality presents a problem. What modificationism requires is that
the phenomenal character of some cognitive episode can constitute, or in
some way individuate, the intentional content of said episode.
Imagine removing whatever phenomenality arises as a result of your internal
monologue that occurs when you read with comprehension. That is, imagine
that you no longer have any sensory phenomenality arising from your
internal monologue. In such a case it is not unreasonable to think that you

102

also lose comprehension.

Bring the phenomenality of one’s internal

monologue back, and with it comes comprehension.

This suggests that

phenomenality—whether it be derived from the sensory or not—is in some
sense constitutive of reading with comprehension. So even if we accept that
all phenomenality is in some sense sensory—or derived from the sensory—
that does not necessarily pose a serious threat to modificationism. What the
modificationist would require here would be an argument to the effect that
conscious thought is sensory in the relevant sense. Prinz (2007) offers
something like this kind of view.

According to Prinz, all mental

representations are perceptual in nature, and therefore have perceptual
phenomenology

(Prinz,

2007,

p.

348).

Perhaps

this

perceptual

phenomenology derives from one’s internal verbal narrative, or mental
imagery, or some such. What is important is that its being sensory
(perceptual) does not entail that it cannot constitute or individuate the
content of the relevant thought.
In summary, our stated purpose in this section was to investigate whether
modificationism faced some insurmountable challenges stemming from its
seeming reliance on both the existence, and content determining powers, of
cognitive phenomenology. While I admit there is a great deal more work
required here to vindicate modificationism on the cognitive phenomenology
front, I also submit that the challenges modificationism faces here are not
insurmountable. Indeed, there appears to be promising progress here.

6.2 Unconscious Content
If you recall, modificationism is committed to the view that original
intentionality is a kind of phenomenality—that (original) intentional content
is phenomenal. Non-conscious states that have intentional content thus
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stand as immediate counter-examples to modificationism.

It would be

extremely convenient if non-conscious states formed a well-behaved kind
such that they could all be addressed together. Unfortunately they do not.
There are three broad categories of non-conscious states that could pose
challenges for the modificationist: 1) states of the deep sub-conscious, such
as those that might make one want to kill his father and marry his mother; 2)
standing states, such as one’s non-occurrent belief that the Eiffel tower is in
France; 3) sub-doxastic/sub-personal states, such that those of early visual
processing.
In what follows, I list several proposals for handling (some) non-conscious
states (or others). My suggestion will be that given the disparity in kind of
non-conscious states, some combination of the following views is the best
way to handle the cases.
Searle (1992, pp. 155 – 162) argues for what he calls the connection principle.
The view is that non-conscious states have the intentional content they do in
virtue of the phenomenal character they would have were they conscious.
This suggests that the relevant kind of unconscious states are at least
potentially conscious, and that their intentional content can only be
determined relative to their connection to consciousness. In a similar vein,
Mendelovici suggests a kind of dispositionalism about some non-conscious
states. In particular, one’s standing non-occurrent belief that the Eiffel Tower
is in France is simply one’s disposition to occurently believe that the Eiffel
Tower is in France (Mendelovici, MS).
Horgan and Graham (2012, p. 341) offer a position dubbed inferentialism by
Kriegel (2011, p. 194).

The idea here is the intentional content of

subconscious states is derived from:
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“…their role in an overall assignment of contents to actual and potential
states of the cognitive system under which: (i) all phenomenally conscious
states are assigned the content that they inherently possess by virtue of their
intrinsic phenomenal character, and (ii) all other states in the system are
assigned contents in such a way that the overall content-assignment exhibits
and acceptably high degree of internal rational coherence” (Horgan &
Graham, 2012, p. 341).
This view emerges within the framework of arguing that only phenomenal
intentionality (intentionality constituted by phenomenal character) has
determinate content. And it is the determinateness of this phenomenal
intentional content that is supposed to do the work of ensuring that a unique
content is assigned to the non-conscious states.

The idea is that the

determinate phenomenal intentional contents act as a network of “anchor
points” sufficient to infer a unique content to each subconscious state.
Subconscious states derive their content by inference—inference based on
the determinateness of phenomenally intentional states and how the
relevant subconscious states interact with them in the “cognitive architecture
of competent human cognizers” (Horgan & Graham, 2012, p. 341).
Kriegel’s view, interpretivism, is that non-conscious states derive their
intentional content by interpretation (Kriegel, 2011, pp. 200-218). A nonconscious state, S, has the intentional content that P, if the best interpretation
of the cognitive system to which S belongs would assign P to S. Kriegel
credits this view’s starting place to Dennett (Kriegel, 2011, p.201). Indeed,
interpretivism in this sense involves taking the intentional stance towards the
sub-system that constitutes a cognitive system’s non-conscious states.
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Another interesting suggestion from Mendelovici (2010) concerns subpersonal/sub-doxastic states.

Her view is that though such states are not

intentional in the same sense that conscious states are, nothing stands in the
way of attributing them a kind of informational/computational content
(Mendelovici, MS)—call this view informationalism. This content might be
attributed to them according to certain causal co-variational relations they
bear to things in the cognitive system’s environment, or by some other
means. This does not contradict what was discussed back in Part 1. There,
the challenges raised against causal covariational theories were based on the
difficulty of specifying which causal/covariational relation was the one that
determines the content. To repeat, the informationalist holds that there need
not be any determinate fact of the matter about what the informational
content of the relevant state is. States of the early visual processing system
might causally covary with several things in a long causal chain, and the
present proposal is that they can be about one, two, or all of these things
based on what information we are interested in. As Mendelovici suggests,
informationalism has the benefit of “freeing-up” informational content from
certain constraints we place on bonafide intentional content (Mendelovici,
MS). Consider the rings on a tree. The rings on a tree can carry information
about the age of the tree, the chemistry of the atmosphere at a given point in
history, the life cycle of certain boring insects, and so on. The virtue of taking
sub-doxastic/sub-personal states as having this kind of informational
content, is that there need not be any determinate fact of the matter about
what they represent/are about: they can be about one, all, or none of these
things depending on our interests.

On the other hand, phenomenal

intentional content does have this kind of constraint (Mendelovici, MS).
As a reminder, there were three kinds of non-conscious states I mentioned
earlier: 1) states of the deep sub-conscious, such as those that might make
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one want to kill his father and marry his mother (subconscious states
hereafter); 2) standing states, such as one’s non-occurrent belief that the
Eiffel tower is in France; 3) sub-doxastic/sub-personal states, such that those
of early visual processing.

Each poses a prima facie challenge for

modificationism—the view that intentionality is a kind of phenomenality—
since non-conscious states are non-phenomenal. As I said earlier, it would be
very surprising if a single theory of the non-conscious could account for such
disparate kinds of non-conscious states.
Again, my goal here is to see whether modificationism faces any
insurmountable challenges arising from non-conscious states. I have listed
several theoretical options found in the literature, and suggested which ones
are open to the modificationist.

To repeat, I am agnostic about which

approach best accounts for subconscious states of the sort posited by Freud.
As for standing states, I favour dispositionalism for reasons of content
determinacy. I am inclined to attribute a level of determinacy to my standing
non-occurrent states, such as my belief that the Eiffel Tower is in France—a
level of determinacy that that I am not inclined to attribute to subdoxastic/sub-personal states. Dispositionalism helps explain why I have this
inclination. My inclination to attribute determinacy to my non-occurrent
standing belief that the Eiffel Tower is in France arises because that very
non-occurrent belief just is my disposition to have the occurrent belief with
that determinate content.
For

sub-doxastic/sub-personal

states,

I

am

inclined

towards

informationalism. My reason for doing so is that informationalism seems to
be the most compatible with the edicts of cognitive scientific research.
Informationalism holds that there are all sorts of informational states that
are not accessible to consciousness, but are nonetheless contentful. The
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informationalist simply holds that the kind of content such states have is
different in kind from phenomenal intentional content.
Before moving on, I would like to note that every view we examined—the
connection principle, dispositionalism, inferentialism, interpretivism and
informationalism—made the content we attribute to the various nonconscious states somehow derived.

Non-conscious states derive their

content from the occurrent states they are disposed to be (Searle,
Mendelovici), or from an inference based on the determinateness of
phenomenally intentional states and how the relevant subconscious states
interact with them in the cognitive architecture of competent human
cognizers (Horgan et al.), or from the interpretation given them by an ideal
interpreter (Kriegel), or from our interests (Mendelovici). In short, if we
insist that these disparate non-conscious states are intentional, they are all
cases of derived intentionality: they are about what they are about in virtue
of intentional states distinct from themselves.

6.3 Structural Modifications
Finally, a family of problems—originating from Jackson (1977, pp. 63-72)—
emerges for the kind of view we are exploring.

Jackson’s concerns are

directed towards the adverbial theory of perception championed by theorists
such as Chisholm (1957). However, Jackson’s worries would seem to apply
equally to the views we are examining. First, in the case of more complex
adverbial states such as thinking redly-squarely, it is unclear what the
relevant adverbs are modifying. For instance, does redly modify squarely or
vice versa?
Consider Jackson’s example:
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1) He speaks impressively.
2) He speaks impressively quickly.
In 1) ‘impressively’ modifies the speaking, but in 2) it modifies the other
adverb. But in the case of thinking squarely, versus thinking redly squarely,
it is not clear that there is any principled way of determining which adverb
modifies what.
On behalf of the adverbialist, one is tempted to say that neither adverb
modifies the other, but both modify the thinking.

When I think redly

squarely, I am thinking redly and squarely. Compare: When he speaks, he
speaks impressively and quickly. Several issues emerge for this way of
understanding the adverbial properties. First, when I think white-unicorn-ly,
it seems like the ‘white-ly’ is somehow connected to the ‘unicorn-ly’. This is
why I can easily entertain white-unicorn-ly thoughts, as opposed to tree-carly, or table-chair-ly thoughts. But how can the present view—on which the
white-ly and unicorn-ly both modify the thinking—make sense of this?
Second and relatedly, imagine thinking about a white unicorn and a hairy
Bigfoot. On one adverbial construal, we are to understand this as thinking
white-ly and unicorn-ly and hair-ly and bigfoot-ly. But this is precisely how
someone would be thinking were they thinking about a hairy unicorn and a
white Bigfoot. The adverbialist cannot distinguish thinking about a white
unicorn and a hairy Bigfoot from thinking about a hairy unicorn and a white
Bigfoot (Jackson, 1977, p. 64).
What to do? One move is to fall back on the original suggestion that when
one thinks about a white unicorn and a hairy Bigfoot, one is thinking whiteunicorn-ly and hairy-bigfoot-ly.

The problem here is that while it can be
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inferred that I am thinking about unicorns from the fact that I am thinking
about white unicorns, the same does not appear to be true of my whiteunicorn-ly thoughts (Jackson, 1977, pp. 69 – 72). In a similar vein, it seems
that when I think about a white unicorn, and then a grey unicorn, my
thoughts somehow overlap, or have something in common—namely, they are
both about unicorns (Jackson, 1977, p 67). However, the adverbial construal
cannot accommodate this: ‘unicorn’ is no more a part of ‘white-unicorn-ly’
than ‘straw’ is of ‘strawberry’. The problem has to do with the structure of
thought: Something about the structure of the thought licenses the inference
from ‘I am thinking about white unicorns’ to ‘I am thinking about unicorns’.
Likewise, something about the structure of the two thoughts—the one about
white unicorns and the one about grey ones—makes them similar: Each
appears to have ‘unicorn’ as a constituent.
What this comes down to is that modificationism seems unable to
accommodate the fact that our thoughts are structured—being composed of
simpler parts in a systematic way so as to produce a complex whole. In short,
the objection is that modificationism cannot accommodate compositionality.
One move for the modificationist here is to bite the bullet and deny that
thoughts have compositionality, or have it only derivatively. One might, for
instance, argue that though thoughts do not have inherent compositionality,
they somehow manage to derive a kind of pseudo-structure from the
structure of language. The idea here would be that language somehow
contributes to the expressive power of thought so as to imbue thought with
the requisite kind of structure. Prima facie, this seems at odds with the idea
that the intentionality of words derives from that of thoughts, but it need not
be. For instance, I can use sticks and stones to build a complicated machine
whose purpose is to manufacture hammers and nails, with which I can build
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an even more complicated machine whose purpose is to build air
compressors and pneumatic nail guns, and so on. Thoughts (or concepts)
would be the sticks and stones, and language would be like the machine/s.
From fairly rudimentary (non-compositional) elements, I can build a more
complicated (combinatorial) system, which then serves to shape, transform
and empower the rudimentary elements into exponentially more powerful
tools. I think it is an interesting view, and one that a modificationist might
reasonably pursue.
On the other hand, it might be argued that modificationism can indeed
deliver the relevant kind of structure. A sketch of such an argument can be
found in Kriegel (2011, pp. 161-163).

The idea is that perhaps the

determinate/determinable structure might help the adverbialist answer
some of Jackson’s challenges. Very roughly, determinables are general ways
things can be, and determinates are more particular ways things can be.
Many things in the world exhibit this structure. Red is a determinable of
which crimson is a determinate. Maple is a determinable of which Japanese
Maple is a determinate. Stephen Yablo has capitalized on this idea to give an
account of mental causation (Yablo, Thoughts: Philosophical Papers Volume
I, 2008), and answer questions about essence and identity (Yablo, 2010).
With respect to Jackson’s challenges, the first was that in cases such as
thinking redly squarely, it is not clear which adverb modifies the other. This
prompted us to amend the adverbial construal so as to make conspicuous
that the redly and squarely modify the thinking, not each other. But this was
problematic since, in cases like thinking white-ly unicorn-ly, the ‘whitely’
seems to be connected to the ‘unicorn-ly’. Again, this is merely a sketch of a
possible solution, so bear with me. First let us take thinking somehow (being
directed somehow) as the ultimate determinable, of which thinking unicorn-
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ly is a determinate. Thinking unicorn-ly is also a determinable, of which
thinking white-unicorn-ly is a determinate, that is, a particular manner or
way of thinking. Let us also assume a level of bottom up transitivity so that if
C is a determinate, or modifier of B, and B is a determinate/modifier of A,
then C is also a modifier of A, by modifying what modifies A—namely B. With
this rudimentary structure in place, we can answer Jackson’s first challenge:
When I think about white unicorns, I am thinking white-unicorn-ly, which is a
determinate of thinking unicorn-ly, which is itself a determinate of thinking.
The ‘white-ly’ modifies the thinking by modifying the thinking unicorn-ly.
But what about thinking red-squarely; which is the determinate or the
determinable here? That is, in the case of white unicorns, the order of
determinable/determinate is obvious, but it is not so obvious in the red
square case. Perhaps this is true, but this does not seem like a problem
particular to modificationism. One can imagine asking someone to think of a
red square and then asking her what it is she is thinking of in the first place,
the redness or the squareness. Sometimes there will be an answer to this
kind of question, and other times there will not. In cases where there is such
an answer, the present suggestion is that modificationism can appeal to the
determinate/determinable structure to accord with it. I can think of a white
egg, and I can think of painting my walls egg white.

According to

modificationism, in the former case, I am thinking white-egg-ly, and in the
later I am thinking egg-whitely—where the difference is a difference in the
determinate/determinable structure.
The second concern we looked at was that modificationism could not make
sense of the fact that, when we think about white unicorns and hairy
Bigfoots, it is precisely that and not hairy unicorns and white Bigfoots about
which we think.

I suggested that the modificationism could avoid this
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particular concern by understanding the relevant thought as a whiteunicorn-ly and hairy-bigfoot-ly thought. The problem with this move was
that it seemed to block certain intuitive inferences. From the fact that I am
thinking about a white unicorn, it follows that I am thinking about a unicorn.
This is because ‘unicorn’ is a constituent of ‘white unicorn’. But the inference
does not appear to go through for thinking white-unicorn-ly. This is because
‘unicorn’ is not a proper constituent of white-unicorn-ly: the latter is
syntactically simple. Notice, however, that though the fact that I kicked a
strawberry does not entail that I kicked a straw, it does entail that I kicked a
berry (Kriegel, 2011, p. 162). This is because a strawberry is a determinate
of the determinable berry. If we assume that thinking white-unicorn-ly is a
determinate of the determinable unicorn-ly, then the inference that I am
thinking unicorn-ly from the fact that I am thinking white-unicorn-ly seems
go through.
Admittedly, this is only slightly more of a sketch than is found in (Kriegel
2011), but I think it is a promising one. At some level the demand for
compositionality is a demand for structure. To require that thoughts have
compositionality is to demand that they be structured in a particular way, or
perhaps,

that

they

be

capable

determinate/determinable structure

of
is

structure.
different

And

while

the

from compositional

structure, it is still structure—structure that seems helpful in answering
some of the most famous objections to adverbialism (and hence
modificationism).

I think the question of how much work this

determinate/determinable structure can do for the modificationism is both
fascinating and a worthy candidate for another monograph. Stephen Yablo,
for instance, argues that the determinate/determinable structure can help us
get some traction on several important issues, including mental causation
(Yablo, Thoughts: Philosophical Papers Volume I, 2008).
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I conclude part 2 with a summary and look forward. Having expressed some
dissatisfaction with relation views of intentionality (Part 1), I said part 2 was
going to be dedicated to exploring non-relational alternatives. I suggested
that we begin our exploration with views on which the intentional and the
phenomenal are closely connected. In particular, I said that I wanted to
examine what I called the moderate identity view: intentionality is a kind of
phenomenality. This led me to phenomenal intentionality theory, and I
examined three different theories that I took to be consistent with moderate
identity.

Dubbing any account that combines the moderate identity view

with the thesis that phenomenality is a modifying feature of mental states
‘moderate modificationism’, I suggested that moderate modificationism
appears to fit the bill of being a non-relational account of intentionality. That
being said, I explained that several challenges arise for this kind of view,
three of which were the problem of cognitive phenomenology, the problem of
the unconscious, and the challenge that thoughts are structured. I discussed
several options that a modificationist might reasonably pursue in attempting
to meet these challenges, and explained which, if any, I thought the most
promising.

I concluded that the challenges considered are not

insurmountable.

However,

there

remains

a

final

difficulty

for

modificationism, one that was not addressed in part 2—the problem of
cognitive contact. To my mind, it is the most pressing of all concerns, since,
as will be explained, modificationism seems primed to leave us all trapped
inside our own heads. It is to this that I now turn.

Part 3: The Problem of Cognitive Contact

7. Introduction to the Problem
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So far, we have examined some difficulties with the relational view of
intentionality, and have been looking into non-relational alternatives. In
particular, the view we have been examining, modificationism, takes
intentionality to be a species of phenomenality.

On this view, the

phenomenal-intentional content of a phenomenally intentional state is an
intrinsic modifying property of that state. In Part 2, I considered several
purported difficulties with this view, but argued that they could be overcome.
In this final section, I want to address another more serious problem with
phenomenal intentionality theory in general, and modificationism in
particular. The problem is this: it seems like the whole point of having
intentionality is that this phenomenon puts us in cognitive contact with the
world outside our skins. Introspectively our intentional states appear to
accomplish precisely this. But how is this possible on the non-relational
account I have presented?
Put another way: It looks as though, almost by definition, making cognitive
contact with something involves being related to that thing. If the ability to
make cognitive contact with the world is a desideratum on a theory of
intentionality, and if making cognitive contact with something involves being
related to that thing, then it looks as though any view that denies that
intentionality is a relation will, by that very denial, make cognitive contact
impossible. Of course, more will need to be said about what exactly cognitive
contact is supposed to amount to, but it is not difficult to see how cognitive
contact poses a prima facie problem for the views we have been looking at.
Indeed, the problem of cognitive contact would appear to make trouble for
any account that combines the thesis that intentionality is entirely a matter
of phenomenality with the view that phenomenality is an intrinsic, nonrelational phenomenon. This is a hard problem, and one that has not been
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given enough attention within what Kriegel calls the Phenomenal
Intentionality Research Program (2013).67
Perhaps this lack attention is due to the fact that the problem of cognitive
contact is considered to be a problem for perception and perception alone.
After all, it is in perception that our cognitive contact with the world is most
apparent. When I have a perceptual experience as of a Japanese maple in
leaf, my perceptual experience seems to put me in cognitive contact with the
maple. However, the problem of cognitive contact cuts much deeper. When,
for instance, I consider rescuing another dog, it seems as though my thoughts
are connected to flesh and blood dogs.
To put things in a way more consonant with what has so far been said: the
non-relational way one is intentionally directed does not appear to be a good
candidate for securing cognitive contact. So, what to do? Perhaps a good
starting place is to concretize the problem a bit:
1) We are in cognitive contact with the world outside our skins.
2) It looks as though this contact is established by intentionality.
3) Being in cognitive contact with X is, or is partly constituted, or
involves, or consists in, being related to X.
4) By 2) and 3), it looks as though intentionality establishes a relation to
the world outside our skins.
5) Intentionality is not a relation.

The issue is discussed briefly in (Kriegel, 2011) and (Mendelovici, MS).
(Montague, 2013) focuses explicitly on what she call The Access Problem,
which is quite plausibly taken to be the problem of cognitive contact.
However, she seems to assume a relation view of intentionality—though an
internalist one.
67

116

Clearly, we have a quasi-inconsistent set. I call this set “quasi-inconsistent”
because of my use of the ‘looks’ locution in 2) and 4). This is not intended to
leave a theoretical loophole through which a slippery non-relation theorist
might slide. My use of ‘looks’ is merely to indicate that introspection appears
to support these theses. I do not intend to make looks-can-be-deceiving
arguments.
So, we have a list of theses that, when put together, appear to be inconsistent,
since 1), 2) and 3) yield 4), which contradicts 5). Of course, without some
clearly defined notion of cognitive contact—a task that I will turn to
shortly—1) lends less to the inconsistency of the set than it might otherwise
do. However, even with only the murkiest conception of what cognitive
contact is supposed to amount to, it is plain that giving up 1) is a
consequence to be avoided. 2) Is introspectively obvious: If I am somehow in
cognitive contact with, say, the cardinal at the feeder, then it looks as though
what is responsible for this contact is my cardinal-at-the-feeder intentional
episode.

Again, 3) seems almost to follow definitionally from the term

‘contact’. I know of no way of contacting anything without being related to it.
4) Is an implication of the acceptance of 2) and 3). As for 5), most would
reject it, but, of course, my view is precisely that 5) is true. So what to do?
With some careful analysis, I will suggest that the modificationist is not
doomed by the seeming inconsistency. In short, I will suggest that 4) and 5)
can be understood as compatible on a proper understanding of 2).

What is

required here is a clearer picture of 2), such that we can accept that
intentionality makes possible our cognitive contact with the world, but is
itself not the relation that constitutes cognitive contact. More on this in what
follows. For now I want to map out how things will proceed.
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First, I want to spell out exactly what an account of cognitive contact should
address. Next, I will list some plausible points on which we might evaluate
theories of cognitive contact—a set of criteria against which we might judge
the relative merits or demerits of various theories. With these in hand, I will
go on to examine two views about cognitive contact, evaluating each. I will
conclude I will conclude that giving a perfect account of cognitive contact is
not an easy thing to do regardless of one’s theoretical commitments, and that
perhaps all we can hope for respect to cognitive contact is a less than perfect
account. I will then explain what options a modificationist might have to
provide a plausible account of cognitive contact and explain my preference
among these. That being said, I will not claim to have solved the problem of
cognitive contact for modificationism. What I hope to do is to show that
modificationism is not a doomed theory with respect to delivering cognitive
contact, and gesture at how someone might go about working on the problem
within the theoretical confines of modificationism.

7.1 What is Cognitive Contact?
Simply put, cognitive contact is the contact that our intentional mental states
make with certain things. How, for instance, do my intentional mental states
make contact with tables and chairs?68 To be sure, some theories’ account of
cognitive contact will just be their account of intentionality. But on other
prominent theories of intentionality, intentional mental states are about

I will sometimes speak as if it is people who make cognitive contact with
things. In a sense, if a particular thought of mine makes cognitive contact
with the world, then I too have so contacted it. Strictly speaking, the
phenomenon I am after is the contact our intentional mental states make
with the world of ordinary objects, so all talk of our/your/my making
cognitive contact should be understood as shorthand for intentional mental
state talk.
68
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abstract properties, or propositions, so at least some of the cognitive contact
we appear to have with concreta stands in need of accounting.
Again, the problem of cognitive contact might seem to bear a family
resemblance to the problems discussed in Part 1; namely, the problem of
specifying the nature of the relation between intentional states and their
contents, and that of specifying what items serve as contents. While the
problems are certainly related, they are not identical.

The problem of

cognitive contact concerns our mental states’ relation to certain objects
regardless of whether you think that those objects are the contents of
thoughts, or instantiate abstract properties that themselves are the contents
of thoughts, or, by some other relation, produce mind dependent sense data
that

serve

as

contents,

or

whether

you

take

contents

modifications/determinants of representational states, etc.

to

be

We are in

cognitive contact with certain objects regardless of your stance on the
abovementioned views, and that is what any given theory must account for.69
That being said, the problem of cognitive contact and the problem of the
nature of content intersect on some views.70 Direct realists, who take
contents to be ordinary objects, will presumably not need to provide an
additional story about cognitive contact, apart from their story about how
intentional states are related to their contents. On the other hand, our
discussion about the abstract objects views of content does not exempt an
abstract objects theorist from providing some account of cognitive contact.

There are, of course, exceptions. A thoroughgoing metaphysical idealist
will have no problem about cognitive contact since his/her ontology does not
posit ordinary objects to be in contact with.
70 That is, the cognitive contact relation just is the intentional relation on
some views.
69
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7.2 A theory of cognitive contact
I suppose the most ideal theory of cognitive contact would have the mind
somehow extend out in to the world and literally rub itself on the things it
appears to be directed at. Assuming the mind is in some way contained in
the brain, this does not seem possible.
A close second would be if ordinary objects managed to somehow permeate
the skull and, as it were, rub themselves on the mind. As stated, this latter
option may also seem problematic. However, I take it that a more refined
version is precisely what many theories aim for. Direct realists, for instance,
hold that ordinary objects are the constituents of perceptions, and thus that
what goes on in perception is partly constituted by ordinary objects and
states of affairs. Representationalists, who posit abstract objects as contents,
also think the external world manages to imprint itself on the mind.71 This
latter view, however, holds that abstract rather than ordinary objects
manage to do the imprinting. This may seem to be an improvement on the
ordinary objects view: perhaps something about their abstract nature allows
such things to permeate the skull in a way that ordinary objects certainly
cannot. However, without some supplemental story about how the
imprinting of these abstract objects on our minds manages to secure our
cognitive contact, the abstract object view will need to say more about the
notion of cognitive contact I am after.

Again, talk of imprinting on the mind is talk of something over and above
any causal effects the external world has on the mind. With the exception of
some ardent idealists, everyone agrees that the external world causes things
in us. But this causing is not what constitutes cognitive contact, since the
world can cause internal changes in non-cognitive things.
71
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7.2.1 Points of Evaluation
One way to understand the problem of cognitive contact is as a problem
about how we manage to peek outside our heads and access the world
beyond our skins.72 Understanding the problem this way highlights the
closely related issue of what the world beyond our skin is like. That is, being
in cognitive contact with the external world would seem to imply some
understanding of that world: cognitive contact would seem to obtain when
what is going on in the external world and what is going on in the head
somehow line up, fit or are otherwise congruent.

And that requires a

substantial view about what the external world is like. Take, for example, the
view that mental representation is a matter of forming a picture in one’s
mind that resembles the aspects of the external world that are represented.
In this case, cognitive contact would obtain when the mental picture is
sufficiently similar to the external world (or parts thereof). Clearly, this view
assumes a particular view of the external world: It is such that a veridical
mental picture can resemble it.
These are deep issues that concern not only theories of mentality, but also
metaphysical issues surrounding realism and idealism, and I cannot possibly
address everything at issue between realism and idealism on the one hand,
and what various theories say about cognitive contact on the other. The
point here is to highlight that any account of cognitive contact will, either
overtly or by implication, say something about the external world. Hence one
way to evaluate theories of cognitive contact is according to how they
conceive of the external world with which we are in contact.

72

I say ‘peek’ but the kind of contact in question is not strictly visual.
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Closely related, is what a theory of cognitive contact implies about our
knowledge of the external world and the mechanisms that secure it. Ideally,
the kind of cognitive contact we have with the external world should, in some
way, make possible a relatively robust knowledge thereof. That is, it would
be ideal for our theory of cognitive contact to make possible the acquisition
of bonafide knowledge about the items we are in contact with in such a way
as to leave the mechanism whereby we acquire that knowledge transparent,
and clear enough to distinguish bad cases—cases where the failure of this
mechanism explains why we fail to acquire knowledge in certain cases.73
An ideal account should also either accord with, or give some sort of
explanation of, the common-sense view that our cognitive contact with the
external world is immediate and direct. At the very least, it certainly seems
that our cognitive contact with the world is immediate and direct. That being
said, one’s view need not be that of direct realism. It should, however,
explain why direct realism appears to be the unreflective default.
I suppose too that parsimony should be included on our list. My only caveat
here is that this last point should figure lower on the list of ideal criteria—a
final tiebreaker if you will. My reason for this is simply that I think parsimony
is a good explanatory principle, but is not necessarily the gold standard for
ontology (Quine and Ockham notwithstanding).
My guess is that there are a whole host of other criteria and ideal cases we
might add. For instance, we might want to add that an account of cognitive
contact should not appeal to any naturalistically problematic entities or
This last point is really a corollary of the bonafide knowledge requirement.
Knowledge should ideally be distinguishable from apparent knowledge. I
suppose one might be content just knowing that we can have knowledge,
even though we might not know we have it.
73
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relations. We would not, for instance, want to count a theory as being ideal if
it managed to satisfy all other criteria by endorsing divine occasionalism. A
theory that appealed to vital spirits, or the ether, or ghosts, too would be out.
I hesitate, however, to include a naturalism proviso, since, assuming that
entities that exist outside of space and time, such as Platonic universals, are
not natural, this criterion would rule out any view on which such entities
played a role in establishing cognitive contact.

7.3 Summary and a Look Ahead
To reiterate then, our evaluation of how various theories understand
cognitive contact will be according to the following:
1) How the theory understands the external world
2) What the theory says about our knowledge of the external world
3) How the theory accounts for the seeming directness and
immediateness of our cognitive contact
4) A theory’s relative parsimony.
At this point, allow me to recap and reiterate how things are going to
proceed. The problem for modificationism—the view that intentionality is a
kind of phenomenality and that content is a modifying property of
phenomenally intentional states—is that it seems unable to deliver, or even
make sense of, this intuitive notion that we are in cognitive contact with the
world outside our skins. The problem is that it looks like intentionality is
what delivers the relation of cognitive contact, but modificationism denies
that intentionality is a relation. Though a serious problem, I think that the
theoretical confines within which modificationism is bound do not spell
certain doom for the theory, and that modificationism does have some
resources for addressing the problem of cognitive contact. Before
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highlighting these resources, however, I want to examine and evaluate how
other theories go about addressing the problem of cognitive contact. My
methodology for this latter project is, as stated, to see how a given theory
stacks up with respect to the points of evaluation listed above. The point,
again, is not to enumerate and evaluate every possible theory that has
something to say about cognitive contact, but merely to show that the
problem is a difficult one. Given this, I will argue that modificationism may
indeed have some resources for addressing the problem, though it may turn
out that the kind of solution open to the modificationist is, like its rivals, less
than perfect.
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8: Various Accounts of Cognitive Contact

8.1 Taxonomy
In general questions about our cognitive contact with the world outside our
skins are questions about our connections to that world; or, more precisely,
about our mental states’ connection to that world. How are our intentional
states connected to e.g. tables and chairs, such that, for instance, we are able
to successfully navigate our environment? How does our cognitive contact
with the world differ from how introspection seems to have it?
While it is difficult to draw up lines that neatly categorize various views
about our cognitive contact with the world, a good starting place is perhaps
to distinguish between what I shall hereafter call directivist theories and
indirectivist theories. Directivist theories take our cognitive contact with the
world to be direct and unmediated by entities such as sense data,
representations74, percepts, abstract properties, universals, etc. Indirectivist
theories posit something in between our intentional states and the world,
such as sense data, representations or abstract objects/properties; and these
intermediaries play a role in establishing contact between the mind and the
world.

74My

use of ‘representations’ here might be a bit misleading, since not every
one who endorses a representational/intentional theory of mind is an
indirectivist. If, however, representations are things that stand in between
our minds and the external world of tables and chairs, then a proponent of
representations in this sense is an indirectivist.
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Later on, it will be made clear where modificationism fits within this
taxonomy.75 Setting this last point aside, a little disambiguation is in order
here. First, everyone agrees that intentionality appears to connect us directly
to the world of tables and chairs. The directivist/indirectivist divide is thus
not about how things seem to an intentional subject. Nor does holding the
view that we only see e.g. the table by seeing (some of) its properties
necessarily land one in the indirectivist camp because the properties of the
table act as intermediaries between one’s intentional state and the table.76
No, the directivist/indirectivist divide categorizes views according to
whether or not what is going on in one’s mind connects directly to the
everyday things it seems to, or whether it connects to something else that is
connected to these things via some other relation.

8.2 Indirectivism
As said, indirectivists posit intermediary entities between our intentional
mental states and the world of ordinary objects. These intermediaries might
be representations, sense data, intentional objects, percepts, or some other
kind of thing.

Different indirectivist views posit different entities for a

variety of reasons. Some, like sense data, are thought to be required because
of a disparity between how things appear and how they are. Others are
sometimes thought to be required in order to avoid certain complications

That is not to say that the details of any given phenomenal intentionalist
account will not constrain the possibilities here.
76 The view in question here is not one that takes the relevant properties to
be abstract universals, but one that takes the properties to be property
instances. So, one is not an indirectivist simply because one holds the
position that we only see the table by seeing its instantiated properties. One
is an indirectivist if one thinks the table’s properties cause us to represent
abstract properties, of which the table’s properties are instances.
75
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arising from intentional inexistents, and other such puzzles. Below I examine
one such indirectivist account, listing its merits and demerits.
Before doing so, I should explain why I have chosen not to discuss a very
prominent theory that can be understood as an indirectivist theory of
cognitive contact: Frege’s account of sense and reference.

Roughly put,

senses, or cognitive contents on Frege’s view (Frege, 1892/1997), act as
intermediaries between mental states and the world of ordinary objects. On
Frege’s view, the cognitive contact relation is akin to reference, which obtains
between a mental state and an ordinary object by means of the object’s mode
of presentation, or sense (Frege, 1892/1997). So for Frege cognitive contact
is a two-step relation: the first between the mental state and its content
(sense), the second between the sense and its referent (the ordinary object in
the present case. My reason for not examining this view of cognitive contact
is that I have already discussed several challenges for views that take
contents to be senses: if there are challenges to the view that intentionality is
a relation to senses, and if this relation to senses is the first of two steps in
making cognitive contact (reference), then those challenges apply here as
well.

8.2.1 Indirectivism and Sense Data
The sense data theory takes mind dependent concrete objects to be the
immediate objects of experience (Russell, 1912/1997, 1927). Though out of
favour, sense data theories appear to have some advantages. There does not
seem to be a problem about how to specify the relation between intentional
states and their contents since the contents with which the intentional states
are connected are, at least on most sense data views, in direct contact with
them. On the other hand, one might ask how exactly are we to pair sense data
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with the ordinary objects a theory of cognitive contact requires. Perhaps
some sense data theorists are idealists, but many are not. Therefore some
additional story about how we cognitively contact the world of ordinary
objects by first contacting sense data is required. That is, some account is
required about which mind-dependent sense datum is linked to which
external ordinary object, such that when I encounter that object, I have that
sense datum.

That is how a sense data theory would deliver cognitive

contact.
One possibility for specifying which sense datum goes with which object is by
appeal to co-instantiation. Roughly, round sense data go with objects that
have the property of roundness. The challenge here is that sense data
theories came about, in part, because our perceptions seem to involve
properties that everyday objects do not have, such as perspectival properties.
More clearly, sense data theories enjoyed the popularity they did precisely
because they had an answer about how perfectly round coins could appear
elliptical, how after images could be yellow, etc. The answer was that in such
cases, there is indeed something elliptical, or yellow. It is just that the
elliptical or yellow thing is a mind dependent sense datum.

This is

problematic because it seems to preclude the sense data theorist from
appealing to the co-instantiation of properties to secure cognitive contact, as
the things that we perceive indirectly (the external world objects) often do
not, or cannot, instantiate some/all of the properties that the sense data
appear to have.
Presumably, someone keen on sense data could posit some causal relation
between ordinary objects and minds such that under certain circumstances,
encountering object X would cause sense data

SDX

to happen, token, be

instantiated, etc. in the mind of the subject. Whether or not this causal
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relation is problematic will depend on the nature of the sense datum. If a
sense datum is a physical object, then the causal relation does not seem so
mysterious. If, however, sense data are non-physical objects, then the causal
relation inherits the problems associated with dualist interactionism: How do
physical events cause sense data?
However, because sense data are supposed to have the very properties they
appear to, perhaps they are physical objects. After all, assuming sense data
theory to be true, and noting that sense data appear to have shape, color, size,
etc., they must be physical.

Only physical objects have these kinds of

properties. But where, then, are sense data located? Russell (1912; 1927),
for instance, thought they were located in the brain. The problem with that
view is that nothing in the brain is, for instance, blue. On Jackson’s (1977)
view, sense data are precisely where they seem to be, and are indeed caused
by the material objects to which they belong—where belonging to is cashed
out in the following way:
…[A] sense-datum, D, belongs to a material object, M, just if (i) an Mevent causes the having of D, and (ii) that spatial properties of D are
functionally dependent on those of M as a consequences of the manner in
which M causes the having of D. (Jackson, 1977, p. 171)
Jackson also endorses the view that sense data can be three-dimensional
(1977, pp. 102-103), which, according to Jackson, provides an answer to
Ryle’s challenge that “round plates, however steeply tilted, do not usually
look elliptical” (Jackson, 1977, p. 103). According to Jackson:

“[T]he three-dimensionalist has an extra dimension in which to resolve
this dilemma. The sense-datum belonging to the round plate held at an
angle is round at an angle.” (Jackson, 1977, p. 104)
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Novel though Jackson’s account of sense-data is, one wonders what
additional benefit there is to calling the posited entities ‘sense data’ rather
than properties. They belong to objects, are (or can be) three dimensional,
have causal influence on our sense organs, and, like the ordinary objects to
which they belong, can appear round at an angle.
Jackson’s idiosyncratic view aside, sense data are often thought to be nonphysical—or at least to exist in a phenomenal domain, rather than a physical
one—mind-dependent entities that we are directly aware of when we
perceive.

This being the case, the question that emerges is how sense data

theory might deliver cognitive contact. Our points of evaluation were:
1) How the theory understands the external world
2) What the theory says about our knowledge of the external world
3) How the theory accounts for the seeming directness and
immediateness of our cognitive contact
4) A theory’s relative parsimony.
If sense data exist outside the physical realm, and the ordinary objects that
we think populate the external world exist in the physical realm, then it is not
entirely clear whether sense data theory has much to say about the external
world. Epistemically, sense data theory also faces some serious challenges:
our perceptually based beliefs are most plausibly taken to be about ordinary
everyday objects and states of affairs. But if perceptions are the justification
for such beliefs, and our perceptions are always perceptions of sense data,
then we seem to lack proper justification for believing anything about the
ordinary objects our beliefs appear to be about—other than, of course, that
said objects have, or in some way produce, the relevant sense data. Perhaps
this complaint demands too much of sense data theory. The complaint, after
all, seems to demand that the theory give us a justification for judgments
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about the things in themselves as it were. On the other hand, the complaint
might be taken as merely stating that according to common sense, our
perceptually based beliefs are about ordinary objects, not sense data. So,
sense data theory owes us an account of why things seem this way.
Moreover, to someone not already committed to sense data, it is unclear how
positing them would help a theory of cognitive contact. While sense data are
concrete particulars on most sense data theories, it is not clear how these
mind dependent concreta manage to connect us with the world of ordinary
objects. This is especially true if, as is commonly held, sense data are not
physical objects, and therefore have properties of a non-physical nature.

8.3 Directivist Theories
I turn now to directivism. Perhaps the most widely known directivist view is
direct realism—of which disjunctivism is one prominent species e.g. (Martin
1997, 2004). However, some versions of adverbialism might also qualify as
directivist depending on how the adverbial modifications are construed. In
any case, what makes a theory directivist is that it posits no entities that
mediate between our intentional states and the world of ordinary objects.
The relation between our intentional states and the world is, in this sense,
direct.
Though direct realism and disjunctivism are theories of perception, I think
the issues that arise in the theory of perception are equally applicable to a
much broader range of our intentional mental lives. If, for instance, there is a
debate about whether your ice-cream perceptions manage to make direct
cognitive contact with the ice cream in front of you, then surely the same
question could be asked about your desire for said ice cream.
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In general, direct realist theories posit a single relation between our
intentional states and the world. When I perceive a chair, I do not indirectly
perceive it via a sense datum, representation, or set of abstract properties;
the chair itself is actually a constituent of my chair-perception. On a very
simple direct realist view, the real world, mind-independent chair is a
constituent of my chair-thoughts. Cognitive contact is thus automatically
established, as the things with which we are in cognitive contact serve as
constituents of the very things that are supposed to do the contacting,
namely thoughts, desires, perceptions etc. This kind of view appears to
accord with how we (unreflectively) think about our cognitive relationship
with our environment. Unreflectively, it really does seem as though when I
visually perceive the chair, I am in direct contact with it.

8.3.1 Directivist Disjunctivism
In a way, directivist disjunctivist theories—views that claim our veridical
thoughts are of a different kind than our non-veridical ones—are a natural
progression of direct realism. Because direct realism takes actual wood-andnail chairs to be constituents of our chair-thoughts, some radically different
account of our unicorn-thoughts is required: no flesh-and-blood unicorn was
ever a constituent of anything. So, concludes the disjunctivist, hallucinations,
illusions, and thoughts about non-existent/impossible objects are not the
same kind of thing as veridical thoughts. On such a view, when a subject
reports that s/he is currently having a mental episode as of seeing a table, we
are to understand this report as saying either that s/he is perceiving a table
or that s/he is in some way hallucinating—where the disjuncts name entirely
different kinds of mental events/episodes. The report should thus not be
taken as indicating that some common mental core is present in both
veridical perceptions and hallucinations. For disjunctivists, then, the problem
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of cognitive contact involves combining direct realism with some plausible
story about how subjectively indistinguishable hallucinations differ from
veridical thoughts, perceptions, etc. in such a way as to allow that veridical
thoughts connect us to the world, but hallucinations, illusions, etc. do not. As
a subset of direct realists, disjunctivists claim that the ordinary objects we
appear to be in contact with (e.g. tables and chairs) are constituents of our
perceptions.

The problem is thus to say how this can be so, when a

subjectively identical hallucination appears to put us in contact with
precisely the same things.
Before evaluating how well disjunctivism fares with respect to delivering
cognitive contact, some theoretical preliminaries are in order.

As I

understand them, disjunctivists do not deny the possibility of subjectively
indistinguishable experiences—one veridical, one hallucinatory.

“The disjunctive account of perception really says that there are two quite
different sorts of oasis experience, which may none the less be
indistinguishable to their owner” (Dancy, 2009).

“…it is simply mistaken to suppose that there need be anything more in
common across veridical perceptions and delusive experience, other than
the fact that all of these states of mind may be indistinguishable for the
subject who has them” (Martin, 2009).
What disjunctivists deny is that two subjectively indistinguishable
experiences—one veridical, one hallucinatory—are the same kind of mental
event.

That is, the disjunctivist is not, if the above passages are any

indication, denying that a subject may hallucinate a lemon such that, from the
subject’s point of view, the hallucination is indistinguishable from a veridical
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case. The disjunctivist claims that, indistinguishable though the two cases
seem to be from the subject’s point of view, the two cases are not the same
type of mental event.
There is something very commonsensical about direct realism, and to my
mind, disjunctivism is a very natural progression of the view. If you think
that the table in front of you is a constituent of your perception, so that your
perception is partly the perception it is because of the real wood-and-nail
table, then it follows pretty straightforwardly that a hallucination of a table
cannot be the same sort of mental event, since there is no table to make that
mental event a perception of a table.
That being said, disjunctivism is often criticised on the grounds that it lacks a
satisfactory explanation about what happens in the case of hallucination or
illusion. To repeat, disjunctivism is the view that perceiving a lemon, and
having a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination as of a lemon, are two
distinct kinds of mental events. The former is the perception it is (and a
perception at all) because of the presence of an actual lemon. The latter is
something else entirely. As Mark Johnson puts it:

The Disjunctive View has nothing satisfactory to say in answer to the
pressing question: What kinds of things can visual experience be a
relation to so that in a transition from a case of visual hallucination to a
case of seeing there need be no difference which the subject can discern?
(Johnson, 2009, p. 216)
While there are numerous arguments in the literature, both for and against
disjunctivism, my concern is not so much with the viability of the view as a
theory of perception, but as a possible explanation of cognitive contact.
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Moreover, what I will have to say is not meant to be devastating to
disjunctivism. Rather, what I want to show is that disjunctivism does not
have a perfect theory of cognitive contact. My strategy, unlike most critics, is
not to press the disjunctivist about what happens in the bad (hallucinatory)
cases, but to focus instead on the good (veridical) ones.

8.3.2 A Worry About Subjective Availability
Take some veridical experience such as that of seeing a table. Remaining
neutral on what exactly the contents of such an experience are,77 we may ask
what exactly is available to the experiencing subject. Intuitively, what is
available to the subject are the table and its features: its shape, color, size etc.
Now, imagine a subjectively indistinguishable hallucination.

To repeat,

disjunctivists do not deny that one might have such a subjectively
indistinguishable experience. Again, we may ask what is available to the
subject here. Presumably what is available to the subject is precisely the
same as in the case of veridically perceiving the table.

But, claims the

disjunctivist, the two experiences are of a different kind: one involves the
table, the other, obviously, does not. Let us assume that the term ‘involves’ in
the previous sentence denotes cognitive contact, so that in the veridical case,
cognitive contact with the table obtains. The question that emerges is: What
about the good case secures the cognitive contact?
According to Byrne and Logue, disjunctivists hold that “…the good case and
the (hallucinatory) bad case share no mental core” (Byrne & Logue, 2009, p.
x). This, combined with the comments from Dancy and Martin above, yields
the following line of reasoning:
Remaining neutral, that is, on the question of the ontology of the contents
i.e. abstract objects, sense data, ordinary objects and their properties, etc.
77
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1) One can have a hallucination as of a table that is subjectively
indistinguishable from a veridical perception (of a table)—i.e. what is
available to the subject is the same in both cases.
2) The hallucination and the veridical perception share no mental core.
3) What is available to the subject is not part of the mental core in either
case.
To be sure, a lot will depend on what exactly this notion of a mental core
amounts to. However, I think it is fairly natural to understand some mental
state’s mental core as being something like its identity conditions. If this is
right, then disjunctivism seems to divorce what is subjectively available from
the identity conditions of the relevant mental states. In other words, one
should be able to specify that perceiving the table is the kind of thing it is—
namely, a mental state that makes cognitive contact with the table—without
mention of what is available to the subject of that state. What is subjectively
available is not a factor in establishing cognitive contact with the table.
Why exactly is this problematic? Consider your visual experience of the table
in front of you. Does it not seem as though what is subjectively available to
you—how the table and its features seem to you—will figure in an account of
the cognitive contact you have with the table?

Say, for instance, that the

table is rectangular and brown, and it also seems to you in a subjectively
available way that the table is such. I am not alone in finding it highly
implausible that what is subjectively available to you—how the table
seems—plays little role in the cognitive contact you have with the table:

One is in causal, sensory, and indeed visual contact with a garden shed,
but when one looks at it one has—due to a disorder in one’s visual
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system, or a distortion of the atmosphere in which light-waves that would
have reached one from the shed do reach one, but profoundly
rearranged—an experience of a pink elephant. In this case, too, one can
locate and track the shed, in spite [of] one’s inaccurate conception of it.
Does one see the shed? My intuition is that one does not, because one’s
apprehension…of it is simply too inaccurate. …[C]ontact with an object, in
the present sense, is not enough…to guarantee that one sees it, that one
is in…contact with it… (Montague, 2013)
For Montague then, cognitive contact with an object requires what is
subjectively available to play an important role in the relation. What is
subjectively available must have some degree of congruence with an object in
order for the subject to be in cognitive contact with it—what is subjectively
available does some work in making cognitive contact. And the worry I am
raising for the disjunctivist is that it is unclear whether s/he can
accommodate this fact.
I want to stress that the worry I am raising here is not just an appeal to
internalism. I am not arguing that disjunctivism is wrong because it cannot
accommodate certain internalist principles.

The worry about subjective

availability is consistent with a broadly externalist view. In the present
context, an externalist view would be that what is subjectively available is
not sufficient to determine what item the subject is in cognitive contact with.
What is required by externalism is that the subject’s relation to her
environment be partly determinative of what, if anything, the subject is in
contact with. When Ed, the earthling, and Ted, his twin earth counterpart,
are staring at a glass of H20 and XYZ respectively, what is subjectively
available to them (which is indistinguishable) is insufficient to determine
that Ed is staring at water, and Ted at twin water. As the story goes, Ed is
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staring at water because of the relation he bears to the glass of water in front
of him, likewise for Ted and twin water. What externalism claims here is that
the identity conditions of Ed and Ted’s respective perceptions are not
exhausted by what is subjectively available to them, the identity conditions
also include the relevant relations they bear to the things in their
environment. In short, externalism does not eschew what is subjectively
available from the “mental core” of a perception; rather, it says that the
mental core consists of more that just what is subjectively available—namely
the actual relations the subjects bear to the things in their environments.
Disjunctivism on the other hand does seem to exclude what is subjectively
available from the mental core.
Let us consider how disjunctivism fares with respect to the points of
evaluation listed above. The points on which I suggested we might evaluate a
theory of cognitive contact were:
5) How the theory understands the external world
6) What the theory says about our knowledge of the external world
7) How the theory accounts for the seeming directness and
immediateness of our cognitive contact
8) A theory’s relative parsimony.
As a species of direct realism, disjunctivism would seem to understand the
external world as being populated by mind independent objects that are the
kinds of things that can be directly perceived.

Tables and chairs are

members of this population and are presumably, according to direct realism,
as we perceive them; though it is unclear whether the disjunctivist can help
themselves to this latter claim, given that the notion of ‘as we perceive them’
seems tied to what is subjectively available.
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One might expect a direct realist theory to be among the best contenders for
delivering the kind of robust epistemology that one might hope for from a
theory of cognitive contact: what better for securing knowledge of the
external world of ordinary objects than an account that connects us directly
to those objects.

The worry here is closely related to the problem of

subjective availability. If what is available from the subject’s point of view is
not involved in establishing cognitive contact, and what is available from the
subject’s point of view are things such as color, shape, texture, etc., then it is
unclear how the latter could deliver the kind of robust knowledge it seems
well positioned to deliver.
Setting aside these kinds of concerns, there is little doubt that disjunctivism
can easily account for the seeming directness of our cognitive contact with
the world: it is not just a seeming; the contact really is direct. Disjunctivism
also surpasses the indirectivist in its explanatory parsimony.

Without

intermediary entities in the cognitive contact relation, the disjunctivist need
not provide some extra account of how the contents of our intentional states
map on to the world of ordinary objects: ordinary objects just are the
contents.

On the other hand, without some plausible account of what

happens in the bad cases, that makes intelligible the claim that such cases are
of a different kind than the good cases, this parsimony may not confer much
of an advantage.

8.4 Tallying Up the Points
What I have tried to do in this chapter is to show that cognitive contact is a
difficult problem for both directivists and indirectivists alike. Neither of the
views we considered had a perfect theory of how we manage to make
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cognitive contact with the world of ordinary objects, and I am inclined to
think that this is due not so much to the shortcomings of the respective
theories, but to the recalcitrance of the problem. I chose to look at the two
views I did because they serve as exemplars of the two approaches to
addressing the problem—directivism and indirectivism.

In general,

directivism appears to best accord with the common sense view, but
disjunctivism in particular, appears not to afford the mind much of a role to
play in establishing cognitive contact. Sense data theory, on the other hand,
appears to have the opposite problem: the mind and its objects, sense data,
appear cut off from the world of ordinary objects. All in all, the point of this
survey was not to refute any particular theory, but rather to show that a
perfect account of how our minds make contact with the world is perhaps too
much to hope for. We should thus accept that what we can have with respect
to cognitive contact is a less than ideal account.

Given more modest

aspirations for a theory of cognitive contact, I think the options I will provide
below will be seen to fare as well as their rivals.
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9 Modificationism and the Challenge of Cognitive Contact
As mentioned above, modificationism is the combination of the moderate
identity view—intentionality is a kind of phenomenality—with the view that
phenomenal character is a way for a mental state to be—a modification of
that state. While modificationism appears not to make a claim about
cognitive contact, some analysis ought to at least constrain the view’s
possibilities. It is precisely these possibilities that will be the focus of this
final chapter. To reiterate, we began with a set of sentences that appear
inconsistent:
1) We are in cognitive contact with the world outside our skins.
2) It looks as though this contact is established by intentionality.
3) Being in cognitive contact with X is, or is partly constituted, or
involves, or consists in, being related to X.
4) By 2) and 3), it looks as though intentionality establishes a relation to
the world outside our skins.
5) Intentionality is not a relation
As I mentioned earlier, the task for the modificationist is to explain how a
non-relational phenomenon such as intentionality can in some way establish
a relation like cognitive contact. In what follows, I would like to sketch
several possible ways a modificationist might address this challenge.

9.1 Two Kinds of Intentionality:
One avenue a modificationist might explore in the pursuit of cognitive
contact is to endorse two kinds of intentionality. In (Horgan, Tienson, &
Graham, 2004), a view is sketched according to which there are two kinds of
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intentionality: phenomenal and externalistic.

As is the case with

modificationism, “[p]henomenal intentionality is narrow: it is not
constitutively dependent upon anything outside the head of the experiencing
subject. Indeed it is not constitutively dependent on anything outside of
phenomenal consciousness itself” (Horgan, Tienson, & Graham, 2004, p. 299).
On the other hand, there is a kind of intentionality, externalistic
intentionality, which does depend on things in the phenomenal subject’s
environment.
For the modificationist, this might seem a rather big concession:
modificationism is a view according to which intentionality is a kind of
phenomenality.

Since phenomenality is not constitutively dependent on

anything outside the experiencing subject (i.e. it is narrow), allowing a kind
of externalistic intentionality seems to give up the thesis that intentionality is
a kind of phenomenality.
However, I think the modificationist has a plausible reply here. First, this
notion of externalistic intentionality might be construed as something like
reference. The modificationist might therefore argue that there is content on
the one hand, and reference on the other, and that phenomenal intentionality
concerns the former, but that cognitive contact concerns both. The idea,
according to Horgan et al, is as follows:

“Suppose that you have an occurrent thought that you could express
linguistically by “That picture is hanging crooked,” where the singular
thought-constituent expressible linguistically by ‘that picture’ purports to
refer to a picture on the wall directly in front of you. This thought-content
involves certain phenomenally constituted presuppositions, which we call
grounding presuppositions, that must be satisfied in order for…the

142

thought to refer: roughly, there must be an object at a certain location
relative to oneself …, this object must be a picture, and there must not be
any other picture in that location that is an equally eligible potential
referent of ‘that picture’. If these grounding presuppositions are satisfied
by some specific concrete particular, then your singular thought
constituent refers to that very object.

Which object your thought-

constituent refers to, if any, thus depends jointly upon two factors, one
phenomenally constituted and one externalistic: on one hand, the
phenomenally constituted grounding presuppositions, and on the other
hand, the unique actual object in your ambient environment that satisfies
those presuppositions. ” (Horgan, Tienson, & Graham, 2004, p. 305)
In

terms

more

consonant

with

modificationism:

The

grounding

presuppositions are part of the phenomenal intentional content of one’s
crooked picture thought, and one’s crooked picture thought makes cognitive
contact with the picture when the picture satisfies this content. Of course
something more is needed here, since my twin earth phenomenal duplicate
will,

ipso

facto,

enjoy

type-identical

phenomenally

constituted

presuppositions. And since there is a twin picture on this twin earth, what is
it about my and my twin’s respective thoughts that ensures that I am in
cognitive contact with this picture, and he with that picture? This is where
allowing some externalistic elements to figure in the relation of cognitive
contact is helpful. It is facts about the actual picture in my environment and
my relation to it that ensure my cognitive contact with this picture, likewise
for my twin.
According to Horgan et al, many thoughts have two kinds of truth conditions,
wide and narrow. The narrow truth conditions for the thought ‘that picture
is crooked’ are those you share with your twin earth and brain-in-a-vat
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counterparts: “there is a unique object x, located directly in front of me and
visible by me, such that x is a picture and x is hanging crooked (relative to my
visual/kinesthetic up/down axis)” (Horgan, Tienson, & Graham, 2004, p.
313). The wide truth conditions for this same thought have as constituents,
the actual satisfiers of the thought. Since your crooked-picture thought and
your twin earth duplicates have different actual satisfiers, your respective
thoughts have different wide truth conditions.
Recall that our inconsistent set of sentences were:
1) We are in cognitive contact with the world outside our skins.
2) It looks as though this contact is established by intentionality.
3) Being in cognitive contact with X is, or is partly constituted, or
involves, or consists in, being related to X.
4) By 2) and 3), it looks as though intentionality establishes a relation to
the world outside our skins.
5) Intentionality is not a relation.
The kind of two-factor approach advocated by Horgan et al might be co-opted
by the modificationist as a means of reconciling the seeming inconsistency.
The modificationist intent on this kind of account would presumably argue
that cognitive contact is not solely established by phenomenal intentionality
(as per 2), but by phenomenal intentionality + externalistic factors (call this
2a).

Phenomenal intentionality sets conditions that externalistically

determined referents then satisfy. Or to put things another way, cognitive
contact is the relation that obtains when both narrow and wide truth
conditions are satisfied. In short, cognitive contact is established partly by
narrow phenomenal intentionality—its narrow phenomenally constituted
presuppositions and truth conditions—and partly by the wide truth
conditions.

Modificationism is a story about the former, which, when
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combined with a suitable account of wide truth conditions and reference, can
provide a plausible account of cognitive contact.

9.2 Descriptive Space, and Phenomenal Flitting
As a reminder, modificationism holds that my red-table intentional episode
consists in my being intentionally directed in a red, table-esque way. This
kind of view bears some similarity to the adverbial theory of perception, as
advocated by theorists such as Chisholm (1957). Adverbialists held that
intentional experiences are not, as the sense data view claims, relations to
contents, but instead modifications of the intentional experiencing subject.
Where the sense data theorist invokes red, round sense data to explain our
tomato experiences, the adverbialist contends that we are experiencing redly,
and roundly. Rather than being independently exiting things (properties,
sense data, etc.), the adverbialist takes redness and roundness to name the
way a subject is intentionally experiencing. Adverbialism does not make a
direct claim about how experiencing redly might make cognitive contact with
the tomato, but there are options.
One avenue a modificationist might take is to provide some story about how
representing redly, roundly, etc. might, in some cases, determine a kind of
descriptive space sufficient to establish cognitive contact. On such a view,
when I represent redly and roundly, my intentional state sets conditions—i.e.
determines a descriptive space—that may or may not be satisfied/fit by
objects in my environment. Here too, modificationism shares some similarity
to another theory from the recent history of philosophy, namely
descriptivism. And given that there are well known challenges to descriptivist
views of content, if the modificationist is to avail herself of descriptivism in
her account of cognitive contact, these will have to be addressed.
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First however, more will need to be said about the kind of determination
invoked in the phrase ‘determine a kind of descriptive space’. Moreover, the
notion of descriptive space—especially to someone who has been at pains to
argue that intentional contents are phenomenal modifications—stands in
need of explanation: e.g. What exactly is this descriptive space; is it a kind of
content; what is its relation to intentional content; is it relational,
propositional, similar to reference, sense, extension, intension etc.; is it, as
per indirectivism, something in between our intentional states and ordinary
objects?
To begin with, I want to try to clarify how intentional content can
“determine” a descriptive space.

Several theorists, (Kriegel, 2011.

Mendelovici, MS. Searle, 1983), have noted that just from how things are for
me when I undergo some intentional experience, I have a pretty good idea
about how the world would have to be in order for my intentional experience
to be accurate, true, satisfied, etc. Of course, I do not mean to imply that any
given intentional experience is sufficiently detailed so as to specify the state
of the entire world at any given moment.

But then again, intentional

experiences do not typically purport to be about the entire world. When I
think to myself that this was a long winter, when I see my azaleas in full
bloom, when I desire another rescue dog, I have a pretty good idea how the
world would have to be in order for these experiences to be satisfied: the
world would have to be just like how my thoughts have it. Moreover, it is not
immediately obvious that I need look any further than how things are for me
from the skin in to determine how the world would have to be. If, for
instance, Descartes’ evil demon were to somehow take a mental snapshot of
what is going on inside me, he would know precisely how to arrange the
world for me to be veridically encountering it.
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If we call how the world would have to be in order for my intentional
episodes to be satisfied the descriptive space determined by an intentional
experience, then this notion of intentional episodes determining a descriptive
space becomes clearer. How things are for me, intentionally, determines how
the world would have to be in order for my intentional states to be satisfied.
Or, to put things in a way more consonant with the spatial metaphor, how
things are for me determines a descriptive space into which the world may
more or less fit.
Again, this approach bears some similarity to the descriptivist theories
championed by authors such as Frege, Russell and later Searle. As developed
in

(Frege,

1892/1997),

(Russell,

1905/2008)

and

(Searle,

1958),

descriptivism is a theory about proper names and how they function:
Descriptivists hold that in addition to their reference, proper names also
have a meaning, sense or descriptive content, and that it is in virtue of this
that they refer. Searle, for instance, contends that a name refers by being
associated with a cluster of descriptions, a vague, unspecified number of
which are true of the thing referred to (Searle, 1958).
Though modificationism is a theory about the nature of intentionality and
phenomenality, not language, the current solution to the problem of cognitive
contact we are examining on behalf of the modificationist is one that avails
itself of the notion of a descriptive space. What I have in mind by ‘descriptive
space’ is similar to what I take Searle to have in mind with his cluster theory.
For Searle, a proper name refers by being associated with a cluster of
descriptions that the referent satisfies; for the modificationist, intentional
episodes make cognitive contact by determining a descriptive space into
which the world (or objects therein) more or less fit.
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But how exactly does this descriptive space arise?

How does content

determine a descriptive space? Consider the following example: The last
time I spoke with my sister, our conversation went from the usual greetings,
to my thesis, to my brother-in-law’s most recent fishing exploits, to the
puppy my wife and I recently got, to my sister’s kids, etc. As is always the
case when speaking with my sister—whose many qualities include ranking
among the world’s best moms—she asked certain questions that lead me to
believe she was fishing for a sense of how my wife and I were coping with the
stress of writing, and for any clue as to how she might help alleviate some of
it. Besides appreciating my sister’s concern, the sense that she was fishing
for such insights led me to ask about any recent fishing adventures her
husband might have had. At sometime during my realization that my sister
was fishing for insight into my stress level, there was a brief, phenomenal
presence of my sister’s husband—owing no doubt to my thinking that my
sister was fishing for insight—that flitted across my mind and led me to ask
about her husband’s fishing. When my sister began asking about our new
puppy, there were several moments that the thought of her kids flitted
through my mind. In particular, for whatever reason, I remember clearly the
look of awestruck wonder on her son Felix’s face when he was presented his
first toy wheelbarrow so he could help his uncle garden. Perhaps this is why,
when I asked about her kids, I asked whether Felix has been helping my Dad
do the gardening. Again, I assume the most plausible explanation here is that
my sister was asking about the closest thing my wife and I have to kids, our
dogs, and that led me to think about her kids, Felix and Charlotte. What I am
trying to convey is that such phenomenal flittings contribute in an important
way to the determination of the descriptive space.
Another feature of the descriptive space is its fluidity: It is not some rigid set
of descriptions, finite and exhaustively expressible in language. It is under
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frequent modification by the phenomenal flittings that serve to determine it.
Horgan, Tienson and Graham make similar remarks about narrow content
and the grounding presuppositions that figure therein:

“…[N]arrow truth conditions…are not compactly formulable linguistically
in a way that can neatly be plugged into the right side of statements of
the form “Statement ‘S’ is true iff…” [T]he background presuppositions
figuring in the narrow content of intentional mental states typically
cannot be spelled out in any tractable way, and…these presuppositions
typically are too complex and ramified to be cognitively surveyable…”
(Horgan, Tienson, & Graham, 2004, p. 314).
Several questions/concerns arise here: First, how well do objects need to fit
the descriptive space in order for cognitive contact to obtain? (This concern
has an analogue in the descriptivist/referentialist debate in the philosophy of
language: how many of the descriptions must something satisfy to be the
referent?) Second, though originally about proper names, Kripkean-type
objections can be adapted to apply here as well. One of Kripke’s original
insights was that someone could refer to Gödel by ‘Gödel’, even though none
of the referrer’s descriptions of Gödel are true of him (Kripke, 1972). Hence
description cannot be the mechanism that secures reference.
The same might be said of the modificationist’s descriptive space. There
might be cases where, a) though some object does not fit the descriptive
space determined by a subject’s phenomenal intentional content, we are
nevertheless inclined to attribute cognitive contact between the subject and
object, and b) where some object fits the descriptive space, but is not
something the subject is in cognitive contact with. Examples of a) include
imposter cases. Imagine one’s wife is replaced with a cleverly disguised
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robot. Though the imposter robot will fit some of the descriptive space—the
part that involves superficial surface features (e.g. hair color)—it will not fit
other parts. The phenomenal flittings that often occur when interacting with
one’s spouse—including flittings of emotion, past events, etc.—will
undoubtedly contribute to the determination of a descriptive space into
which the imposter will not fit.

The point is that, were one to have lunch

with the imposter robot, there is a pretty clear sense in which one is in
cognitive contact with the imposter despite it not fitting the descriptive
space.

Examples of b) might include cases of type identical, twin earth

artefacts: It could be argued that both the pencil in your hand, and its twin
earth counterpart, fit the descriptive space that secures the cognitive contact
between you and the pencil. But surely you are not in cognitive contact with
the twin-pencil.
Let us first address a): How might a modificationist address the imposter
objection? To repeat, the objection is that there are reasons to think that
when having lunch with a robot that is cleverly disguised as one’s wife, one is
in cognitive contact with the robot. This runs counter to the modificationist’s
claim that the mechanism by which cognitive contact obtains is fit: objects fit
the descriptive space determined by phenomenal intentional content
(including phenomenal flittings). Since the descriptive space determined in
this instance would include flittings of emotion, past events, etc., and since
the robot does not satisfy these flittings (your emotions are not robotdirected, your wedding did not involve the robot), the robot does not fit the
descriptive space. But, the objection continues, one is in cognitive contact
with the robot.

Ergo, cognitive contact is not, or not just, a matter of

descriptive space.
In response, the modificationist might simply deny that one is in cognitive
contact with the robot.

The robot does not fit the descriptive space,
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therefore, incredible though it undoubtedly seems, one is not in cognitive
contact with the robot with which one is having lunch. Less incredibly, the
modificationist might contend that the contact one has with the imposter is
degenerate, or somehow divided.

The idea here would be that the

descriptive space determined during your lunch with the imposter is
partially satisfied by the robot, but also partially satisfied by your actual wife.
That being the case, there is something amiss, cognitively speaking, about the
contact one has with the robot. The robot fits certain superficial surface
features involved in the descriptive space, but fails to fit other elements such
as those determined by flittings of emotion and past events. In my view this
is just the kind of response one would want in this situation: the contact you
have to the thing you are having lunch with is imperfect: You take yourself to
be having lunch with your wife, but are instead having lunch with something
that satisfies some descriptions of your wife, but not others.
With respect to b), the modificationist also has a couple of possible
responses. To repeat, the objection was that a pencil on twin earth would
equally fit the descriptive space determined during my interaction with the
pencil on my desk. But I am in cognitive contact with the pencil on my desk,
not the type identical pencil that exists in a different world. Therefore, the
fitting of a descriptive space cannot be the mechanism that establishes
cognitive contact.

Again, the modificationist might simply argue that,

implausible though it seems, cognitive contact can indeed be a trans-world
relation. Notice too that the modificationist cannot avail herself of the kind of
emotional, or past experiential, flittings that are involved in the cognitive
contact one has with one’s spouse. Odd fetishes notwithstanding, we do not
form those kinds of bonds with pencils.

An interesting avenue that a

modificationist might pursue here is the token reflexive indexical account
proffered by Searle’s theory of intentionality (Searle, 1983, pp. 218-225). In
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some cases, phenomenal intentional content determines a descriptive space
that includes a token reflexive indexical component. In our pencil case, this
component can be glossed as ‘the cause of this very phenomenal intentional
episode’. When undergoing a phenomenal intentional episode as of the
pencil, the descriptive space determined, includes the component ‘the cause
of this very phenomenal intentional episode’. Since the twin pencil does not
fit that part of the descriptive space, one is not in cognitive contact with the
twin pencil.
But there is a lurking worry here. The modificationist is committed to
intentionality being a kind of phenomenality, and being non-relational.
Phenomenal intentional content is a way for an intentional state to be. The
solution (that we are now considering) to the problem that such a position
engenders—namely, the problem of cognitive contact with the external
world—is that phenomenal intentional content (including phenomenal
flittings) determines a descriptive space into which objects in the external
world more or less fit. This led us to the present objection that some twinworld artefacts will fit the descriptive space determined by some
phenomenal intentional contents. So by the theory’s own lights, we are in
cognitive contact with twin-world artefacts.

The current proposal for

answering this objection is to invoke, as part of the descriptive space, a selfreflexive indexical component that, in the present example, is something like
‘is the cause of this very phenomenal intentional episode’. But how can a
theory that has been at pains to eschew relations such as causation from
being constitutive of intentionality (see Part 1) appeal to that very relation to
get out of twin-world hot water (or XYZ as it were)? In other words, isn’t the
modificationist helping herself to something she cannot have?
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To answer this concern on behalf of the modificationist, let me start by saying
that I do not think any modificationist denies that the world outside our skins
can, and regularly does, have a causal impact on us, and that often the
effect—by complicated psycho-physical processes—of this impact is the
production of phenomenal intentional content. What the modificationist
denies is that this content is constitutively dependent on the causal relation.
It is contingently true that pencils often cause pencil-esque phenomenal
intentional episodes, but such an episode could occur in a brain-in-a-vat, and
the modificationist is committed to the view that the latter is every bit as
pencil-esque as the former.

What makes it the kind of phenomenal

intentional episode it is is not that it is pencil-caused (though it may have
been), but that it has certain phenomenal features that we can gloss as
‘pencil-esque’ (again, what this actually comes to for the modificationist was
addressed in part 2). Now, consider how the modificationist would account
for having a phenomenal intentional episode as of kicking. Presumably, she
would say that what it is to have a kicking-thought is to be intentionally
directed in a kicking-wise way. Does this, much to the modificationist’s
chagrin, commit the modificationist to a relational view? In tamer language:
Kicking is a relation. A subject can represent kicking. Does that mean the
representation is relational?
To come back to b)—the objection that twin-world objects fit worldly
descriptive spaces—I do not think it is straightforwardly inconsistent for the
modificationist to contend that, in the case of the pencil, the reason why the
twin-earthly pencil does not fit the descriptive space is that part of the
descriptive space determined includes a token-reflexive component. This
kind of view might also help the modificationist account for the following
kind of brain-in-a-vat (henceforth, BIV) scenario: Your BIV duplicate’s
phenomenal intentional contents will determine a descriptive space into
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which no pencil fits. This is because his descriptive space will include a token
reflexive component that may be glossed as ‘the pencil causing this very
pencil-esque intentional episode’, and nothing fits that space. I find this kind
of view promising, but my guess is trying to spell out the phenomenal
intentional content in a coherent way will be challenging. Again, the situation
is this: Your current phenomenal intentional episode as of the pencil needs to
be explicated such that it is clear how it might determine a descriptive space
that guarantees your cognitive contact with the pencil, and not its twin-earth
counterpart, and also makes clear how your BIV duplicate’s similar
phenomenal intentional episode does not make cognitive contact with either
object. The modificationist story here is that your current pencil episode has
certain phenomeno-intentional properties that may be glossed as: yellowpencil-causing-this-very-experience-esque.

That is, you are intentionally

directed in a yellow-pencil-causing-this-very-experience-esque sort of way.
On the one hand, these kinds of translations always come across as clumsy
and contrived. On the other hand, it really does seem like many phenomenal
intentional episodes—especially perceptual ones—are token-reflexive in this
way.
Coming back to the question of how well something needs to fit the
descriptive space in order for cognitive contact to obtain, I want again to
draw an analogy from the philosophy of language. According to Searle, the
criteria for applying a proper name are loose, and unspecified, rather than
rigid (Searle, 1958, p. 172). By this, I take him to mean that the descriptions
some object must satisfy in order to be the referent of a proper name is a
loose set with an unspecified number. Likewise for the descriptive space and
the object that fits it. In her account of how exactly we access (perceive/think
about) external objects, Michelle Montague expresses a similar view:
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“We achieve access to a material object via perception by correctly
representing enough of that object’s properties.

It is difficult if not

impossible to give a principle for determining when there is enough
matching for perceptual contact” (Montague, 2013, p. 46).
Again, the problem of specifying how well an object must fit the descriptive
space may be partly due to the fluid nature of the descriptive space itself. On
the modificationist line we are examining, the descriptive space is being
frequently modified, adjusted, and revised. The thing about phenomenal
flittings is that they flit—making their contribution to the descriptive space
before giving way to other flittings, which subsequently modify the
descriptive space too. When I think of my Pyrenees, Sibyll, on one occasion,
and then on another, the chances are that some of the phenomenal flittings
that occur on each occasion will be different. Sometimes the thought of how
parental she is with our cat flits through my mind. Other times, it is the
maddening frequency with which she insists on rolling in mud (she’s our only
white dog).
Before moving on, a brief summary of this descriptive space view and how it
addresses the problem of cognitive contact will be helpful. According to the
present line, phenomenal intentional content, which includes phenomenal
flittings, determines a descriptive space—a way-the-world-would-have-tobe. Cognitive contact is achieved when ordinary objects fit, more or less, into
the space. How well an object must fit the descriptive space—i.e. how much
of the descriptive space must be satisfied by the object—is difficult to say.
This may be due, in part, to the fluid and changing nature of the descriptive
space.
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Recall our inconsistent set of sentences:
1) We are in cognitive contact with the world outside our skins.
2) It looks as though this contact is established by intentionality.
3) Being in cognitive contact with X is, or is partly constituted, or
involves, or consists in, being related to X.
4) By 2) and 3), it looks as though intentionality establishes a relation to
the world outside our skins.
5) Intentionality is not a relation
The descriptive space view attempts to address the inconsistency by
accounting for intentionality in such a way that intentionality is responsible
for establishing cognitive contact, without thereby being a relation itself.
Phenomenal intentional content determines a descriptive space into which
items in the external world fit (more or less). In this sense, the present line
understands 2) as saying that phenomenal intentionality establishes the
conditions that make cognitive contact possible (assuming the world
cooperates) by determining this descriptive space.

9.3 Descriptive Space, Directivism and the Externalism Issue
Recall that one of the points by which we evaluated theories was how the
theories account for the seeming directness and immediateness of our
cognitive contact with the world. This raises the question of whether the
descriptive space view is directivist or indirectivist. In other words, does the
descriptive space stand in between phenomenally intentional mental
phenomena and the world of ordinary objects, and in so doing, make the view
indirectivist?

Though I take it that advocates of something like the
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descriptive space view would opt for directivism, it is worth examining
whether the descriptive space view and directivism are really consistent.
Let us start with an analogy.

A grocery list, though lacking original

intentionality, seems to determine something like a descriptive space, that
items in the grocery store more or less fit. The question is whether the
descriptive space determined by the list somehow stands in between the list
and the items that would satisfy it, such that a theory of grocery contact that
assumes this kind of fit mechanism is necessarily indirectivist. To my mind,
there is nothing problematic about endorsing this descriptive space view
about grocery lists while maintaining directivism about grocery contact;
likewise for the descriptive space view of phenomenal intentionality.
That being said, the grocery list analogy can serve to highlight what is
undoubtedly the descriptive space view’s weakest point. While we have no
trouble understanding how a grocery list can fully determine a descriptive
space, nor precisely what would fit that space, the same is not true of
phenomenal intentional content. Though the descriptive space is fluid, and
under constant modification, and several theorists recognize that the answer
as to how well something needs to fit the descriptive space in order for
cognitive contact to obtain is going to have to be vague and unspecified, and
probably not something exhaustively expressible in language, this kind of
view is unlikely to win any converts. As a phenomenal intentionalist cousin
of descriptivism, the descriptive space view’s chief opponents will likewise
be related to descriptivism’s chief opponents—namely externalists of one
stripe or another. And just as the externalist who opposes descriptivism
presses the descriptivist to provide some cogent account of how many
descriptions a potential referent must satisfy in order for reference to obtain,
so too will the externalist who opposes modificationism press the
modificationist for an answer about how well something must fit the
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descriptive space in order for cognitive contact to obtain. Consider Kriegel’s
scant treatment of the issue:
“One way to think of this is that intentionality provides truth conditions, or
accuracy conditions, which then may or may not be satisfied, depending on
the world’s cooperation. When the conditions are satisfied, cognitive contact
with the world will have been established. The role of intentionality is only
to make such contact possible by laying the conditions whose satisfaction
would constitute the establishment of contact. …I conclude that when the
connection-to-the-world requirement is properly understood, there is reason
to expect adverbialism to meet it.” (Kriegel, 2011, p. 166)
Assuming the point of view of an objector, we might ask what exactly counts
as satisfaction here. That is, how many of the abovementioned conditions
must be satisfied for cognitive contact to obtain? Though I am sympathetic
towards this kind of descriptive space view, I recognize that solving the
problem of cognitive contact is not as simple and straightforward as the
cursory treatment of the issue by the phenomenal intentionalist community
would suggest: a great deal more work is required here. Moreover, given the
shortcomings of many past attempts to ground our contact with the world in
sensory terms alone, it is clear that phenomenal intentionality theory in
general, and modificationism in particular, ought to take the problem of
cognitive contact, and the resources available to address it, seriously. What I
have tried to show is that modificationism is not necessarily doomed with
respect to cognitive contact, but again, more work is required.

9.4 Taking Stock
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So far, we have considered two possible ways a modificationist might go
about addressing the problem of cognitive contact. The first was that there
are two kinds of phenomena involved in the cognitive contact relation:
phenomenal intentionality, and wide intentionality. The second was the
descriptive space view. Though not solutions to the problem of cognitive
contact, each can be seen as a starting place for addressing the problem. Let
us now briefly examine how these views stack up with respect to our points
of evaluation, i.e.:
1) How the theory understands the external world
2) What the theory says about our knowledge of the external world
3) How the theory accounts for the seeming directness and
immediateness of our cognitive contact
4) A theory’s relative parsimony.
With respect to 1), the two-factor theory proffered by Horgan et al appears to
be realist in the sense that it understands the external world as populated by
the kinds of things that can satisfy the truth conditions of intentional states.
True thoughts about crooked pictures will make cognitive contact with actual
crooked pictures. Crooked pictures therefore number among the things that
populate the external world.

Likewise, the descriptive space view also

understands in the same way.
Unfortunately, the descriptive space view cannot deliver a robust
epistemology: nothing about the descriptive space guarantees that the
ordinary objects we are in fact in cognitive contact with actually do fit the
descriptive space, nor that we can tell when they do or do not so fit. On the
other hand, because the two-factor theory allows some externalistic elements
to play a role in cognitive contact, it would seem to have an advantage with
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respect to condition 2. Externalism is often admired (or criticised) for its
anti-sceptical (with respect to knowledge of the external world) implications
(see, for instance, (Greco, 2004). Briefly: sceptical arguments often rely on
calling into doubt what is introspectively available to the subject. In other
words, these arguments assume that justification (and therefore the
knowledge it delivers) is an internal matter—concerned only with what is
introspectively accessible. The next step in such arguments is to impugn
what is introspectively accessible, and thereby threaten justification.
However, if it turns out that the justification for some belief depends, in part,
on matters external to what is introspectively accessible to the subject, then
sceptical arguments that seek to impugn what is introspectively accessible do
not necessarily threaten justification, and therefore knowledge. Hence a
theory that allows certain external factors to play a role in establishing
cognitive contact with the world might be better positioned to give an
account of knowledge of that world. To be sure, this scant treatment of the
epistemic implications of the two-factor theory is underdeveloped, and blurs
the distinction between epistemic and semantic externalism/internalism.
However, at the very least, such considerations confer a prima facie
epistemic advantage to the two-factor theory. Both the two-factor theory
and the descriptive space view are directivist, and so accord with the view
that our contact with the world is direct and unmediated by things such as
sense data. Finally, with respect to parsimony, both theories appear equal.
To summarize, modificationism has at least two possible avenues for
pursuing a solution to the problem of cognitive contact. The first is more
theoretically inclusive because of its invocation of some externalist
principles. While some phenomenal intentionalists might be content with
this first option, the second option—the descriptive space view—is a live
option for those phenomenal intentionalists in general, and modificationists
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in particular, determined to provide a non-relational, internalist theory of
intentionality—one that is, as Katalin Farkas says, without compromise
(Farkas, 2008). Again, neither option is meant as a decisive solution to the
problem of cognitive

contact, but are instead sketches of how

modificationists might go about addressing the problem—sketches that I
think are within the theoretical constraints within which modificationists, by
their own lights, must work.

9.5 Two More Possibilities
Before concluding I would like to briefly mention two more approaches to
the problem of cognitive contact that a modificationist might take. The first is
not so much a possible solution to the problem of cognitive contact as a flat
denial that it is a theory of content’s job to provide such a solution. The idea
here is that phenomenal intentionality theory and its subspecies,
modificationism, are theories concerned with psychological content, not
semantic relations such as cognitive contact, reference or truth. In the words
of Jerry Fodor:
“Truth, reference and the rest of the semantic notions aren’t psychological
categories. What they are is: they’re modes of Dasein. I don’t know what
Dasein is, but I’m sure there’s lots of it around, and I’m sure that you and I
and Cincinnati have all got it. What more do you want?” (Fodor, 1981)
Again, I will not belabour this point too much because my focus is on the
possibilities the modificationist has for facing the problem of cognitive
contact, not how she might avoid it.

161

The final avenue down which a modificationist might venture in pursuit of
some way to address the problem of cognitive contact is what I dub
reconstructive realism. Before going briefly into the view, a caveat: The
following is but the barest of sketches—one that I have spent very little time
on, but one that strikes me as extremely interesting. It was suggested to me
that what it is to be an object for us is to be something like the locus of
engagement, or interaction possibilities78.

This view has some intuitive

force: the reason why the thing in my left hand is a pen is because of certain
ways I can engage or interact with it. And for this very reason, the thing in
my left hand cannot be a pen for my dog. It can be a fetch toy, a stick (and
most likely a chew toy to be shredded into inky pieces on my new duvet).
But it cannot be a pen for my dogs. Of course, certain logical snafus are
bound to arise. For instance, if I throw the pen for my dog, then what I throw
and what he fetches are different objects. Perhaps this kind of problem can
be resolved by appeal to overlapping possibilities. The pen can also be such
that I can engage it as a fetch toy for my dog, and so there is some overlap in
how I can engage the pen, and how my dog can. At any rate, we are bidden,
according to this line of thought, to reconstrue the world of ordinary objects
as loci of interaction/engagement possibilities (Bickhard, 2010).
Undoubtedly, this kind of view smacks of idealism: Ordinary objects are not
defined independently of our impressions of them, but are defined instead in
terms of how we might interact with them. Maybe this sounds too far-fetched
to be a metaphysical account of ordinary objects, but consider the
phenomena of invention and discovery. Ancient man needed some way of
transporting heavy things over great distances. One day, someone noticed
that it was easier to move fallen trees by rolling them rather than lifting
them, and all of a sudden circular objects became more than just sections of
78

By Chris Viger in conversation
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fallen trees…they became wheels.

What were loci of engagement

possibilities that included, for instance, fuel for the fire, poles for simple hut
construction, etc. became new things; they became wheels.
Though this is a mere sketch, it might be further fleshed out along similar
lines to the enactive approach to perception developed in (Noë, 2004).
Briefly, Noë’s view is that perception is something we do, not something that
happens to us. “Think of a blind person tap-tapping his or her way around a
cluttered space, perceiving the space by touch, not all at once, but through
time, by skilful probing and movement” (Noë, 2004 p. 1).

The world,

according to Noë, “makes itself available to the perceiver through physical
movement and interaction” (Noë, 2004 p. 1). To see the tree over there is to
see something up which one might climb. “It is to see it, directly, as affording
certain possibilites” (Noë, 2004 p. 106).
To be sure, modificationism and Noë’s enactive model are incompatible in
many other ways. For instance, according to Noë, one implication of the
enactive approach is that we ought to “reject the idea—widespread in both
philosophy and science—that perception is a process in the brain whereby
the perceptual system constructs an internal representation of the world”
(Noë, 2004 p.2). But that need not prevent the modificationist from adopting
certain Noë-esque metaphysical views about the nature of ordinary objects.
The important point is that there is this view of what it is to be an object: To
be an object is to be the loci of interaction possibilities, or, in Noë’s words, to
be such as to afford certain possibilities. And this view might be co-opted by
the modificationist in her account of cognitive contact.
How exactly could reconstructive realism help the modificationist in her
pursuit of some account of cognitive contact? Well, all along, the assumption
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has been that the problem of cognitive contact is a problem about how to
account for what’s going on in the mind of a cognizer such that what is going
on there manages to reach out into the world and make contact with things.
But on the present view, our focus ought to be on how we conceive of, and
account for, the things we take ourselves to be in contact with, such that they
can be possible candidates for cognitive contact.

In slightly more earthy

language: The present line contends that the problem of cognitive contact is
not a problem about how we fix the mind such that it can contact the world,
but about how we conceive of the world such that it is the kind of thing that
could be in contact with the mind. And indeed, how you might go about
engaging/interacting with something seems, at least prima facie, to be the
kind of thing for which one’s phenomenal intentional experiences could play
a central role. Perhaps reconstructive realism could even be combined with
the descriptive space view such that what it is to determine a descriptive
space is to determine a space of interaction possibilities. Again, I realize this
is extremely underdeveloped and exceedingly vague, but for the
modificationist, it might be worth pursuing.
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9.6 Conclusion
The central goal of this project was to examine what I find to be an
interesting family of views that fall under the common head of phenomenal
intentionality theory. More specifically, I wanted to examine the strengths
and weaknesses of a particular species of phenomenal intentionality theory
advocated by theorists such as Kriegel (2011) and Mendelovici (2010). This
species of theory, which I called modificationism, rejects the view that
intentionality is a relation, but is instead one kind of another pervasive
mental phenomenon, phenomenality.
Before examining the strengths and weaknesses of modificationism, I
examined what motivations might lead someone to reject the relational view
of intentionality. I looked at what are undoubtedly the most popular answers
to two questions:
1) What sorts of things does intentionality relate us to?
2) What kind of relation is intentionality?
Though certainly not an exhaustive vetting of all relational views, I think the
concerns I raised—which have been voiced throughout the philosophical
community for some time—made it easier to understand why a
modificationist might look for non-relational alternatives to the relation view
of intentionality.
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Next I examined three views within the phenomenal intentionalist camp—
focusing in on two similar views, and distinguishing them as modificationist.
I explained the elements of modificationism, and went on to address some
concerns that arise for phenomenal intentionalism in general and
modificationism in particular. I noted several different attempts to address
these concerns in the phenomenal intentionality literature, and suggested
that some promising progress has been made.
I then moved on to what I take to be a rather large concern for
modificationism—one that I have heard described as the elephant in the
phenomenal intentionalist room: the problem of cognitive contact. After
explaining what the problem is, and why it emerges as particularly vexing
given the theoretical constraints of modificationism, I went on to examine
two theories that served as exemplars for two different approaches to
cognitive contact. The theories were sense data theory and disjunctivism,
and their respective approaches were what I called indirectivism and
directivism, respectively.

From my examination of directivism and

indirectivism, I concluded that a perfect theory of cognitive contact is hard to
come by, and therefore that we might have to settle for a less than perfect
account of how we manage to get outside our heads. Keeping these more
modest expectations in mind, I went on to examine the options a
modificationist might have to address the problem of cognitive contact.
Though in need of a great deal more theorizing, I suggested two avenues
down which a modificationist might pursue a solution to the problem of
cognitive contact. My conclusion was that modificationism is not necessarily
doomed with respect to providing a solution to the problem of cognitive
contact.
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In summary, my aspirations were modest: I wanted to investigate what I
took to be an interesting theory, highlight some of its central motivations,
and examine its strengths and weaknesses—the most problematic of which is
modificationism’s seeming inability to account for our cognitive contact with
the world outside our skins. Whether or not phenomenal intentionality
theory, and modificationism, can deliver a viable account of cognitive contact
remains to be seen. All the same, I hope this project serves, at the very least
to draw attention to the problem; and, at best, gives hope that a solution to
the problem of cognitive contact, even an uncompromising one, might be
possible.
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